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General introduction 
 
A defining feature of developing countries is their structural handicaps to growth. 
Households, firms and governments frequently lack the capability to enhance their welfare 
and escape from poverty, contribute to economic activity and pursue good policies. Given the 
limited ability of many of these countries to raise domestic resources through taxation, 
external finance is essential to support a multi-year public investment program aimed at 
developing public capital in infrastructure, health, and education. Some industrialized 
countries agreed that a massive inflow of resources from the North was needed to stimulated 
more rapid economic development and eradicate widespread poverty in the South. This claim 
for more external capital flows is based on the proposition that there is a positive relationship 
between the volume of capital inflows and the rate of economic growth. They argue that 
substantial inflow of financial resources is needed to generate sufficient savings and 
investment to accelerate economic growth which will ultimately free these less developed 
countries from poverty. Thus, in the name of development, governments, aid agencies, and 
citizens from industrialized countries have often transfer capital flows to those countries to 
help them follow a sustainable growth and finance their development. The most external 
financial resources for development included foreign aid, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
workers' remittances. 
Does aid promote economic growth? Official foreign aid is a major source of revenue for 
developing countries. The macroeconomic impact of foreign aid has long been a hotly 
contested subject. Foreign aid’s impact on growth in developing countries is arguably the 
most contested topic and also the most important given its implications for poverty reduction. 
The extent to which foreign aid can be a decisive factor in the economic development of low-
income countries remains controversial. Some experts charge that aid has enlarged 
government bureaucracies, perpetuated bad governments, enriched the elite in poor countries, 
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or just been wasted. Others argue that although aid has sometimes failed, it has supported 
poverty reduction and growth in some countries and prevented worse performance in others. 
In contrast to this stream, another stand of studies argues that the impact of aid is conditional. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002) argue that aid effectiveness 
depends on sound economic policies and good institutions, while Guillaumont and Chauvet 
(2001) have shown that a major factor conditioning aid effectiveness in recipient countries is 
the economic vulnerability they face. Thus, the welfare gain from aid should be mainly 
related to its stabilization impact. 
Hope and frustration which surround foreign aid generate an important literature. Some see it 
as essentially damaging, others see aid as a crucial means to realize development outcomes 
and support sustained growth in the poorest countries, while others argue for a total reform of 
the aid system due its historical under-performance. Infusions of aid to developing countries 
have been recommended as a means of escaping the poverty trap, and promoting development 
(Sachs et al., 2004; Sachs 2005a, 2005b). However, doubts about aid effectiveness are 
sustained by the weak performance of recipient countries (Easterly, 2007a, 2007b; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008). 
Today, foreign aid is under additional pressure as many developed countries' governments 
implement stringent austerity programmes in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 
2008/09. Nevertheless, new initiatives have been developed by emerging donors and private 
philanthropists, and emphasize the contribution of private flows like FDI or remittances. 
These flows follow different patterns; foreign aid which have been the major external flows 
for some developing countries, is under severe pressure as donors seek to cut budgets and 
change the focus of aid debate towards stimulating the private sector (Nelson, 2009). At the 
same time workers' remittances have tremendously increased since two decades; recorded 
remittances in 2012 were nearly as large as foreign direct investment. 
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Figure 1 shows that while ODA stagnated in recent years with aid resources durably lower 
than international commitments, FDI and remittances have exploded since the late 1990s. 
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Fig1. Evolution of net ODA (red), Remittances (blue) and FDI (green)  1980 - 2008, USD constants 
 
Determinants of Foreign direct investment 
An investment is classified as FDI when the investor acquires a lasting management interest 
in the company invested in, normally defined as “10 percent or more of voting stock.”  
In 2011 there was a net inflow of FDI to developing countries of $300 billion – equivalent to 
1.3% of their GDP. According to UNCTAD, net FDI inflows were equivalent to 1.6% of low-
income country GDP in 2011. However, a significant proportion of these flows represent 
reinvested earnings from existing investments. According to UNCTAD, this was over $200 
billion of the inflows total in 2011. 
FDI can be seen as the response to a need of internalization of transaction costs in order to 
improve profitability (Banga, 2003). Brewer (1991), Kim & Park (2013) and Subbarao (2008) 
emphasize that the level of human capital in the host country is among other a strong 
determinant of FDI inflow. Indeed the high level of human capital makes easy the 
development of existing technologies and the increase of capital productivity. As stated by De 
Mooij, Ruud & Ederven (2003), fiscal policy is also relevant while one want to attract FDI. 
Aware that higher taxes discourage FDI, governments have tried, with varying degrees of 
success to direct or incentivize FDI to different areas. The issue of taxes directly leads to the 
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concern of institutions. Several empirical studies reveal the importance of institutions through 
FDI behavior models ( Asiedu, 2006; Banga, 2003; Busse, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004). More 
recently Caetano & Galego (2009) and Ramirez (2010) emphasize that better institutions 
(political stability, low level of corruption, less bureaucracy) attract more FDI. 
According to Nunnenkamp (2002), globalization has changed the rules of the game. In fact, 
while traditional market-related determinants are still dominants factors, some new evidences 
emerge. Thus, natural resources endowment, human capital, fiscal policy, and institutions 
have gained importance. In this vein, the literature related to FDI hold that FDI inflow depend 
of a lot of factors among which one can quote the rate of return, internalization of cost, human 
capital, taxes, the availability of natural resources and institutions. Furthermore, in some 
countries a significant share of FDI is linked to foreign aid. For example, 64 percent of South 
Korea’s aid is tied, 45 percent of Greece’s aid, and 23 percent of the United States’ aid is tied.  
Majority of aid from emerging countries, especially China, India, and Venezuela, is combined 
with special trade arrangements and commercial investments (Walz and Ramachandran, 
2011).  
 
The macroeconomic determinants of remittances 
 
International remittances defined as the money sent back by migrant workers living abroad 
constitute one of the most important aspects of the current economic globalization. These 
flows result from the fact that more than 215 million people or 3 percent of the world 
population, live outside their countries of birth (United Nations Statistics Division). 
Remittance inflows to developing countries have tremendously increased since two decades. 
According to the World Bank (2011), in 2010, worldwide remittance flows are estimated to 
have exceeded $440 billion. From that amount, developing countries received $325 billion 
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(7% of this amount is received by the low-income countries and 93% by the middle income 
group), which represents an increase of 6 percent from the 2009 level. The true size, including 
unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is believed to be significantly larger. 
Recorded remittances in 2009 were nearly three times the amount of official aid and almost as 
large as foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries. 
The empirical literature on the macroeconomic determinants of remittance inflows has 
provided clear results on specific factors explaining remittance inflows. The first variable that 
is recognized to explain significantly the level of remittances that a country receives is the 
level and the composition of the stock of migrants. Countries that export a large number of 
emigrants receive on average more remittances than the others (Freund and Spatafora, 2008; 
Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; Frankel, 2011). The composition of the migrant stock also 
matters. Indeed, two recent papers have confirmed the result that low skilled migrants remit 
more than the others (Faini, 2007; Adams, 2009). The second significant determinant of 
remittance inflows is the financial costs associated with remitting money. Freund and 
Spatafora (2008) showed that high transaction costs charged by Money Transfer Agencies 
(MTA) significantly reduce the amount of remittances received. 
The third determinant of remittances recognized in the recent macroeconomic empirical 
literature is the occurrence of natural disasters. The existing cross country studies showed that 
remittances increase significantly in the aftermath of natural disasters (Yang, 2008; 
Mohapatra et al., 2009; David, 2010). 
Taking an optimistic view, remittances contribute to the development of recipient countries 
by relieving households’ financial constraints through their positive effect on financial 
development (Gupta et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2011), by protecting them against natural 
disaster shocks (Yang, 2008; Mohapatra et al., 2009; David, 2010), and by reducing 
macroeconomic volatility (IMF, 2005; Bugamelli and Paternò, 2011; Chami, Hakura and 
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Montiel, 2009; Craigwell et al., 2010). It has also been shown that remittances have a positive 
effect on country sovereign ratings (Avendano et al., 2011) and reduce the probability of 
current account reversals (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2009) what contributes to build and 
reinforce the credibility and the attractiveness of the receiving countries in the views of the 
international investors. 
The existing macroeconomic literature on the consequences of remittances is a mix of good 
news (remittances increase household welfare) and beware news (the effects beyond the 
households are sometimes frightening). Indeed, evidences show that remittances can 
contribute to increase the level of real effective exchange rate and hence, deteriorate the 
external competitiveness of the receiving economies. Several papers using a cross country 
approach with panel data have shown that remittance inflows lead to exchange rate 
appreciations (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Acosta, Baerg and Mandelman, 2009; 
Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman, 2009; Barajas et al., 2009). Chami et al. (2003) and Chami et 
al. (2005) emphasized that remittances could lead to a moral hazard problem on the receiving 
household side by reducing the labor supply and increasing leisure. This implies that 
remittances do not always have positive effects on economic growth.  
 
Complementarity and substitutability between foreign aid, FDI and remittances 
To summarize, foreign aid is mainly oriented to support the government budget and finance 
investments in human capital (Kosack and Tobin, 2006), Remittances are sending directly to 
households, while FDI is a private sector decision and relatively more connected to physical 
capital. Therefore, they enter our picture in ways quite different. Primarily, FDI is simply 
capital. FDI may increase growth indirectly, through creation of new fixed capital and 
positive externalities (Kosack and Tobin, 2006). Contrary to FDI, Aid and remittances share 
more common determinant factors such as income per capita in receiving countries, and are 
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geared to some extent toward similar development goals, for instance improving well-being in 
recipient countries (LeGoff and Kpodar, 2011). 
If Foreign Aid, FDI and Remittances are the main external sources of development finance, 
the policy coherence between these flows in promoting growth and contribution to the 
development process has very recently been addressed in empirical work. This question 
usually refers to the complementarity or substitution between these capital flows, purposely in 
this important period in which the developed economies are facing a public finance crisis. 
Indeed, a decline in aid over the next five years should be considered and undermines the 
strategy of scaling up Aid for achieving the MDGs. The natural inclination then, is to search 
for how more can be obtained from the limited amount available. The research will therefore 
consider a dynamic in which analyze the complementarity or substitutability between aid and 
the other two external sources of financing for development. 
The empirical studies interested by the complementarity and the substitutability between 
different sources of external capital flows (Aid, FDI, Remittances) only focused on two of 
them each time: Aid and FDI or Aid and Remittances. 
 
The first studies on FDI and Aid saw aid as a contribution to investments that will enable the 
economic takeoff of the countries concerned (Thorbecke, 2000; Kanbur, 2003). Nevertheless, 
recent developments opposed the two flows and gradually weakened this theory, even if, there 
seems to be a consensus on a positive effect of aid on FDI channelled into financing 
infrastructure. However, this effect is conditional to the policy environment (Karakaplan et 
al., 2005) and it is sometimes limited to a relationship between ODA and FDI from the same 
partner (Kimura and Todo, 2010). 
Some studies about remittances have the common belief that remittances would complement 
aid in fostering growth and reducing poverty. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe 
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remittances could actually lead to lower aid flows, as a country becomes less dependent on 
external assistance (LeGoff and Kpodar, 2011). With fiscal challenges faced by donors' 
countries, many of them are unable to meet aid commitments and may be tempted to reduce 
aid to high-remittance recipient countries and use the savings to increase aid to low-
remittance recipient countries. Remittances could also be positively associated with aid 
because by enhancing the home country's absorption capacity—the lack of which has been 
often pointed out as a bottleneck to aid scaling up—remittances can in fact lead to an increase 
in aid.  
Uncertainty in government revenues and income distribution 
Bulırˇ and Hamann (2003) show that aid flows are highly volatile; their volatility is even 
higher than the government’s domestic budget revenues. Moreover, they show that the 
volatility of aid flows is higher the more aid-dependent countries are. Next, they find that aid 
falls during periods in which domestic revenues of governments also fall and that the 
volatility of domestic revenues coincides with the volatility of aid flows. Lensink and 
Morrissey (2000) find that uncertainty in aid receipts may affect fiscal behavior that in turn 
may influence growth. The reasons for aid flows being uncertain may be either explicit donor 
country policies or actions, or external shocks. In either case, aid uncertainty may have an 
adverse impact on government expenditures, and in particular on public investment. A 
reduction of public investment may in turn lead to lower private investment, and ultimately 
also to lower economic growth. 
The distribution of income between countries will therefore also lead to stabilize incomes for 
the different actors of economic activity: Government (foreign aid), private sector (FDI) and 
households (remittances). This will likely improve their contributions to growth. 
Complementarity between the external capital flows will therefore be illustrated by the 
stability of income distribution in economic activity and thus have a direct impact on 
General Introduction 
17 
 
economic growth. In addition, it will also affect the impact of these flows on economic 
conditions of countries and therefore the effectiveness of these flows to promote growth. 
 
Absorption capacity and leverage effects 
Leverage effect is an important issue in empirical studies. If the leverage effect of aid on 
remittances is a priori unlikely (Guillaumont, 2011), the relationship between aid and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has been more extensively studied in the literature and suggests 
several possibilities of leverage. The idea is that sector aid should finance large infrastructures 
that cannot be finance by the private sector alone. 
Selaya and Sunesen (2012) suggested that aid may raise the marginal productivity of capital 
by financing complementary inputs, such as public infrastructure projects and human capital 
investment, but on the other hand should crowd out productive investment. The expected 
positive leverage effect through infrastructure only happens in case of good governance and 
financial market development (Karakaplan, 2005). Foreign aid also mitigates risk faced by 
FDI in the receiving countries, which includes the violation on contractual agreements, 
changes in laws and regulations (Asiedu et al., 2009). 
The relationship between aid and remittances received less empirical evidence. LeGoff and 
Kpodar (2011) explained that when remittances are mostly invested in human and physical 
capital rather than consumed, they are likely to improve macroeconomic performance and 
access to health and education. Then remittances improve absorption capacity through human 
capital accumulation, which would reduce barriers to aid effectiveness. 
 
The broad subject of this thesis is whether foreign aid and the other ECF are effective in 
promoting development. Despite the voluminous literature on the relationship between DF 
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flows and growth in recipients' economies, many points not studied or newly explored by the 
existing literature have constituted the starting points of the essays provided in this thesis. 
 
1. The debate over the effectiveness of ECF has given rise to an important literature. Turning 
to the empirical evidence on aid effectiveness, detailed literature reviews are readily available 
(Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Riddell, 2007; Temple, 2010; Arndt et al. 2010). However, even for 
the studies on FDI and the more recent literature on remittances, empirical analyses reach to 
heterogeneous findings about their macroeconomic effects. Little is said about the causes of 
these misunderstandings even today with a better data availability and development of 
advanced econometrics tools. A systematic review of the research process in each of these 
fields is necessary. 
 
2. The emergence of alternative sources of financing and policy models has intensified 
researchers and practitioners’ attention on this evolution in development cooperation. Indeed, 
with the emergence of new economic powers there are more donor countries operating outside 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Despite the number of papers focusing on 
the ongoing revolution in development assistance (Woods, 2008; Paulo and Reisen, 2010; 
Zimmermann and Smith, 2011; Walz and Ramachandran, 2011), nothing is said about the 
effect of the increasing influence of emerging donors on the aid allocation of traditional 
donors. If we are aware of the importance of political and strategic interests related to aid 
allocation, thus the question of the reaction of traditional providers of aid is central.   
3. Moreover, there are no empirics about the fiscal implications of emerging donors aid 
allocation for recipients' governments. What we know is that some authors claimed without 
evidence that the success of emerging donors would lead to a macroeconomic disaster in 
countries welcoming their aid because they do not follow DAC's recommendations on 
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development assistance (Manning, 2006; Naim, 2007). Thus, the question of whether 
emerging donors could play a role in the development process of low-income countries or 
represent a treat for governance standards and public management systems in low-income 
countries (LICs), is particularly relevant given the increasing share of non-DAC aid in total 
ODA inflows in some countries. 
 
4. Recent IMF Working papers show that shocks in foreign aid and FDI are more frequent 
than shocks in terms of trade and external demand in the last decades (Crispolti and Tsibouris, 
2012) and also that countries dependent to remittances appear more vulnerable to risks 
stemming from shocks to the global economy because remittance flows significantly increase 
business cycle synchronization with the rest of the world (Barajas et al., 2012). These recent 
empirical evidences suggest that the presence of development finance flows offers both 
opportunities and challenges to recipient countries. Indeed, previous studies suggested that 
external shocks explain a smaller fraction of output volatility (Raddatz, 2007), but 
recognizing these facts could revived the debate about the preeminence of domestic shocks 
over external shocks. Although the importance of this issue in explaining the business cycle 
of DCs, we still lack of valid model and analytical framework that could capture the 
macroeconomic challenges generated by development finance flows and quantify their 
contribution on recipients' business cycle fluctuations. 
 
5. Companion to external finance flows like foreign aid, Remittances and FDI, they are 
various international measures for development that represent a supply of possible benefits for 
developing countries (on agriculture, trade, health…), but do they finally enhance the welfare 
of recipients and contribute to their development? Surprisingly, we do not have valuable 
impact analyses of the major programmes designed for developing countries but we certainly 
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lack of methodology and empirical strategies to overcome the difficulties faced by such 
analyses.  
 
Remainder of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into three broad parts. Each part consists of two chapters. Our 
dissertation is developed around the three groups concerned by this debate of aid and 
development finance effectiveness: the recipients, aid architecture and the actors of 
development, and the researchers. 
 
The first part uses meta-analysis methodology to draw a literature review on external 
development finance flows with a particular interest on the research processes follow by the 
empirical studies. The underlying idea of meta-analysis is to subtract the empirical evidences 
from authors' characteristics, econometric or methodological choices, to sum up the effective 
knowledge from existing works. This first part is constituted of an introduction to the meta-
analysis and two chapters highlighting different areas and opportunities that such analyzes 
bring for the development of research.  
Chapter 1 analyzes the literature on conditional aid effectiveness and the heterogeneity of 
studies' findings. Examining the reported estimates of aid impact in "Good Policies" and 
"Medicine" models, where aid effectiveness depends upon a conditional variable, this chapter 
seeks to determine through meta-analysis tools, if the reported estimates of conditional aid 
effectiveness are genuine or are supported by a publication bias. Indeed, given the political 
and economic stakes behind the question of foreign aid, researchers and editors are suspected 
to favor studies with positive results. Moreover, this chapter investigates methodological 
choices madeby the authorsoften without theoretical justification, which cause huge 
discrepancies in the findings about the effectiveness of aid. 
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Many development economists believe that remittances inflows are an important source of 
funding for long run growth. Therefore, recent studies have investigated the growth enhancing 
effects of remittances in the recipient countries but reached different conclusions. The Chapter 
2 uses meta-analysis to combine, explain, and to summarise these disparate estimates of 
remittances effects. The hypothesis that there is a direct effect of remittances on growth is 
rejected but we find robust evidence that remittances have positive indirect effects on growth. 
Although there is evidence of publication selection, there is also evidence of a genuine 
estimate effect beyond publication bias.  We also established some methodological rules for 
future studies on this issue. 
 
The second part focuses on recent evolutions in aid architecture with the increasing influence 
of emerging donors. This part of the thesis analyzes the consequences of non-DAC donors aid 
allocation on government fiscal choices in recipients countries and on traditional donors' aid 
allocation. 
Starting with fear and critics expressed towards emerging donors aid allocation, we analyze in 
chapter 3 if the increasing influence of emerging donors in official development assistance 
has led to the macroeconomic disaster in recipient economies. Indeed given that emerging 
donors do not follow DAC recommendations in their aid allocation, the presence of emerging 
donors in the aid market could increase the transaction costs in the aid allocation process and 
bring additional fiscal management challenges for governments. The chapter 3 investigates 
how emerging donors' aid allocation influences the fiscal behavior of recipients. This analysis 
is conducted on a panel dataset of 82 developing countries over the period 1980-2010. Our 
findings suggest that fear expressed by DAC donors is not justified and moreover welcoming 
emerging donors could help low-income countries to enhance their fiscal response to aid, in 
particular through an increase in their aid absorption rate. 
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Then chapter 4 moves to analyzing the impact of emerging donors on the allocation of 
traditional donors. This chapter describes the behavior of DAC donors in dealing with the 
increasing influence of these new leaders in development cooperation. Choosing to analyze 
the emergence of new donors from the DAC donors' perspective, this chapter contributes to 
the literature on the determinants of aid allocation, and explicitly assesses the importance of 
political and strategic interests in development cooperation. By confronting allocation choices 
at the multilateral level to the heterogeneous strategic reactions of DAC members in their 
bilateral aid process, this chapter highlights the importance of political and strategic interests 
in aid allocation. We show how traditional donors seek to keep their interests from non-DAC 
donors given that they also give aid to increase their commercial interests and political 
influence. This chapter ends by examining the impact of this competition among donors on 
the quality of aid provided.  
The third part of the thesis proposes new evidences of the impact of external capital flows for 
development finance and international measures for development. Chapter 5 proposes to 
analyze the link between development finance and business cycles fluctuations in developing 
countries. The chapter revisits the Raddatz (2007)' result that external shocks can only explain 
a small fraction of the output volatility in low-income countries. Starting with a RBC model, 
the chapter shows that, when foreign aid, FDI and remittances inflows are accounted for, 
external shocks drive a significant share of output fluctuations in low-income countries. The 
findings of the theoretical simulation are supported by our panel data analysis which reported 
that development finance flows can account for more than twenty-five percent of economic 
fluctuations in aggregate output in some developing countries. The chapter 5 ends by 
describing the stabilizing or destabilizing property of each of these flows and the associated 
transmission channels, on business cycles. The findings of this chapter impose to rethink our 
knowledge about the openness and economic integration of developing countries, because 
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even for LICs characterized by their underdeveloped financial sector, with development 
finance flows, they appear more expose to external shocks than expected. 
This thesis concludes by addressing one of the major difficulties in the development of action, 
assessing the impact of different policies and programs designed to support the less developed 
countries.  One of the most important initiatives was the least developed countries (LDCs) 
category. The UN recognized in 1971 that some developing countries have particular 
structural characteristics which dampen their economic development and make them more 
likely to remain caught in the poverty trap. The LDCs are defined as being among the poorest 
countries in the world; they have low level of human capital and are highly vulnerable to 
natural and external shocks. The Chapter 6 evaluates the contribution of the measures 
designed to support LDCs and analyses the impact of being categorised as a Least Developed 
Country (LDC) on economic growth and the vulnerability to economic shocks. Moreover, this 
chapter proposes an empirical methodology that could help to perform macroecononomic 
impact evaluation. 
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PART 1.  META-ANALYSES ON DEVELOPMENT FINANCE STUDIES 
 
Given the existence of various surveys about foreign aid (Tsikata 1998; Hansen and Tarp 
2000; Easterly 2003; Kanbur 2006; Roodman 2007; Thorbecke 2007), FDI (Fan, 2002), 
remittances (Chami et al., 2008). We seek to provide a summary of the current state of the 
literature and the research in a more comprehensive and intuitive way. Therefore, we should 
propose an analysis that goes beyond classic literature review. Thus, the first part of this 
thesis applies a "meta-analysis" of the research on development finance flows, following 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2010) which performed a meta-analysis on aid effectiveness 
studies. 
Briefly, meta-analysis is the analysis of a large collection of individual studies for the purpose 
of integrating the findings. It goes beyond a literature review in two ways. First, it includes all 
the studies that meet the review criteria and is thus comprehensive. It provides a basis for 
understanding why evidence of impacts differs among studies, over time, and among types of 
interventions. Second, with a large sample a meta-analysis can make use of statistical 
techniques for amalgamating, summarizing, and reviewing quantitative research to overcome 
limits of size or scope in individual studies and obtain more reliable information about the 
estimated' effect. Because of these advantages, meta-analysis has become increasingly 
popular in economics during the last five years. To illustrate the use of meta-analysis tools, 
we present some results issued from meta-analyses of studies on FDI effect, which is one of 
most advanced economic topic in meta-analysis (Gorg and Strobl, 2001; Meyer and Sinani, 
2009; Havranek and Irsova, 2010; Havranek and Irsova ,2011). 
 
 Meyer and Sinani (2009) have examined studies on productivity spillovers effect from FDI. 
Havranek and Irsova (2011) build also a meta-analysis on the same topic. To examine these 
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vertical spillovers in a systematic way, they collected 3626 estimates of spillovers and 
reviewed the literature quantitatively. The construction of the database is the most important 
step in meta-analysis. They need to collect all known published and unpublished empirical 
papers that estimate FDI spillovers by the sensitivity of local firm’s productivity to the 
presence of FDI in industry.  EconLit and other internet databases are helpful to find the 
papers, using keywords related to the topic. The collected estimates of the effect reported in 
studies are summarized with statistical tools that serve to analyze the estimates. For example, 
the figure below represents a funnel plot. 
 
 
Source: Funnel plot from Havranek and Irsova (2011) 
The funnel test helps to find out if the research is oriented toward a specific result and why.  
Meta-analysis indicates that journals select relatively large estimates for publication as we can 
see on the funnel plot graph. Furthermore, meta-analysis helps to test specification 
characteristics, for example Havranek and Irzova (2011) show that cross-sectional and 
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industry-level studies are likely to find relatively strong spillover effects, and that the choice 
of the proxy for foreign presence is important. Meyer and Sinani (2009) confirm that 
productivity spillovers are related in a U-shaped form to the host country’s level of 
development in terms of per capita income, human capital and institutional development, 
while trade openness has a positive effect. Such results have implications both for economic 
policy and for the design of future empirical studies. 
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Chapter 1.Aid, Policy and Growth:A meta-analysis of conditional aid effectiveness studies 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
About hundred studies have investigated the effect of foreign aid on growth with 
heterogeneous findings. This paper uses meta-analysis to examine the hypothesis that aid is 
conditionally effective. Therefore, we collected estimates of fifty studies analyzing 
conditional models where aid effectiveness depends upon a conditional variable. The 
hypothesis that there is no effect of aid on growth is easily rejected.  We find that good 
policies positively influence the effectiveness of aid, and on average aid works, but with 
diminishing returns. We have also established the presence of publication bias, but it does not 
seem to undermine the genuineness of estimated effects. 
 
JEL Code : F35, O1, O4 
Keywords: conditional aid effectiveness, meta-analysis, results heterogeneity, publication 
bias 
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1.1 Introduction 
Does aid promote economic growth? Interest in this question has been growing, especially 
recently, which is boththe best andworstfordevelopment aid (Heller, 2011). After sinking to 
new lows in the 1990s, large infusions of aid to developing countries have been recommended 
as a means of escaping the poverty trap, and promoting development (Sachs et al., 2004; 
Sachs 2005a, 2005b). Major efforts are underway to mobilise resources for scaling up aid. 
New initiatives have been developed by emerging donors and private philanthropists, and the 
international community have agreed on a set of targets, the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Despite this revival of momentum for promotion of growth in developing countries, 
doubts about aid effectiveness are sustained by the weak performance of recipient countries 
(Easterly, 2007a, 2007b; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). An intermediate position in this 
debate is that the growth enhancing effects of aid work under specific conditions; 
macroeconomic policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), structural characteristics (Guillaumont 
and Chauvet, 2001), or quality of institutions (Collier and Dehn, 2001).  
Since the work of Burnside and Dollar (1998), empirical research has investigated 
theconditions which favortheeffectiveness of aid. In total the group of conditional aid studies 
had grown to about 50 papers at the end of 2010. After more than a decade of intense 
analytical work using new theory, new data, and new empirical methodologies, the 
conditional aid effectiveness literature (CAEL) remains divided about the impact of aid on 
growth and the conditional factors. Like other authors we think that the striking heterogeneity 
in this literature requires a systematic survey. Thus, following Doucouliagos and Paldam 
(2010) (henceforth referred to as DP10), we have used a meta-analysis approach1. 
Meta-analysis, a quantitative method of synthesis of research, consists of a set of statistical 
techniques which can be used to compare and/or combine the outcomes of different studies, 
                                                 
1See Stanley (2001) for details 
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with similar characteristics or with differing characteristics, that can be controlled for. Meta-
analysis was originally developed in psychology, and later on extended to fields such as 
biomedicine and experimental behavioral science, specifically education, but is now 
increasingly used in economics as well (see Card and Krueger, 1995; Smith and Huang, 1995; 
Ashenfelter et al, 1999; Stanley and Rose, 2005; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008; Havranek 
and Irsova, 2011). Meta-analysis is not just a quantitative literature review, but can also be 
used to pinpoint critical aspects for the future development of theory (for example, type of 
data, model specification, estimation methods, and so forth). Throughthe meta-analysiswewill 
be ableto be conclusive abouttheempirical effectof aid,andthe importanceof the macro-
economic and the institutional conditions which determine itseffectiveness. Therefore we can 
test the hypothesisofconditionaleffectivenessof aid which was introduced byBurnsideand 
Dollar in 1998,using informationavailablein thefiftyempirical studies which have 
examinedthis issue. 
If meta-analysis becomes a widely used instrument in economic research, there are still some 
misunderstandings and issues about his methodological framework, as shown by the Mekasha 
& Tarp (2013) vs. Doucouliagos & Paldam (2013)' debate about meta-analysis results on aid 
effectiveness in DP08. The debate relies on the measure of the effect of aid on growth and the 
treatment of heterogeneity in meta-analysis. We are not going further on this debate because 
dealing here only with conditional aid studies we do not have measurement effect issues. 
Nevertheless, we think that it must be important to mention this controversy in so far as it has 
influenced some methodological choices (selection criteria and estimation method) in this 
paper.2 
                                                 
2Mekasha and Tarp (2013) critise the measure of aid effect, the treatment of heterogeneity and the use of the 
fixed effects estimator in DP08 meta-study. In response, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2013) manage to show that 
their critiques are comprehensive but invalid and all rely on misunderstandings of Mekasha and Tarp (2013) 
about the results. 
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Doucouliagos and Paldam (2010) use a data collection of 40 conditional aid studies to 
perform their meta-analysis with the purpose of finding out if the specific conditions3 for aid 
effectiveness which have been discussedsince 1998, have been established empirically. Thus, 
they study the validity of the main conditionality models. Our paper is in line with DP10 since 
we follow their analytical framework and nomenclature. However, we propose to improve 
their analysis in several ways. First, we use a reduced database of 30 comparable studies that 
includes recent empirical papers, secondly we use a Random effect meta-regression and 
Bayesian averaging model, instead of the probit model used in DP10, using real estimated 
coefficients instead of binary dummy variable reporting only the significance of coefficients. 
Thus, the first step of our contribution lies in better exploitation of the available information 
contained in studies selected for the metanalysis. Indeed, with more comparable studies our 
analysis should be more robust; moreover our Bayesian framework allows us to use the 
available information in a better way. The combinationof the Bayesian approachto meta-
analysis will also allow usto overcome somelimitations oftraditionalmeta-analysis,especially 
the presence of unexplained heterogeneity and uncertainty. We will return to these aspects 
later in this paper.  
Given the important implications of DP10 about the ineffectiveness of aid, we decide to see if 
their findings are not dependent of their empirical strategy. This study aims also to complete 
the meta-analysis of DP10 by focusing on another value added of meta-analysis that consists 
to pinpoint the methodological and econometrics practices influencing results in aid-growth 
studies. DP10 was centered on political and policy related implications of their MRA results. 
To summarise, in this paper,we seek first to determine if there is an empirical conditional 
                                                 
3DP10 distinguish between a condition that enters multiplicatively with aid and the control set that controls the 
estimate of country heterogeneity and other ‘‘disturbing’’ factors. In growth empirics the term conditional 
normally means that the estimate contains a set of variables, which control the relation for country heterogeneity. 
This paper uses the word in the aid policy sense. 
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effect of aid on growth. Next we explain the factors behind the heterogeneity of results on aid 
effectiveness,and their consequences for future models.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents conditional aid 
models, and the issues behind heterogeneity in the studies' findings. Section 3 explains the 
meta-analysis approach and the meta-results. Section 4 offers conclusions and discusses the 
interest of such analysis. 
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1.2. Conditional Aid Effectiveness Literature 
 1.2.1. Conditional aid effectiveness estimates data set 
Studies in CAEL4 consider the following growth regression: 
( ) εββββ +∗+∗∗+∗+= ZXaidaidG 3210
 
where X can be aid, policy or institutional controls and Z is a vector of other explanatory 
variables. When the "condition" is aid itself, we have the Medicine Model developed by 
members of the Danish Aid Agency. The idea is that aid works if given in moderation, and 
harms if taken in excess, just like most medicine. Burnside and Dollar (1998) and the World 
Bank developed the Good Policy Model where aid effectiveness depends on countries’ policy 
environment. 
 
The last group of studies regarding CAEL is the Institutions model. In these studies authors 
investigate various institutional and structural characteristics that could affect the impact of 
aid on growth: External vulnerability (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001), GDP (Bowen 1995; 
Svensson 1999); Democracy (Svensson 1999; Kosack 2002; Knack 2009); Quality of 
institutions (Collier and Dehn ,2001; Collier and Dollar 2002); Trade openness (Teboul and 
Moustier, 2001); Economic freedom (Brumm, 2003); Political instability (Chauvet and 
Guillaumont, 2004). Following DP10, we agree that this group is too small and too 
heterogeneous to be part of a formal meta-analysis5. However, unlike DP10, we do not 
remove these studies from the meta-study because we choose to use an empirical framework 
which can use the information they contain (Bayesian Framework). 
 
                                                 
4Studies in CAEL are divided into three groups. 
5Details in the appendix. 
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Literature Sampling and Combining Estimates 
The data used in this paper originate mostly from 40 published and unpublished aid–growth 
studies identified by DP10 exploring conditional aid effectiveness. We employed the 
following strategy for studies inclusion. After reviewing the DP10 database and added few 
recent empirical studies, we elaborated a baseline selection query that was able to capture 
most of the relevant studies. Studies that failed to satisfy one or more of the following criteria 
were excluded from the meta-analysis. First, the study must include a Good policy model, a 
Medicine model or an Institutions model. Second, the dependent variable in regression must 
be the GDP growth rate and the studies must report estimations based on a panel data (with 15 
years at least). Third, the study should be available online. We also excluded country case 
studies and sectoral studies. This strategy provided 30 prospective studies, which were all 
examined in details (62 estimates for Good Policy models, 45 estimates for Medicine 
models). Results of Institutional models are used for the belief in prior distributions in 
Bayesian analysis.  
For each reported regression in the primary studies, we recorded an estimate of the 
conditional effect of aid on growth and its associated standard error, degree of freedom, and 
so forth. In addition, we recorded authors and publication details, characteristics of the 
original dataset (use of sub-sample, numbers of countries, and so forth), the level of 
aggregation (countries or regions), initial year of the sample and the number of observations, 
and regression characteristics, such as the type of estimator, and the type and number of 
conditioning variables included in the regression. The total number of observations in our 
database is 113, each corresponding to a regression, provided by the 30 separate studies.  
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1.2.2 What explains differences in conditional aid effectiveness estimates? 
 
Conditional aid effectiveness literature contains many stories of how foreign aid affects 
economic growth: aid raises growth…. “in countries with good policies”, or “in countries 
with difficult economic environments”, or “mainly outside the tropics”, or “usually, but with 
diminishing returns”... The diversity of these results suggests that many are not robust 
(Roodman, 2007). 
 
Among the numerous studies of CAEL, the contribution by Burnside and Dollar (1998) came 
to exert a significant influence on policy: aid has a positive impact on growth in developing 
countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies; but in the presence of poor policies, 
aid has no positive effect on growth. However, these results were subject to criticism, and this 
challenge was seen in the Conditional Aid Effectiveness Literature6.Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
found that, on average, aid works, but with diminishing returns. Guillaumont and Chauvet 
(2001) offered evidence that aid works best in countries with difficult economic 
environments, such as those characterised by volatile and declining terms of trade, low 
populations, and natural disasters. In the same vein, Collier and Dehn (2001) found that 
increasing aid cushions countries against negative export price shocks. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) applied the good policies argument for aid in post-conflict countries. These studies are 
different in their findings, but also often in their methodological choices. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Arndt et al (2010) 
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(1)Methodological choices 
 
The choiceofthe conditionandtheinterpretationofthe non-linearity of Aid-Growth leads to 
thecategorizationidentified byDP10(Good Policy, Medicine, institutional). We are concerned 
bythe heterogeneity of the studiesineach of these families, in their conclusions,but also in 
theirmethodologicalframework. 
First, there are differences in sampling and lengths of study periods that raise the question 
ofthe homogeneity of the effect of aid, as discussed by Mekasha and Tarp (2013). Assuming 
that the effectiveness of aid is conditional means that the effectof aid is not a constant, but a 
function of factors. Thus, variation in length of study periods and sampling will influence not 
only the sign of the impact, but also its magnitude. Moreover, calculation methods and model 
specifications (controls, transmission channels, and so forth) also affect the results, as well as 
affecting the treatment of the endogeneity of aid, for which an appropriate solution has not yet 
been found. 
It also raises issues about the ability of econometrics to make valid causal inferences with 
respect to complex aggregate phenomena such as the determinants of economic growth 
(Arndt et al, 2010), or because of timing of causal relationships between aid and growth 
(Clemens et al, 2011). For example, in the treatment of endogeneity, there is an increasing 
awareness that dynamic panel (system) GMM methods, frequently employed for robust 
estimation, are not a panacea7, because under some conditions they lead to results which are 
even more biased than OLS or panel FE estimates. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Details of this issue are presented in Arndt et al (2010) 
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(2) The Importance of Publication Bias 
Arndt et al (2010) perform a review of aid effectiveness literature in which they identify a 
new group of studies, whose only distinctive aspect, is the view that the impact of aid on 
economic growth is non-existent. DP10 (and previously DP08) also argue this pessimistic 
conclusion, and talk of a zero correlation result8. In their workthey consider thatgiventhe 
particular issues indevelopment aidthe zero correlation result was seen as highly undesirable, 
and the search for models that allow a nicer story to be told, led to the development of CAEL 
, and the high heterogeneity of findings. What is more, the real contribution of DP10 is to give 
a reflection on the research process and researcher's interactions with their environment and 
their personal motivations. The issue of publication bias implies a tendency for published 
papers to exhibit statistically significant results for the main variables of interest. This 
phenomenon may occur either because of self-censoring by authors, or because editors of 
journals make publication decisions partly based on levels of statistical significance.  
 
 
 
1.3.Meta-Analysis in Practice 
 
The above discussion has pointed out the fact that both theoretically as well as empirically, 
there is a lack of clear-cut evidence about the conditions that determine aid effectiveness. This 
section aims to test the conditional aid effectiveness theory, and take the descriptive analysis 
in the previous sections one step further, by considering the relevance of several sources of 
heterogeneity in the results of previously released studies by using meta-analysis tools.  
                                                 
8
 The Zero correlation result means that the aid’s aggregate impact on economic growth is non-existent. 
 
Chapter 1.Aid, Policy and Growth: A meta-analysis of conditional aid effectiveness studies   
42 
 
The meta-analysis used in this study is a set of techniques divided into two groups. The first 
group of techniques is used to determine the true empirical findings about the research 
question submitted, and we investigate if there is an empirical conditional aid effect beyond 
the publication bias. The second phase is to determine, for future studies, the main issues to 
consider when using an Aid-Growth model. 
 
 
1.3.1.True empirical effect and publication bias 
 
Naturally the first question is what the combined estimates of all the studies tell us about the 
conditional aid effect on growth hypothesis. To be sure that the empirical effect adequately 
represents the true underlying size of the effect between aid and growth, we need to know 
whether it is genuine, or an artefact of the publication bias. 
An arithmetic average of the results reported in the CAEL will be a biased estimate of the true 
effect, if some results are more likely than others to be selected for publication. Publication 
selection bias is an important issue for research validity.  If the CAEL is free of publication 
bias, the reported results of the Good Policies, Medicine and Institutions models will be 
randomly distributed around the true effect. If, in contrast, some results fall into the “file 
drawer” (Rosenthal, 1979) because they are insignificant, or have an unexpected sign, the 
reported estimates will be correlated with their standard errors. 
In practice, two tools are used for this analysis. Firstly, we use Funnel Plots, which are 
graphical images used to illustrate the relationship between treatment effect estimates in 
individual studies (plotted on the horizontal axis), and a measure of study precision (plotted 
on the vertical axis), to make a preliminary examination of the presence of publication bias. 
Secondly, we use the MST-FAT tests: 
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The main idea behind these tests is that, if a statistically significant effect is required, an 
author may re-run calculations, specification search, and/or data adjustments until the result 
becomes statistically significant. The meta-significance test (MST) verifies the authenticity of 
empirical effects by analysing the relationship between the natural logarithm of the absolute 
value of a study’s standardized effect (t-statistics) and its degrees of freedom (df).  As the 
sample size for the ith study rises, the precision of the coefficient estimate for the ith study 
rises also, that is, standard errors fall and t-statistics rise. Stanley (2005) showed that the slope 
coefficient in the MST equation offers information on the existence of genuine empirical 
effects, publication bias, or both. If α1 < 0, the estimates are contaminated by selection effects: 
studies with smaller samples report larger t-statistics. If α1> 0, there is a genuine association 
between aid, policy condition and economic growth. 
The Funnel Asymmetry Test (FAT) shows the presence of a genuine empirical effect outside 
any publication bias. If there is a publication bias, α3 will be statistically significant and α2  the 
expression of a genuine empirical effect (corrected for publication bias). 
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Figure 1. Funnel plots 
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In Figure 1, we present a funnel plot, which is done using inverse of standard error as the 
measure of accuracy. As can be seen from this funnel plot, the estimates from the Good 
Policy models9 are fairly randomly distributed. Although the distribution of the studies to the 
right of the funnel seems relatively more concentrated for working papers, there is no clear 
asymmetry. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9Because of data, we present only funnel plots for Good Policy models. 
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Table 1: Meta-significance and funnel asymmetry tests, aid-growth conditionality effects 
 MST FAT 
Dependent variable Ln|t| t-statistics 
 
Good policy model 
constant 0.84 (0.78) 1.25*** (10.18) 
Ln|df| -0.16 (-0.73)  
1/SE  0.001** (2.22) 
R2 0.02 0.047 
N 65 65 
 Medicine model 
constant -1.70 (-1.06) 2.07*** (8.38) 
Ln|df| 0.44 (1.46)  
1/SE  -0.0012* (-1.85) 
R2 0.10 0.072 
N 47 47 
Note: t-statistics in brackets, using robust standard errors. 
Comments: If aid interaction terms have an effect on growth, ln(df) in the MST should have a positive and statistically significant coefficient. 
This fails for both models. If the literature is free of publication bias, the constant in the FAT should not be statistically significant.  
 The 1/SE term is a measure of the existence of a genuine empirical effect, corrected for publication bias. For both models, FAT test 
identifies a true empirical effect of conditional aid effectiveness. 
 
If aid interaction terms have an effect on growth, ln(df) in the MST should have a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. This fails for both models. If the literature is free of 
publication bias, the constant in the FAT should not be statistically significant. However, the 
estimated effects corrected for publication bias (the slope coefficients reported in Table 1) are 
significant for Good Policy and Medicine models. For both models, the FAT test identifies a 
true empirical conditional effect of aid.  
To sum up, when the existing empirical evidence is analysed, the results suggest that in 
countries with a good policy environment aid has a positive impact on growth, but with 
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diminishing returns.Unlike some meta-studies, we do not use the slope coefficients to give the 
value of the aid impact, but to get information about empirical evidence beyond potential 
publication bias. It would be hazardous to try to draw any other conclusions from the meta-
analysis at this stage. 
 
 
1.3.2. Meta-regression Analysis (MRA): Explaining heterogeneity in the results 
 
The previous analysis shows that the research environment could influence the results, now 
we need to point out methodological choices that matter in CAEL, and explain the large 
heterogeneity. It has become standard practice to use a multivariate meta-regression. 
Technically speaking, it is a regression where the dependent variable is a summary statistic, 
perhaps a regression parameter, drawn from each study, while the independent variables may 
include characteristics of the method, design and data used in these studies. Following, 
Stanley (2001) we use a random effect model contrary to the Probit model in DP10 which 
MRA is based on measures of whether the empirical results were significant or not instead of 
measuring the magnitude of the results: 
 
θi= α+ γ1Xi1 + … + γkXik+ δ1Ki1 + … + δnKin + ui    (MRA) 
whereθi is the standardised effect derived from the ith study ,Xj are dummy variables 
representing characteristics associated with the ith study,Kj are continuous variables associated 
with the ith study,γ and δare the unknown regression coefficients, and ui is the disturbance 
term, with usual Gaussian error properties. Seems like a lot of information would be lost 
based on making the data discrete instead of incorporating the magnitude of the results. We 
understand there might be difficulties in using directly the coefficients from the studies and I 
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assume this is why DP10 did not use them. However, we believe that our inclusion strategy 
and the moderator variables of the MRA help to circumvent those problems. 
The regression coefficients in MRA quantify the impact of specification, data and 
methodological differences in the reported studies’ effects (γ,δ). For example, because the 
size of datasets used by primary studies varies substantially, we control for the number of 
years and countries in the sample, to find out whether smaller studies report systematically 
different outcomes. We include the average year of the data period to control for the time 
periods used to capture the effects of aid. The other moderator variables of our MRA are 
related to publication details of the study (such as publication status, or year of publication), 
author's information (such as institutional affiliation), and estimation methods.  
We also apply Bayesian Model Averaging using Institutions models results as priors, in order 
to define the relevant moderator variables because there is no theory that would help us decide 
which variables should be included in the meta-regression model.  The moderator variables of 
MRA are defined by groups in relation to the personal characteristics of the author 
(institutional affiliation), data (level of aggregation), the methodological choice or estimation 
techniques (control of heterogeneity and endogeneity). They contribute in their own way to 
the heterogeneity of results. However, there are two kinds of uncertainty to deal with: 
influence of selected variables for our model, and their relationship with our variable of 
interest. Hence, if they are not included, it might be interpreted that they are simply missing 
variables, or missing variables which lead to an omitted variable bias. 
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Table 2: Differences in studies’ characteristics 
 Variable                         Description 
  
 Dependent BD if study reports significantly positive effect  θ 
 DevJour  BD if published in development journal  
 Stars Level of significance of aid-policy effect 
 AidBus  BD if author(s) employed/affiliated with aid agency  
 WorldBk  BD if paper from World Bank group  
 Danida  BD if paper from Danida group  
 NrCountries  Number of countries included in the sample  
 WorPap  BD if the research has yet to be published in journal  
 NrYears  Number of years covered in the analysis  
 Endo  BD if the aid was treated as an endogenous variable  
 EDA  BD if paper use EDA measure of assistance  
 Region  BD if paper controlled for regional effects  
 Subsample  BD if estimate relates to sub-sample of countries  
 Reproduce  BD if estimate is an attempt to replicate results  
 Fixedeffects  BD if Fixed Effects estimator used  
 Ethnic  BD if controlled for ethnic fractionalization  
 Polmeasure  BD if a Burnside-Dollar type measure of policy used  
 Finmarkets  BD if controlled for financial markets development  
 Institutions  BD if controlled for quality of institutions  
 Aidsqr  BD if included aid*aid term  
 AidSqr*Policy BD if included aid*aid*policy term  
 Instability  
Transmission 
Channels 
Decoup  
 
BD if paper controlled for political instability  
Number of  transmission channels controlled in the 
analysis 
Period used (N- year average) 
 
BD= binary dummy. It is 1 if condition is fulfilled, otherwise 0. 
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Meta-analysis consists of collecting information in previous empirical studies to test a 
proposition (here about conditional aid effectiveness) in order to confirm it or not. Therefore, 
the challenge is to use the collected information as well as possible. Using Bayesian 
estimation framework within our meta-regression analysis enables the uncertainty in the 
distribution of variables and the functional form of the model to be taken into account more 
appropriately. Moreover, our Bayesian MRA also uses the information from studies excluded 
in a classical meta-analysis approach, such as the Institutional Model studies in DP10. Indeed, 
we use this additional information to construct prior estimates10  (model calibration) for our 
Bayesian estimation. We therefore obtain estimates that are more informed and more 
accurate. The Bayesian MRA procedure is detailed in the appendix. 
 
 
 
1.4.Interpretation of MRA Results 
 
We begin our analysis with the multivariate MRA by including all explanatory variables 
presented in table 2in the regression. This general model includes 24 variables clustered by 
categories: author's background, data characteristics, estimation methods, publication outlet, 
and control and specification choices. For the method and specification variables, no theory 
exists to determine which of them are important, and what sign they should have. Thus, 
following DP10 we include all variables in the regressions: the results for the classic MRA 
are reported in the first column of Table 3. 
For the specification reported in Column 2 of Table 3, we used the Bayesian MRA. To 
perform the Bayesian estimation we need the prior information for the parameters, to calibrate 
                                                 
10TheBayesian estimationis doneby multiplyingthe prior distributionbythe likelihood functionof data. This prior 
density functionrepresents theavailableinformationon model parametersbeforeusing the datainthe likelihood 
function. 
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our model before the simulations. We generally have the choice between non-informative 
prior or informative prior11  information (see Table 4). We always perform our calculation for 
two cases, but we have only reported those that used the information given in the studies of 
the Institution model group not included in our metadata. 
The results in table 3 show that publication status of studies, the nature and level of 
aggregation of data, and the inclusion or omission of important controls in the analysis make a 
difference to the findings. However, we noted that classic MRA detects the author affiliation 
effect, whereas the Bayesian MRA focuses on estimation techniques and the treatment of 
endogeneity of aid.  Ourcomments will focuson the Bayesian resultsthat we findmost 
appropriate. 
 
Our discussion here is structured around four important issues on which previous authors 
have made assumptions without enough empirical assessment: measurement of aid flows, 
period averaging, treatment of endogeneity and inclusion of transmission channels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11Table 4 illustrates improvement in estimation with a comparison of BMRA results which have with different 
information about prior distribution, from the non-informative priors - used if nothing is known about the value 
of a parameter - to objective informative priors - based on previous meta-studies and studies not included in our 
data.  Table 4 shows the gain in level of certainty in estimation. 
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Table 3: Method Heterogeneity in conditional aid effectiveness studies 
 
 Classic Multivariate MRA Bayesian Meta-Regression Analysis 
Variable   
 
  
Authors details   
Danida -0.002 (-0.54) -0.07 (0.11) 
WorldBk 0.34***(2.46) 0.15 (0.12) 
 
  
Estimation methods   
Fixedeffects -0.091 (-1.39) 0.22 (0.039) 
Endo -0.004 (-0.86) 0.24 (0.031) 
 
  
Publication outlet   
Reproduce -0.088 (-1.51) -0.11 (0.038) 
WorPap 0.42 (1.56) 0.42 (0.028) 
Devjour 0.76** (1.90) 0.56 (0.079) 
 
  
Data differences   
Polmeasure -1.25* (-1.75) -0.77 (-0.11) 
NrCountries -0.024** (-2.46) -0.01 (0.002) 
NrYears 0.022 (0.76) 0.008 (0.007) 
Subsample -0.39** (-2.50) -0.127 (0.060) 
Eda 0.50 * (1.72) 0.35 (0.032) 
 
  
Specification and controls   
Ethnic -1.04 (-0.77) -0.74 (0.25) 
Transmission channels 0.39 *** (2.84) 0.328 (0.03) 
FinMarkets 1.15** (2.10) 1.13 (0.50) 
Aidsqr 0.68 (1.39) 0.71 (0.155) 
Instability -0.38 (-1.06) -0.80 (0.153) 
Decoup (Period Averaging) -0.04 (-1.66) 0.038 (0.022) 
 
  
N 65 65 
R2 24.51 - 
Studies used 28 28 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses for classic MRA and level of uncertainty for Bayesian MRA. (For the Good Policy studies) 
Estimation details:   Classic MRA=Random-effects model. The stata's module "Metareg" performs meta-regression analysis. 
 
 
 
1.4.1. Measuring aid flows 
 
The first issue is in the measurement of aid itself. All the studies take total aid received as a 
share of recipient GDP. However, there are different measures for aid flows. Burnside and 
Dollar (1998), Collier and Dehn (2001), and Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) for example, 
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use Effective Development Assistance (EDA)12, while the others use net Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). It is commonly thought that switching from one to the other 
may not stress results much because the two are hugely correlated13 (Roodman 2007, 
Dalgaard and Hansen 2001). Our MRA variable "EDA" tests this assumption, and finds that 
the choice of measure of aid flows matters.  
The concept of net ODA flows, as defined for the last four decades by OECD, and used in 
most of the papers, obscures its heterogeneous composition by including elements which do 
not correspond to a transfer to “recipient countries” (For example the cost of “sponsored” 
foreign students) (Guillaumont, 2009).  
EDA is different from ODA in that the official loans component is replaced by the grant 
equivalent of official loans, and it disregards grants that are tied to technical assistance. The 
main difference between EDA and ODA is that EDA is the sum of grants and the grant 
equivalents of official loans, whereas ODA includes both direct grants and the concessional 
loans for which the grant component is above 25 per cent.  The EDA measure provides a 
better picture of resource flows than ODA. The significance and sign of the dummy variable 
"EDA" parameter show that the use of EDA data improves the analysis of aid effectiveness. 
 
1.4.2. Length of periods studied  
 
Aid-Growth models generally use a 4 or 5-year period average growth rate. On the other 
hand, key cross-section studies in the growth literature use periods of 10 to 25 years, despite 
                                                 
12
 Burnside and Dollar were the first to use a new database on foreign aid compiled by Chang et al. [1998] for 
the World Bank. 
13 Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) showed that the Pearson correlation between nominal ODA/GDP and nominal 
EDA/GDP is 0.98, and the correlation between nominal ODA/GDP and real EDA/GDP is 0.95 [see also 
Roodman (2007)]. 
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the small samples which result: Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Sachs and 
Warner (1995) (Roodman 2007). Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) noted that “this 
literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from 
theory”. Indeed, it would make more sense for studies claiming to have the aim of capturing 
the impact of aid on growth, to use longer periods, as for example Guillaumont and Chauvet 
(2001) who used a 12-year period. This confirms by the significance of the variables 
"Decoup" and "Nryears", which express the fact that studies using longer periods measure the 
effect of aid in the conditional models better. 
 
1.4.3. Simultaneity and Endogeneity 
 
One of the most difficult issues for aid studies is the endogeneity of aid variables. Since the 
late 1990s, instrumental variables and GMM methods have proliferated as prominent features 
to adequately deal with the growth regression for the endogenous response of foreign aid to 
economic growth. However, authors like Roodman (2009) warn about the automatic use of 
these methods, because they do not provide a definitive answer to these problems. As Deaton 
(2009) argued, few studies have dealt with the endogeneity of aid in a convincing manner. 
The treatment of the endogeneity of aid (and other capital flows) in growth models has not yet 
been resolved in a satisfactory way and remains an important issue. However, the treatment of 
aid endogeneity and heterogeneity in conditional aid models provides a bettermeasure of the 
effect,as indicated by the dummy variables "endo" and "fixedeffects" which have an 
uncertainty lower than 3 per cent. 
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1.4.4. Transmission channels 
This variable represents the number of transmission channels considered by the author. The 
significance of this variable in our MRA recalls an issue, already highlighted by Gomanee 
and Morrisey (2005), concerning the necessity of explaining the transmission channelsin Aid-
Growth models. Indeed, as we saw above, in a cross-country context, specification seems to 
matter. However, other than including aid as an explanatory variable in the growth regression, 
these studies do not attempt to specify and test the mechanism by which aid impacts on 
growth. Specific mechanisms through which aid can affect growth also help to deal with 
reverse causality Gomanee and Morrisey (2005).   
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1.5. Conclusion 
Our meta-analysis of 30 studies from the Conditional Aid Effectiveness Literature (CAEL) 
concludes that good policies positively influence the effectiveness of aid, and on average aid 
works, but with diminishing returns. We have also established the presence of publication 
bias in CAEL, like in previous meta-analyses of aid literature, but it does not seem to 
undermine the real positive and significant effect of aid on growth. 
 
The Bayesian approach of meta-analysis allows more certainty about the relevant moderator 
variables and the findings about methodological choices for empirical studies in CAEL. The 
BMRA gives the value of parameters with an average uncertainty of 5 per cent. Posterior 
distribution illustrates how objective prior information and a better control of all kinds of 
uncertainty in model formulation make Bayesian inference better for this analysis. Using prior 
information about the value of parameters, BMRA works better and gives  clearer results than 
in “classical” meta-analysis (like that of DP10). We were therefore ableto test the 
methodological choices (made by the authors often without theoretical justification), and 
which cause huge discrepancies in the findings about the effectiveness of aid. We found that 
the measure of aid flows (EDA vs ODA), the length of the period of the sample used to 
capture the impact of aid, the treatment of endogeneity of aid variables, and the specification 
of aid transmission channels are all important. 
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Appendix 
Table 4:Posterior meta-distribution vs. choice of prior information 
 Conjugate prior Informative Prior   
Variable PostMean   PostSTD PostMean   PostSTD 
Const -0.05976   0.97699 0.09399   0.56759 
mu -0.03123   0.13412 -0.02971   0.03291 
stars 0.09221   0.06132 0.08890   0.00664 
endo 0.22990   0.17407 0.24433   0.03136 
eda 0.34498   0.18905 0.35159   0.03290 
ethnic -1.04357   0.87741 -0.74094   0.25689 
channels 0.37275   0.16277 0.32818   0.03035 
polme -0.75405   0.36506 -0.77010   0.11126 
finmark 0.51455   7.96950 1.13611   0.50558 
institut 0.40317   8.08935 -1.14233 148.37092 
aidsqr 0.77097   0.53337 0.71135   0.15501 
instab -1.06024   0.59458 -0.80032   0.15303 
nrcoun -0.01514   0.00940 -0.01641   0.00201 
nryears 0.01297   0.02662 0.00806   0.00700 
decoup 0.06274   0.07782 0.03873   0.02211 
region 0.34778   8.04664 1.16482 148.03272 
subsampl -0.12265   0.21195 -0.12773   0.06072 
reproduc -0.09887   0.20548 -0.11781   0.03876 
fixeffec 0.25238   0.23114 0.22373   0.03926 
worpap 0.46657   0.19649 0.42201   0.02896 
devjour 0.63583   0.31655 0.56106   0.07910 
aidbus 0.26278   5.58007 0.23814   0.11290 
danida -0.11258   5.58387 -0.07300   0.11709 
worldbk 0.12937   5.58516 0.15159   0.12537 
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Aid-Growth Studies Used in Meta-regression 
Alvi, Mukherjee ,  and Shukralla. 2008. Aid, policies and Growth in developing countries: A 
new look at the empirics. Southern Economic Journal  74 (3), pp. 693-706. 
Antipin, J. and G. Mavrotas. 2006. On the Empirics of Aid and Growth: A Fresh Look. 
Research Paper N°2006/05 UNU-Wider 
Brumm, H.J. 2003. Aid, policies and growth: Bauer was right. Cato Journal 23, pp. 167-174. 
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar. 2000. Aid, policies and growth.  American Economic Review 90, 
pp. 847-868 (Working paper available as World Bank WP since 1996)  
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar. 2004. Aid, policies and growth: Reply. American Economic 
Review 94, pp. 781-784 (reply to Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004)  
Chauvet, L. and P. Guillaumont. 2001. Aid and Performance: A reassessment. Journal of 
Development Studies 37 (6), pp. 66-92. 
Chauvet, L. and P. Guillaumont. 2004. Aid and growth revisited: Policy, economic 
vulnerability and political instability. Published in Tungodden, B., Stern, N. and I. Kolstad, 
eds. Toward Pro-Poor Policies - Aid, Institutions and Globalization. World Bank/Oxford UP, 
pp. 95-109. 
Clemens, M. A., Radelet S., and R. Bhavnani. 2004. Counting Chickens When They Hatch: 
The Short Term Effect of Aid on Growth, Working Paper No. 44, Center for Global 
Development. 
Collier, P. and J. Dehn. 2001. Aid, shocks, and growth. WP 2688 World Bank Policy  
Research. 
Collier, P. and D. Dollar. 2002. Aid allocation and poverty reduction. European Economic 
Review 46, pp. 1475-1500.  
Dalgaard, C.-J.and H. Hansen.  2001. On aid, growth and good policies. Journal of 
Development Studies 37 (6), pp. 17-41.  
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Dalgaard, C.-J., Hansen, H., Tarp, F., 2004.On the empirics of foreign aid and growth.The 
Economic Journal 114 (6), pp. 191-216. 
Dayton-Johnson, J. and J. Hoddinott. 2003. Aid, policies and growth, redux. WP Dalhousie 
University. 
Denkabe, P. 2004. Policy, aid and growth: A threshold hypothesis.  Journal of African 
Finance and Economic Development 6, pp. 1-21. 
Durbarry, R., Gemmell, N., and D. Greenaway. 1998. New evidence on the impact of foreign 
aid on economic growth. Credit WP University of Nottingham. 
Easterly, W., Levine, R., and D. Roodman. 2004. Aid, policies, and growth: Comment. 
American Economic Review 94 (3), pp. 774-780.   
Gomanee, K., Girma, S., and O. Morrissey. 2005. Aid and growth: Accounting for the 
transmission mechanisms in Sub-Sahara Africa. Journal of International Development 17 (8), 
pp. 1055–1075. 
Hadjimichael, M.T., Ghura, D., Mühleisen, M., Nord, R., and E.M. Ucer.1995. Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Growth, savings, and investment. IMF Occasional Paper 118, pp. 1986-1993.  
Hansen, H., and F. Tarp. 2000. Aid effectiveness disputed. Journal of International 
Development 12 (3), pp. 375-398.  
Hansen, H., and F. Tarp. 2001. Aid and growth regressions. Journal of Development 
Economics 64 (2), pp. 547-570. 
Hudson, J., and P. Mosley. 2001. Aid policies and growth: In search of the Holy Grail. 
Journal of International Development 13 (7), pp. 1023-1038. 
Jensen, P.S., and M. Paldam. 2006. Can the two new aid-growth models be replicated? Public 
Choice 127 (1), pp. 147-175.  
Lensink, R., and H. White. 2001. Are there negative returns to aid? Journal of Development 
Studies 37 (6), pp. 42-65. 
Chapter 1.Aid, Policy and Growth: A meta-analysis of conditional aid effectiveness studies   
59 
 
Moreira, S.B. 2003. Evaluating the impact of foreign aid on economic growth: A cross-
country study (1970-1998). WP for 15th Annual Meeting on Socio-Economics, Aix-en-
Provence, France. 
Ovaska, T. 2003. The failure of development aid.Cato Journal 23, 175-88  
Rajan, R. G., and A. Subramanian. 2008. Aid and Growth: What does the cross-country 
evidence really show? Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (4), pp. 643-665. 
Ram, R. 2004. Recipient country’s “policies” and the effect of foreign aid on economic 
growth in developing countries: Additional evidence. Journal of International Development 
16 (2), pp. 201-211.  
Roodman, D. 2004. The anarchy of numbers: Aid, development and cross-country empirics. 
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Bayesian Posterior Prediction and Meta-Analysis (Moral-Benito, 2010) 
Meta-Regression Analysis  
The meta-regression model (known as MRA) has been developed to analyze the multi-
dimensional nature of the research process. The impact of specification, data and 
methodological differences can be investigated by estimating an MRA of the following 
(linear) form: 
ωi = α + γ1Xi1 + … + γkXik+  δ1Ki1 + … + δnKin + ui            (1) 
whereωiis the standardized effect derived from the ith study ,  Xj are dummy variables 
representing characteristics associated with the ith study, Kj are continuous variables associated 
with the ith study,γandδare the unknown regression coefficients, andui is the disturbance term, 
with usual Gaussian error properties. The regression coefficients in (1) quantify the impact of 
specification, data and methodological differences on reported study effects. 
Bayesian Posterior Prediction 
Bayesian econometrics is the systematic use of a result from elementary probability, Bayes' 
theorem. Suppose we have a model given by ( )θ;yf y , where y  represents the data and θ the 
parameters. The object of interest from an econometric perspective is the vector of parameters 
θ. The logic of Bayesian inference is to apply Bayes' theorem such that: 
p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ)p(θ) 
Where p(θ|y) is referred to as the posterior density, p(y|θ) is the likelihood function of the data 
given the parameters and p(θ) is the prior density of the parameters. 
In the present case, like in most econometrics, prediction is a major concern. That is, given 
the observed data, y, the econometrician may be interested in predicting some unobserved 
data y*. In our case, the observed data y will be the different estimates of the aid-growth 
correlation of previous studies and their characteristics. The unobserved data y* that we want 
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to predict will be the true effect of aid on growth and the most prominent characteristics of a 
model in AEL. 
The Bayesian reasoning argues that uncertainty about the unobserved elements (y* and X*) 
are summarized by a conditional probability statement. That is, prediction should be based on 
the posterior predictive density p(y*|y) given by: 
p(y*|y) = ∫ p(y*|y,  θ) p(θ)dθ         (*) 
 
Meta-Analytical Bayesian Model 
The combination of the two techniques described above allows us to obtain the whole 
distribution of the conditional aid effect on growth. The resultant procedure can be 
denominated Meta-Analytical Bayesian Posterior Prediction. 
The method uses Bayesian methods that will allow us to incorporate uncertainty from the very 
beginning in a more natural way than classical approaches. Finally, given the compilation of 
data from previous studies and the use of statistical techniques in order to combine this 
information, Bayesian methodology can be thought of as a compromise between the fixed 
effect model and the claim that it is seldom appropriate to merge results from disparate 
studies. Bayesian meta-analysis considers a random effect model as in (1) but it also allows 
for specifying prior distributions for parameters. 
I now formally introduce the methodology. We depart from a linear regression model: 
)2(' iii vxY += β  
Where i = 1, ..., n refers to the n previous studies or regressions for which we have data. Yi is 
the effect of aid on growth (ω) reported in the regression i and xi is the k-1 vector of 
observable characteristics of study i. (for example the policy measure or the institution home 
of the author). By stacking the n observations in vectors we can rewrite (2) in matrix form: 
                                                  Y = XB + V (3) 
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Where now, Y and X are a n-1 vector and a n-k matrix of data respectively. 
B is a k-1 vector of parameters and V is the n-1 vector of disturbance terms. 
Given the model in (3), we can now turn to the application of Bayesian posterior prediction. 
For this purpose, we follow a sequential procedure: 
(i) Elicitation of the likelihood function for the data and the prior distribution 
for the parameters, 
(ii) Given the likelihood and the prior distribution, obtain the posterior 
distribution of the parameters, and finally,  
(iii)  Obtain the posterior predictive distribution. 
First, we propose to assume that the error term in (2) follows a multivariate normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix given by N2σ :          
                                              V ~ N(0; N2σ ). 
The previous assumption implies that the likelihood is given by:                  
p(y|β, σ2) = 

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In many situations, when we face the problem of choosing a prior distribution for the 
parameters of a model, we have very little (if any) prior information for such task. As the 
likelihood function in (2) belongs to the family of normal-gamma distributions, I elicit a 
diffuse prior distribution for the parameters by assuming a normal-gamma distribution with a 
finite variance base on prior initial values (As the variance is a measure of uncertainty, by 
fixing it to infinity, we are assuming that we do not have any prior information). 
Given the likelihood and prior concept proposed above, and by using Bayes' theorem as in 
(3), the posterior distribution of the parameters is: 
β, σ2|y ~ ( )vSNG rrrr ,,, 2−Σβ  
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Where since we have employed diffuse prior distributions, the over lined parameters of the 
posterior distribution are given by: 
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We are now ready to obtain the predictive distribution in which we are interested by solving 
the integral in (*). As shown, for example in Koop (2003), with the likelihood and the prior 
distributions presented above, this integral can be solved analytically. Moreover, the resultant 
predictive distribution is a Student's t-distribution defined by the following parameters: 
y*|y ~ [ ]( )vXXSXt rrrr ,**1,* '2' Σ+β (**) 
Therefore, by simply compiling some information about omega and model variable (the X* 
vector) and applying (**), we easily obtain the predictive characteristics of the model in 
CAEL and perhaps the true distribution effect. In the application, we see the kind of 
information that we need depending on the availability and the value of interest. 
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Chapter 2.Workers' Remittances and Economic Growth: What does meta-analysis reveal 
about empirical estimates? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Many development economists believe that remittances inflows are an important source of 
funding for long run growth. Therefore, recent studies have investigated the growth enhancing 
effects of remittances in the recipient countries but reached different conclusions. This paper 
uses meta-analysis to combine, explain, and to summarise these disparate estimates of 
remittances effects. The hypothesis that there is a direct effect of remittances on growth is 
rejected but we find robust evidence that remittances have positive indirect effects on growth. 
Although there is evidence of publication selection, there is also evidence of a genuine 
estimate effect beyond publication bias.  We also established some methodological rules for 
future studies on this issue. 
 
Keywords: Remittances, Growth, Meta-analysis  
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2.1. Introduction 
Remittances from migrant workers in rich countries are increasingly important to developing 
countries. Total official remittances to developing countries amounted to $240 billion in 2007, 
up from $31.2 billion in 1990. It has become difficult for financial markets and governments 
to ignore the power of remittances. Because remittances now make up a significant proportion 
of the GDP of many developing countries, some researchers and policymakers believe that 
emigrant remittances could play the same role in economic development as Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and other capital flows. Since the financial crisis, the number of research 
papers has risen more than 100 per cent, with the motivation being that if remittances can be 
better understood, then perhaps they can either be shown to promote development on their 
own, or they can be channeled into productive investment by wise policies. 
If remittances are like other capital flows, it would be expected that remittances would have a 
positive correlation with output growth. At the same time, remittances have significant 
indirect and direct macroeconomic effects (Rao and Hassan, 2011). Remittances, by reducing 
volatility, indirectly increase growth rate (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Hnatkovska and Loayza, 
2003; Chami et al, 2008). Other studies have found that remittances indirectly increase 
growth rate by speeding up the development of the financial sector (Aggarwal et al, 2010). If 
some researchers think that remittances may have a positive effect, other researchers conclude 
that, at best, remittances have no impact on economic growth. In fact, remittances could have 
a negative effect on growth rate through, for example, exchange rate appreciation (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Lopez, Molina, and Bussolo, 2007; Acosta, Lartey, and 
Mandelman, 2007; Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta, 2008). Other indirect effects of 
remittances on growth work through development of human capital, labor force and 
investment. This obvious heterogeneity inthe findingsis also found inthe analysisofdirect 
effects.Indeed, some studies have tried to estimate the direct growth effects of remittances by 
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performing a regression of growth rate on remittances and a set of control variables, but have 
reached different conclusions. Barajas et al (2009) and Rao & Hassan (2011) found that these 
direct growth effects are insignificant or even negative, whereas Pradhan et al (2008), 
Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz (2009) and Fayissa & Nsiah (2010) found them to be positive.  
Thus, our analysis tests this hypothesis: Remittances have a positive and significant effect on 
growth. Rather than test this hypothesis on a single country, or with a panel of aggregate data 
on remittances, like the previous studies, and then continue to reflect the ongoing 
heterogeneity in our results, we choose to use an alternative strategy to disentangle the debate 
about remittances. To take a step beyond single-country case studies and establish robust 
evidence for remittances effects, we employ meta-analysis methodology (Stanley, 2001). In 
fact no systematic survey has been done yet to establish robust evidence about the growth 
enhancing effect of remittances. 
Indeed, using meta-analysis we will be able to be conclusive about the empirical effect of 
remittances.We can therefore test the hypothesis of the positive correlation of remittances 
with economic growth, using information available in the twenty–one empirical studies that 
have examined this issue. 
To our knowledge, our paper provides the first meta-analysis in the economics of remittances.  
Meta-analysis, in various ways, better reflects the econometric, statistical and data challenges 
faced in this type of research. In doing so, we address two main research questions that are 
common to any standard meta-analysis (i) What explains the heterogeneous findings about the 
macroeconomic effects of remittances? (ii) How conclusive is the empirical evidence on the 
growth effect of remittances?  The validityof our meta-analysis resultsalso depend onhow 
they take into account the quality and stability of the analytical framework and findings 
reported by authors, when we collect our data. Therefore, we adopt an empirical strategy to 
control the internal quality of studies included in our meta-analysis 
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The aim of this paper is to find what we really learn from the research on emigrant 
remittances, and describe using meta-analysis the prominent characteristics of research on 
remittances in order to prevent the disaster that happened in the past in other Economics 
fields, like the aid effectiveness literature. This paper uses meta-analysis to uncover the 
econometric, statistical and political challenges faced in this field.  In doing so, we address 
several questions. First, we want to identify characteristics (methodological approaches, 
model specifications, authors' affiliation or data differences) which influence empirical 
findings. Then, we want to find the 'True' empirical effect reflected by this literature. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents Remittances/Growth 
models, and the issues behind the heterogeneity in studies' findings. Section 3 explains our 
meta-analysis approach and presents data. Section 4 is a discussion of the meta-analysis 
results. Section 5 offers conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Remittances-Growth studies 
2.2.1. Model and Theory 
Remittances have both welfare and growth effects. They directly alleviate poverty 
levels by increasing recipient families’ incomes and living standards: Adams and Page 
(2005), Insights (2006), Siddiqui and Kemal (2006) and Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh (2009). 
Given their effects on households' consumption, short-run effects on output are to be 
expected, but the real question is whether remittances have any long-term effects on economic 
performance, and whether remittances can hasten a country's economic development (Barajas 
et al, 2009). The idea, that remittances appear to be similar to FDI and other private 
international capital flows, and may therefore have similar effects on economic growth, seems 
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to be increasingly popular among policymakers and economists: Remittances could be "an 
important and stable source of external development finance" (Ratha, 2003).  We looked at 
papers concerning the growth effects of remittances, and we noted an increase of more than 
100 per cent in the quantity of empirical analysis since the beginning of the 2008 global crisis. 
We need to know if this optimism is truly warranted. 
 
(1) Growth enhancing effects model 
To estimate how remittances affect economic growth, models reflect various 
considerations. As noted above, remittances received can add to domestic consumption and 
savings. To the extent that remittances help families in the recipient country to maintain a 
minimum standard of living, remittances can raise the family members’ productivity. 
However, remittances will be more likely to contribute to long-term growth, if the remittance 
receiving countries’ political and economic policies and institutions use remittances to create 
the incentives for financial and business investment and saving.  For example, a country's 
capacity to use remittances, and its effectiveness in doing so, might be influenced by local 
financial sector conditions (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). 
The traditional model for investigating the effect of remittances on economic growth is based 
on the extended version of the Solow model by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1991) 
[ ] itikkitiit vXREMITYY εβγλpi +++++=∆ lnlnln 0  
where the dependent variable is the average rate of growth and the control variables are: 
- Proxy for macroeconomic management (openness to trade, inflation, Money M2, 
government expenditure, and so forth); 
- Ratio of Investment to GDP; 
- Proxy for development of financial sector (ratio of credit to GDP, deposits to GDP, 
loans to GDP); 
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- Human capital (population growth rate, years of schooling); 
- Quality of institutions. 
Authors agree on the choice of these control variables, although they do not always use the 
same ones. 
 
 
(2) Channels and indirect effects 
If Remittances can be expected to have large effects on economic growth, it is most 
important to examine the channels through which remittances receipts may exert such effects: 
• Positively 
(i) Reducing output volatility:  
 Remittances have been a remarkably stable source of income, relative to other private and 
public flows, and they seem to be compensatory in nature, rising when the home country’s 
economy suffers a downturn. This combination of stability and counter-cyclicality has led 
some to believe that remittances play a stabilizing role at the aggregate level in recipient 
countries. 
(ii) Through the financial sector: 
The relationship between remittances, financial development, and growth is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, well-functioning financial markets, by lowering costs of conducting 
transactions, may help direct remittances to projects that yield the highest return and therefore 
enhance growth rates. On the other hand, remittances may become a substitute for inefficient 
or non-existent credit markets by helping local entrepreneurs to bypass a lack of collateral or 
high lending costs and start productive activities (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). 
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(iii)Capital accumulation: 
From a microeconomic perspective, if households face financial restrictions that constrain 
their investment activities, remittances inflows may ease such constraints, permitting an 
increase of physical and human capital accumulation. In fact, remittances inflows improve the 
creditworthiness of domestic investors, with a lower cost of capital in the domestic economy; 
indeed, they augment household collateral. Remittances receipts could also stimulate 
additional investment in the form of human capital accumulation. They could do so by 
financing the cost of this investment directly, or by reducing the need for younger members of 
the household to abandon formal schooling in order to work and contribute to household 
income. However, the effects on domestic economic growth depend on the recipients’ 
subsequent participation in the domestic labor force. Positive growth effects obviously would 
not be forthcoming, for example, if the extra education funded by remittances made it 
possible for the recipients themselves to emigrate. (Barajas et al. 2009) 
• Negatively 
(iv) Appreciation of exchange rate: 
Large and sustained remittances inflows could cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and make the production of the tradable goods sector less profitable (the so called ‘Dutch 
Disease’ problem). Workers’ remittances have the potential to inflict economic costs on the 
export sectors of receiving countries by reducing their international competitiveness 
(Amuedo-dorants and Pozo, 2004). 
(v) Labor force : 
Remittances could also indirectly affect labor supply by encouraging some remittance-
recipient households to work less. This could reduce labor supply and reduce economic 
growth. Remittance transfers take place under conditions of asymmetric information, in which 
the remitter and recipient of the transfer are separated by long distances. This could lead to 
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significant moral hazard problems where the latter is likely to be reluctant to participate in the 
labor market, limiting their job search, and reducing labor effort (Chami et al, 2003). 
 
(vi) Transmission of foreign shocks: 
 From a theoretical perspective, some observers have noted that the labor supply effects 
induced by altruistic remittances could cause the output effects associated with technology 
shocks to be magnified (Chami, Cosimano and Gapen, 2006). Empirically, while remittance 
flows may be more stable than other foreign exchange inflows, they are not insensitive to 
macroeconomic developments in the source countries, and thus represent a potential channel 
for the international transmission of business cycles; implying that greater “openness” to 
remittance flows, other things being equal, may not be stabilizing (Chami, Hakura and 
Montiel, 2010). 
 
(vii) Bad incentives for government to do less 
In a context of bad governance, remittances inflows strongly reduce public spending on 
education and health in receiving countries (Ebeke, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2. What explains the differences in the results? 
 
Vote counting Table 
 Direct Indirect Positive Negative 
All studies 83% 17% 59% 36% 
Significant 65% 82% 74% 67% 
Positive+significant 38% 73%   
 
This vote counting table presents the empirical results of the studies by sign and statistical 
significance. This is almost an extreme bounds analysis, but it is not a reliable way to 
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summarize the results of a literature in the presence of model polishing and asymmetry. 
However, it offers a first overview of what the literature has established.  
These studies are different in their findings, but also, often in their analytical choices - related 
to the personal characteristics of the author (institutional affiliation), data (level of 
aggregation), the methodological choice or estimation technique (control of heterogeneity and 
endogeneity), which all contribute in their own way to the heterogeneity of the results. 
 
Publication bias 
Another important issue commonly explored in meta-analysis study is publication bias. The 
issue of publication bias implies a tendency for published papers to exhibit statistically 
significant results for the main variable of interest. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2012) identify 
two kinds of publication bias:  polishing bias and censoring bias. A polishing bias occurs 
because most of us have a preference for clear results with high t-statistics. This preference is 
common but it may not necessarily influence the average result. A censoring bias occurs if 
referees and editors have widespread expectations about the size and sign of the effect of 
remittances on economic growth. 
Since Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008), one interest of the meta-analysis approach is to bring 
into analysis non-sampling, or non-empirical questions, and quantify the influence of the 
interaction of researcher and his environment on the results.  Publication bias has been found 
in most areas of Economics research (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2008; Havranek and Irsova, 
2011).Giventhe enthusiasm generatedbyremittancesin recent years, it seems important tonote 
the relevance of this phenomenon, even though it will probably be less important than in the 
aid effectiveness debate. 
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2.3. Empirical Strategy 
2.3.1. Meta-analysis: Tools and Limits1 
 
(1) Meta-Regression Analysis 
The meta-regression model (known as MRA) has been developed to analyse the multi-
dimensional nature of the research process. The impact of specification, data and 
methodological differences can be investigated by estimating an MRA of the following 
(linear) form: 
θi= α+ γ1Xi1 + … + γkXik+ δ1Ki1 + … + δnKin + ui (3) 
where θiis the standardised effect derived from the ith study , Xjare dummy variables 
representing characteristics associated with the ith study, Kjare continuous variables associated 
with the ith study, γ and δ are the unknown regression coefficients, and uiis the disturbance 
term, with usual Gaussian error properties. The regression coefficients in (3) quantify the 
impact of specification, data and methodological differences on reported study effects (γi). For 
example, because the size of datasets used by primary studies varies substantially, we control 
for the number of years and countries in the sample to find out whether smaller studies report 
systematically different outcomes. We include the average length (in years) of the data period 
to control for the different study periods chosen to capture the effects of remittances. The 
other moderator variables2 of our MRA are related to publication details of the study (such as 
publication status, or year of publication), author's information (such origins or institutional 
affiliation), and estimation methods. 
                                                 
1Stanley (2005) provides a complete overview of meta-analysis tools. 
2See Table 1 for details. 
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However, in Economics, the generally very limited number of available studies, which as a 
rule provide various ‘competing’ specifications, requires the meta-analyst to sample more 
than one observation per study. As these observations are derived from the same data, the lack 
of independence is obvious (Florax et al., 2002). To deal with this risk of potential bias we 
need to control for the differences in the quality of studies. So we propose a strategy to 
control for the "internal quality" of the model or framework used by authors in their meta-
regression (probit model).  
 
(2) A proxy for better control of Heterogeneity among studies 
Internal Quality index (IQI) 
We measure the sensitivity of the results to change and inclusion of the additional explanatory 
control variables. If including controls substantially attenuates the result of the coefficient, 
then it is possible that inclusion of more controls would reduce the estimated effect even 
further, and vice versa. If, on the other hand, the inclusion of controls has no effect on the 
magnitude of the coefficient’s result, then we can be more confident in suggesting a causal 
interpretation for the relationship. We formalise this intuition3 and derive the ratio of the 
internal quality of the paper: 
 
Consider first a Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) growth model (which we call "restricted 
model" denote by R), where X are countries' characteristics and T workers' remittances 
εγα ++= 'XTY ; 
The OLS estimation of the effect of remittances on growth, has a standard omitted variables 
bias (Wooldridge, 2002): 
                                                 
3Altonji et al. (2005) use a similar relationship to address selection on unobservables in estimating the effect of 
the treatment. 
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Now, suppose we add additional individual controls, not observable by the researcher during 
the identification process, but that could potentially influence the impact of remittances: 
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    (where x are observed). The new OLS estimate of α will have the following 
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measures how much stronger the selection on 
unobservables needs to be, relative to observables, to explain the entire effect. A large ratio 
suggests a strong internal quality of the results for the growth enhancing impact of 
remittances. 
2.3.2. The Data for the MRA 
(1) Literature Sampling and Combining Estimates 
We utilised the following sampling criteria. First, we searched the EconLit, sciencedirect, and 
other databases for empirical studies on remittances and growth. Subsequently, we reduced 
the sample by considering only articles with comparable estimates. The total number of 
studies left after applying these criteria was 21. 
For each reported regression in the primary studies, we recorded an estimate of the effect of 
remittances on growth and its associated standard error. In addition, we recorded author and 
publication details, characteristics of the original data set (such as use of sub-sample, numbers 
of countries, etc), the level of aggregation (countries or regions), initial year of the sample and 
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the number of observations, and regression characteristics such as the type of estimator, and 
the type and number of conditioning variables included in the regression. The total number of 
observations in our study is 66, each corresponding to a regression, provided by 21 primary 
studies. An overview of the studies is given in the appendix. 
The data used in this paper originate from 21 published and unpublished Remittances-Growth 
studies covering the period 2004 to 2011 (see appendix). Since each of the 21 studies reports 
one or more regressions, we have 66 observations to work with. 
We have two binary dependent variables: the first taking the value of 1 if the study reports a 
statistically significant remittances/growth effect, and otherwise 0. The second taking the 
value of 1 if the study reports a positive effect of remittances on growth and otherwise 0. The 
aim of our probit-MRA4 is to identify the characteristics of studies that influence the reported 
results. The number of observations is limited, so we only use the most important explanatory 
variables, which are defined in Table 1. 
 
[Here Table 1] 
 
(2) Differences in characteristics of studies 
We are interested in exploring whether the authors' institutional affiliation affects the results 
concerning the growth enhancing effect of remittances. We include the IMF and World Bank 
dummies in order to explore the effect of institutional affiliation. We add a control variable 
related to the native country of authors to see if their potential participation in remittances 
transactions, has any influence on the view they take of remittances (that is "actor" is our 
binary measure of influence of origin). 
                                                 
4
 DP10 use a probit MRA for a meta-analysis of aid effectiveness studies, we use their notations in the text. 
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Five variables are included to capture the impact of data and specification differences: 
NrCountries, NrYears, Year average, NrControls, and Channels. For Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2008), if the effect related to our dependent variable is robust, we should expect a 
positive correlation between the number of countries included in a study and the study results. 
Similarly, we include the number of years covered by each study.  Mekasha and Tarp (2011) 
criticise this view because it supposes effect homogeneity across studies. In contrast, the 
impact of remittances on growth across the 21 studies is heterogeneous, as well as across 
countries and over years. 
NrYears and Year Average control for different lengths of period of study data to analyse 
remittances. NrControls and Channels represent the number of controls and transmission 
channels included in a study in order to reduce reverse causality and capture the effective 
impact of remittances. These variables are related to the perception and methodological 
choice authors have about remittances. Direct is our binary measure of methodological 
choice: Remittances have a direct effect or an indirect effect.  
Three variables are related to estimation techniques: Endogeneity, Panel and Fixedeffects are 
included to control for difference in treatment of endogeneity and heterogeneity in the 
Remittances-Growth model.  
Finally, we have our internal quality index to account for quality differences between studies 
and capture the true empirical effect. 
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2.4. Results of the Multivariate Meta-Regression 
We use meta-regression analysis (MRA) to explain heterogeneity in results and determine the 
true effect of remittances on growth, while controlling for differences in studies’ designs. 
[Here Table 2 and Table 3] 
Table 2 presents probit MRA results and Table 3 presents MRA results corrected for 
differences in design of studies, using our internal quality index as a proxy of the 
quality/stability of the study. In the specifications reported in columns 1 to 5 the dependent 
variable of the probit MRA is the "significant estimate effect" dummy5. The specifications in 
columns 6 to 11 use the "positive estimate effect" dummy as the dependent variable of our 
probit MRA. 
The results in table 2 show that authors' institutional affiliation, the level of data aggregation, 
and the methodological choice to capture Remittances/Growth effect are relevant for the 
findings. As concerns the authors' characteristics, both WB and IMF dummies are significant 
in the probit-MRA.  We find that World Bank affiliated studies are more likely to report a 
significant effect of remittances, whereas IMF studies have a reduced probability of finding a 
positive growth effect of remittances. The surprising result is due to the variable related to 
native countries of authors. In the probit-MRA of the positive effect of remittances, it appears 
that our measure of influence of origin has a negative and significant effect. Suggesting that 
authors who are potential actors in remittances transactions, because of their country of 
origin, are likely to report a negative effect of remittances. 
Furthermore, we have noticed that the length of the period studied, the inclusion or omission 
of some standard control variables, the transmission channels, and the treatment of 
                                                 
5section 2.3 explains data. 
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endogeneity of remittances flows in growth model are of importance. When we account for 
differences in study design6 (IQI) as in Table 3, our findings remain the same. 
These MRA results are related to some common issues in the empirical assessment of the 
impact of flows on growth: 
(i) Length of period studied: 
We find that the longer the period studied, the less is the probability of finding a significant 
effect of remittances on growth. In column 7 and 11 of table 2, the dummy variable 
"Yearaverage" is positive and significant, suggesting that studies using longer time periods 
better measure the positive effect of remittances on growth, which is in line with the 
Roodman (2007) comment about the Aid/Growth model. 
In fact, on the contrary to key cross-section studies in the growth literature that use periods of 
10 to 25 years despite the small samples that result (Barro 1991; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
1992; Sachs and Warner 1995), remittances/growth studies generally consider a time span of 
around 5 or 10 years and claim that their specifications are based on one of the endogenous 
growth models. However, it is hard to understand how their specifications are derived from 
the claimed endogenous growth model. Commenting on the unsatisfactory nature of 
specifications in many such empirical works, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) have 
noted that “this literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear 
guidance from theory, which often means there are more plausible specifications than there 
are data points in the sample". 
The consequence is that to the extent that 5 years does not adequately proxy for long-run 
growth, the panel methods may be less precise in assessing the remittances/growth 
relationship than methods based on longer time period data (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
2008). 
                                                 
6
 In the past Meta-studies used to take publication status as proxy of differences in study design, even if the 
eventuality of publication bias makes this procedure less relevant. 
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(ii) Transmission channels: 
The coefficient for the variable capturing the methodological choice between the direct and 
indirect effect of remittances, is negative and significant in both probit-MRAs. Studies that 
look for a direct effect of remittances have a low probability of finding a significant growth 
enhancing impact of remittances. We conclude, through this finding, that remittances work 
mainly by indirect effects. Furthermore, as explained by Gomanee and Morrisey (2005) 
concerning aid effectiveness, other than including remittances flows as an explanatory 
variable in the growth regression, empirical studies should attempt to specify and test the 
mechanism by which remittances affect growth. Specifying these mechanisms would also 
help to deal in some way with reverse causality. Probit-MRA results suggest that the more we 
take into account the transmission channels, the better are the estimates of the impact of 
remittances on growth (columns 7 and 10 in Table 2, columns 6,9,10 in Table 3). 
 
(iii)Simultaneity and Endogeneity: 
In the growth equation, remittances are likely to be correlated with the error terms because 
remittances are affected by income, and possibly by growth, according to the determinant 
equations (Singh et al., 2011). Since the late 1990s, instrumental variables and GMM methods 
have proliferated as a prominent feature for adequately dealing in the growth regression with 
the endogenous response of capital flows to economic growth. However, the treatment of the 
endogeneity of foreign capital flows in the growth model has not yet been solved in a 
satisfactory way and remains an important issue.  
The weaknesses of macroeconomic instruments suggest that promising candidates for 
instruments could be found among microeconomic determinants of remittances, since these 
are unlikely to exert a direct impact on the growth rate of the recipient countries. Barajas et al 
(2009) discussed this strategy for dealing with the endogeneity problem of remittances flows 
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based on microeconomic instruments. Unfortunately, direct observations of such variables, 
for example the transaction cost associated with a remittance transfer7, are unavailable. 
 
 
True empirical evidence and best study design 
The results of the multivariate meta-regression can be used to assess the true empirical effect 
of remittances. This approach is based on the "quality" of studies. The idea is that we can 
determine the true empirical evidence on the Remittances/Growth relation, following the 
results provided on average by the "best" studies. However, defining "best studies" could be 
subjective because different researchers may prefer different methodologies (Havranek and 
Irsova, 2011). To deal with this issue, our definition of quality is related to the stability of 
estimates within the framework chosen in the study as explained in section 2.2; the MRA 
variables already control for differences between studies. 
The coefficient for the variable capturing differences in studies’ designs is positive and 
significant for all specifications in Table 3, suggesting that "best" studies conclude that there 
is a positive and significant growth enhancing effect of remittances. We extend this 
conclusion, using the above MRA results, to synthesise the empirical evidence about the 
Remittances/Growth relation: Remittances have significant indirect and positive effects on 
growth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7Barajas et al. (2009) explain that changes in the effective cost of remittances flows should be negatively 
correlated with aggregate remittances flows, but the microeconomic innovations affecting such transactions costs 
should be uncorrelated with the error terms in the growth equations for remittance-receiving countries. 
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2.5.Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to answer to two questions: why results vary across 
Remittance/Growth studies, and what the true empirical effect of remittances on growth is. 
With a meta-analysis of results collected from 21 studies, we find robust evidence that 
remittances have positive indirect effects on growth. This conclusion suggests two 
implications, in terms of policy and empirical research. Given the fact that only indirect 
effects are significant, contrary to what is expected by some development economists who 
believe that remittances are similar to foreign direct investment and private capital inflows in 
their effects on growth, governments should focus on policies that can be used to enhance the 
incidence of channels on the long run growth rate, instead of depending only on an increase in 
remittances receipts. Therefore, studies in this literature should focus on channels and 
mechanisms by which remittances affect growth. We also established that the length of period 
studied and the treatment of endogeneity influence the findings about the impact of 
remittances. 
Another feature of meta-analysis is that we can test the genuineness of empirical evidence. 
Indeed, it allows usto integratein the analysisnon-empirical factors related tothe research 
environment. As wehave seen, author's institutional affiliation (World Bank or IMF) 
influences the results, but nevertheless there is evidence of a clear empirical effect that goes 
beyond publication bias. As show in Table 3 by the internal quality index, "best" studies have 
high probability of reporting a positive and significant effect of remittances on growth. 
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Tables and Figures: 
 
Table 1: Moderator variables of MRA 
 Variable                         Description 
  
 Positive BD if study reports significantly positive effect  θ 
 DevJour  BD if published in development journal  
 Direct BD if study focuses on direct effect of remittances 
 Actor  BD if author(s) related to remittances transactions  
 WorldBk  BD if author(s)  affiliated to World Bank group  
 IMF  BD if author(s)  affiliated to IMF  
 NrCountries  Number of countries included in the sample  
 WorPap  BD if the research has yet to be published in journal  
 NrYears  Number of years covered in the analysis  
 Endo  BD if remittances was treated as an endogenous 
variable  
 Region  BD if paper controlled for regional effects  
 Subsample  BD if estimate relates to sub-sample of countries  
 Reproduce  BD if estimate is an attempt to replicate results  
 Fixedeffects  BD if Fixed Effects estimator used  
 Finmarkets  BD if controlled for financial markets development  
 Institutional factor BD if controlled for quality of institutions  
 Aid BD if included aid term  
 Instability  
Transmission 
Channels 
Yearaverage  
 
BD if paper controlled for political instability  
Number of  transmission channels controlled in the 
analysis 
Length of  period in years average 
 
BD= binary dummy. It is 1 if condition fulfilled, otherwise 0. 
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Table 2: Meta-probit regression analysis 
Moderator MRA Significant effect (dummy) Positive effect (dummy) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Author 
characteristics 
           
WB 0.79 
(1.08) 
   2.01 
(1.88) 
-0.45 
(-0.55) 
     
IMF 0.29 
(0.48) 
    -1.93 
(-2.44) 
   -0.87  
(-1.40) 
-1.75 
(-2.42) 
Actor in 
remittances 
0.29 
(0.48) 
   0.83 
(0.94) 
-0.95 
(-1.25) 
    -2.50 
(-2.59) 
 
           
Data 
characteristics 
           
NrCountries  0.0006 
(0.11) 
  0.009 
(0.73) 
 -0.004 
(-0.80) 
  -0.0008 
(-0.09) 
-0.02 
(-1.45) 
NrYears  -0.054 
(-2.29) 
  -0.055 
(-2.05) 
 -0.001 
(-0.07) 
  -0.024 
(-0.69) 
-0.17 
(-0.54) 
Year average  -0.025 
(-0.35) 
  -0.053 
(-0.40) 
 
   0.15 
(2.02) 
  0.085 
(0.81) 
0.22 
(1.99) 
NrControls  0.13 
(1.45) 
  0.15 
(1.42) 
    0.13 
(1.41) 
  0.21 
(1.85) 
0.13 
(1.17) 
Channels  0.01 
(0.06) 
  -0.44  
(-1.40) 
 0.46 
(2.56) 
  0.33 
(1.60) 
0.22 
(0.90) 
 
           
Estimations 
characteristics 
           
Fixed effects   0.45 
(1.18) 
 0.35 
(0.74) 
  0.33 
(0.91) 
 0.73 
(1.44) 
0.47 
(0.86) 
Panel   0.43 
(1.08) 
 0.72 
(1.17) 
  0.13 
(0.34) 
 -0.14 (-
0.24) 
1.12 
(1.26) 
Endogeneity   0.27 
(0.67) 
 -0.25 
 (-0.41) 
  1.09 
(2.52) 
 0.72 
(1.15) 
0.71 
(1.07) 
 
           
Methodological 
choices 
           
Direct    -0.53 
(-1.04) 
-1.27  
(-1.79) 
   -1.33  
(-2.96) 
-0.95  
(-1.34) 
-1.34 
(-1.61) 
Institutional 
factor 
   0.81 
(2.02) 
 0.24 
(0.47) 
   0.34 
(0.97) 
0.31 
(0.63) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
 
           
Published            
constant 0.09 
(0.16) 
1.77 
(2.12) 
-0.09 
(-0.23) 
0.55 
(1.00) 
1.02 
(0.64) 
1.45 
(1.87) 
-0.51 (-
0.64) 
-0.26 
(-0.64) 
1.28 
(2.41) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
2.85 
(1.59) 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.098   0.029 0.080 0.267 0.161  0.243  0.083 0.0836 0.374 0.466 
Prob (chi2) 0.684 0.149   0.491 0.083 0.054 0.002  0.000  0.059 0.023 0.000 0.000 
Note: The estimation method is random-effect meta-regression using residual maximum likelihood to estimate between study variance, with 
clusters and small sample correction. z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust and clustered standard errors. Numbers in bold are 
statistically significant, at least at the 10% level. 
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Table 3:Meta-probit regression analysis (with explicit control for Quality of studies) 
Moderator MRA Significant effect Positive effect 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Author 
characteristics 
          
WB 0.49 
(0.58) 
   
 
     
IMF 0.28 
(0.38) 
   --1.56 
(-2.76) 
   -1.01 
(-1.96) 
-1.26 
(-2.07) 
Actor in 
remittances 
0.19 
(0.27) 
   -0.61 (-
1.19) 
   -2.20 
(-3.58) 
-2.93 
(-3.40) 
 
          
Data 
characteristics 
          
NrCountries  0.005 
(0.08) 
   0.004 
(0.46) 
  -0.004 
(-0.42) 
-0.005 
(-0.47) 
NrYears  -0.036 
 (-1.38) 
   0.02 
(0.87) 
  0.02 
(0.88) 
0.04 
(1.51) 
Year average  0.036 
(0.44) 
   0.34 
(3.64) 
  0.50 
(3.17) 
0.67 
(3.63) 
NrControls  0.10 
(1.13) 
   0.10 
(1.49) 
  0.16 
(1.53) 
0.11 
(0.96) 
Channels  0.027 
(0.15) 
   0.66 
(2.72) 
  0.64 
(2.00) 
0.75 
(2.22) 
 
          
Estimations 
characteristics 
          
Fixed effects   0.45 
(1.10) 
   0.29 
(0.71) 
 0.66 
(0.87) 
0.28 
(0.40) 
Panel   0.43 
(1.02) 
   0.11 
(0.22) 
 -0.35 
(-0.30) 
-0.50 
(-0.36) 
Endogeneity   0.50 
(1.15) 
   1.25 
(2.97) 
 1.58 
(3.69) 
2.02 
(3.06) 
 
          
Methodological 
choices 
          
Direct    
 
-0.79 
(-1.67) 
   -1.40 
(-2.35) 
 
 
Institutional factor    0.65 
(1.57) 
   0.22 
(0.35) 
 1.56 
(2.29) 
 
          
Quality 0.89 
(2.44) 
0.82 
(1.66) 
1.01 
(2.69) 
0.91 
(2.47) 
0.30 
(0.52) 
2.10 
(1.98) 
0.60 
(1.09) 
0.50 
(0.84) 
2.78 
(2.65) 
3.69 
(3.82) 
Published           
constant -0.11 
 (-0.16) 
0.53 
(0.47) 
-0.51 (-
1.11) 
0.65 
(1.43) 
0.98 
(1.84) 
-3.44 
(-1.91) 
-0.51 (-
0.90) 
1.20 
(2.23) 
-2.27 
(-1.48) 
-3.30 
(-2.06) 
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.133 0.124 0.148 0.166 0.398 0.118 0.108 0.550 0.580 
Prob (chi2) 0.099 0.087 0.036 0.008 0.018 0.000 0.036 0.11 0.000 0.000 
Note: The estimation method is random-effect meta-regression using residual maximum likelihood to estimate between study variance, with 
clusters and small sample correction. z-statistics are in parentheses, using robust and clustered standard errors. Numbers in bold are 
statistically significant, at least at the 10% level. 
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Papers used in Meta-analysis: 
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Ahortor, C.R.K. and D.E. Adenutsi. 2009. The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth 
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Baldé, Y. 2009. Migrants’ Remittances and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.LAPE, 
Université de Limoges. 
Barajas, A., R. Chami, C. Fullenkamp, M. Gapen, and P. Montiel.2009. Do Workers’ 
Remittances Promote Economic Growth? IMF Working  Paper. 
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D'ITALIA Working Papers. 
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Capital for Development. IMF Staff Papers 52. 
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Volatility in Developing Countries? Williams College, Department of Economics Working 
Papers. 
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Finance Working Paper Series. 
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Abstract: 
 
From the perspective of recipients, the presence of emerging donors in the aid market leads to 
the problem of higher transaction costs in the aid allocation process, with more aid 
fragmentation and additional fiscal management challenges for governments. This paper 
investigates how emerging donors' aid allocation influences the fiscal behavior of recipients. 
Our findings suggest that countries receiving aid from emerging donors enhance their fiscal 
response to aid, in particular through an increase in their aid absorption rate. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
The increasing influence of emerging donors in aid architecture has been at the center 
of recent academic and policy debates (Manning, 2006; Naim, 2007). In the face of the 
increase in aid from these new donors, traditional donors, members of Development 
Assistance Committee1 (DAC), have become more anxious and vociferous about the impact 
of these emerging donors on the pattern of aid provision; arguing that emerging donors are 
encouraging poor policies, lowering standards and increasing the debt burden of recipient 
countries. Traditional donors are worried about the impact of the emerging donors on 
governance standards and public management systems in low-income countries (LICs). Some 
traditional donors fear that countries with weak rule-of-law, particularly those with abundant 
natural resources, have gained greater freedom to circumvent the demanded policy and 
institutional reforms. Manning (2006) discusses the possible risk that loans from emerging 
donors to LICs may prejudice their debt situation and may waste resources on unproductive 
investments. 
China is at the forefront of this new anxiety. However, Woods (2008) argued that the 
empirical evidence shows higher growth rates, better terms of trade, increased exports and 
higher public revenues for some African countries as a result of cooperation with China. 
Nevertheless, if the increasing influence of non-DAC donors2 creates new donor competition, 
which may enlarge the recipients' room for manoeuvre, the presence of emerging donors 
aiding Africa and other LICs is by no means a guarantee of enhanced development. Indeed, 
emerging donors not only provide aid in order to facilitate economic and social development; 
                                                 
1
 The 24 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are :  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and European Union Institutions (OECD, 
2011) 
2
 We will use the term "non-DAC donors" to describe emerging donors, even if it defines the group by what they 
are not, rather than by what they are. 
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they give aid also for commercial interest and to gain political influence (Kragelund, 2008; 
Dreher et al, 2011). 
Moreover, an observation of the highly fragmented aid market may lead to the 
conclusion that the arrival of emerging donors exacerbates the situation and thus undermines 
macroeconomic management in recipients, because of the heavy transactions costs associated 
with donor-recipient coordination. Also, given that most aid goes through the public sector, its 
impact on the recipient economy will depend on how it affects governments’ fiscal behavior 
(Morrisey, 2012; Ouattara, 2006). Therefore, the presence of non-DAC donors leads to the 
problem of higher transaction costs in aid allocation processes, with more aid fragmentation 
and also creates additional fiscal management challenges for the recipient governments. 
 This paper has for its starting point the two previously mentioned issues for a 
recipient country related to emerging donor aid allocation:- New fiscal management 
challenges and Aid fragmentation. We will analyze how these concerns are managed by LICs. 
The purpose of this analysis is twofold. Firstly, we use fiscal response modeling to describe 
how emerging donors affect the fiscal behavior of recipient governments. Secondly, we 
develop a theoretical framework to explain how welcoming emerging donors could be used 
by recipient governments as a strategic attitude to modify their fiscal response to aid flows. 
Our findings indicate no strong evidence that non-DAC donor aid undermines recipients' 
fiscal behavior, and contrary to the usual preconceptions, the presence of emerging donors in 
aid market seems to increase the rate of aid absorption. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents some stylized facts about 
emerging donors' aid. Section 3 reviews the literature and modeling issues related to aid and 
fiscal behavior. Section 4 details the empirical methodology and interprets the results of fiscal 
response models. Section 5 presents, with reference to an absorption-spending framework, 
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how recipients can take advantage of the presence of emerging donors to improve their 
response to aid flows.  Section 6 offers conclusions. 
 
 
 
3.2. Emerging donors and Recipients: Some Stylized facts 
3.2.1 Who are Emerging donors and how they proceed? 
 
According to Paulo and Reisen (2010), more than 30 donor countries operate outside the 
DAC, a 50 year old club of ‘established donors3’.  We choose the term "non-DAC donors" to 
describe these actors, even if it defines the group by what they are not, rather than by what 
they are4. 
 
The most important non-DAC donors included China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, 
Russia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Kuwait, Thailand and Korea. To 
that list, we can add the group of newest member states5 of the EU that are working to align 
their programmes with EU principles and commitments (Zimmerman and Smith, 2011). 
 
Most of these new donors are in a quest for energy security, enlarged trading opportunities 
and new economic partnerships. Therefore, although there may not be policy conditionalities, 
the majority of aid from emerging countries, especially China, India, and Venezuela, is 
combined with special trade arrangements and commercial investments. Statistics show that is 
not uncommon; many traditional donors also give tied aid, despite an official policy of 
                                                 
3
 The 24 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) include the following: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and European Union 
Institutions (OECD, 2011) 
 
4
 Zimmermann and Smith (2011) introduce well these emerging donors. 
5Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia 
and the Slovak Republic. 
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untying. For example, 64 percent of SouthKorea’s aid is tied, 45 percent of Greece’s aid, and 
23 percent of the United States’ aid is tied (Walz and Ramachandran, 2011). 
 
The most obvious critique of emerging donors focuses on their support for rogue states, or, as 
they would put it, their determination not to involve themselves in the politics of countries 
with which they deal. Another aspect of their non-interference policy, emerging donors 
traditionally do not apply conditionality on their aid, while traditional donors are known for 
requiring specific changes to governance and macroeconomic policies in recipient countries. 
Non-DAC donors generally have fewer requirements to meet. This enables more rapid 
disbursement compared to an often-prolonged DAC process. (Walz and Ramachandran, 2011) 
 
Given an alternative source of aid, poor countries choose to work less with those who 
‘burden’ aid or loans with strong reforms requirements, and so reducing the influence of the 
DAC donors and international organizations. Thus, the emerging donors are said to be 
weakening progress made by the traditional donors. 
 
3.2.2. Potential effects of emerging donors aid: Preliminary analysis 
 
The overall arguments can be resumed in the fear that a new consensus will replace the long-
hallowed Washington consensus on economic policy. But the common thread against 
emerging donors do not have evidence that macroeconomic disaster has in fact followed 
acceptance of aid from emerging donors. Therefore, this paper tries to present fiscal 
management challenges faced by countries where non-DAC donors are becoming more 
powerful. Figure 1 shows the evolution of some fiscal behaviour's variables in recipients 
when emerging donors influence in ODA increases. It seems that there is a positive 
correlation between short-term debt and the presence of non-DAC donors. Furthermore, tax 
effort and public investment are negatively correlated to aid flows from emerging donors. 
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Figure1: Correlation Graphs: Emerging donors influence in ODA and Evolution of fiscal behaviour in recipients 
Source: Author's calculation 
 
These observations suggest that the presence of non-DAC donors induce different recipients' 
fiscal behavior from those expected and described by Ouattara (2006). In fact using panel data 
over the period 1980–2000, he found that public investment is positively related to aid flows; 
aid flows exert a positive impact on government developmental expenditure and a negative 
significant impact on non-developmental expenditure; aid does not discourage revenue 
collection effort. His results also suggested substitution between borrowing and aid. The 
figure shows that governments receiving more non-DAC aid follow some potentially 
dangerous fiscal behaviors, comforting the critique made about emerging donors aid 
allocation. However, we need a more robust analysis to show whether or not a 
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macroeconomic disaster has followed acceptance of aid from emerging donors in recipients 
countries. This paper aims to fill this gap. 
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3.2.  Methodological and empirical  reviews 
Given the highly fragmented “aid market” in some LICs, the emergence of new donors might 
undermine the situation and lead to increasing challenges in macroeconomic management by 
LICs. We need to understand why LICs' governments accept aid from emerging donors 
despite the associated transaction costs. Of course, the main reason is that developing 
countries have begun to look beyond the traditional donors for policy ideas, this change has 
been caused by their dissatisfaction at the ineffectiveness of aid as regards their development 
needs. Welcoming aid from emerging donors could be a passive willingness to “accept 
whatever aid is offered”, or part of a carefully considered strategy that views the new donors 
as providing alternatives important to a country’s balanced development (Sato et al, 2011).  
Most of the aid that is spent in a country goes to or through the government, or finances 
services that would otherwise be a demand on the budget. Our analysis focuses on the 
influence of emerging donors’ aid allocations on the recipient government’s fiscal behavior, 
in terms of the decisions between various sources of revenue (e.g. taxation and domestic 
borrowing), and areas of expenditure (e.g. public investment and recurrent government 
expenditure). 
 
 3.2.1. Brief review of related literature 
 
We will consider fiscal effects and aid fragmentation. 
Aid may affect government spending, the level of tax revenue and borrowing behavior. 
Morrissey (2012) provides a good survey of fiscal effects studies, and finds that there is 
relatively little evidence about the effect of aid on the level and evolution of government 
spending.  One reason is that data is not available for long periods. Secondly,studies which 
examine the fiscal effects of aid focus on fungibility, but the fungibility approach, does not 
explain how aid impacts on recipient government fiscal behavior. 
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Our analysis ties the fiscal effects to the aid fragmentation issue related to the emergence of 
new donors. There is evidence that donor fragmentation has negative consequences, both for 
the effectiveness of aid, because of higher transactions costs (Djankov et al,2009), and for the 
domestic institutions in recipient countries (Knack and Rahman, 2007). The study of donor 
fragmentation has received a lot of attention recently. From the perspective of policy makers, 
the question of aid fragmentation has direct implications for the way aid programs are 
administered. Donors are concerned about how their aid is used, especially how it affects 
fiscal behavior by recipient governments. With increasing number of donors administrative 
requirements tend to overburdening local authorities (Easterly, 2007).  
The focus on transactions costs causes studies to skip the discussion on the potential strategic 
behavior behind the welcoming of new donors. Indeed, highly concentrated donor structures 
mean that unexpected aid shortfalls by one main donor can do serious harm to overall aid 
flows to a recipient country. Aid fragmentation could serve to reduce the risk of a severe 
reduction in aid flows. 
 
(1) Modeling fiscal behavior 
 
To investigate fiscal behavior, studies use fiscal response models.  
Fiscal response models view governments as organisms that attempt to optimize the value of 
some ultimate target such as the rate of economic growth. In reality, governments do this by 
steering certain intermediate policy variables towards their desired levels (Cassimon and Van 
Campenhout, 2007). 
Fiscal response models have been criticized on a number of grounds. The need to presume the 
existence of, and estimate, targets for government expenditure and revenue seems to be a 
weak point. The sensitivity of this method to starting values leads to cicumvention of this 
problem by estimating fiscal response models in a vector autoregression (VAR) framework. 
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Ouattara (2006) provides a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal effects of aid with panel data 
methods: 
 
It is assumed that decision-makers in the public sector behave as a single individual having an 
effective homothetic preference map and with the following utility function: 
 
),,,,( BARGIfU g=
 
 
where Ig stands for public investment, G for government consumption, R for government 
revenue (tax and non-tax), A for net foreign aid disbursements, and B for the flow of public 
borrowing from other sources (domestic and foreign). 
It is then assumed that the public authorities minimize the following quadratic loss function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2423222*10 2222 ∗∗∗ −−−−−−−−= BBRRGGIIU gg
αααα
α  
 
subject to the budget constraint BARGI g ++=+ ; where the starred variables indicate 
exogenously determined targets, and αi>0, i =1,. . .4 represent the weight attached to each 
element of the utility function. The problem has been to obtain the target variables included in 
the model6. In this paper classic panel data econometrics have been adopted. 
 
3.3.  Emerging Donor Impact on Recipient Fiscal Behavior 
 
3.3.1.Methodology and data issues 
 
(1) The model 
 
The central insights from our paper associate the evolution of aid architecture and the reaction 
functions that frame recipients' fiscal policy choices.  Therefore, a fiscal policy reaction 
                                                 
6
 Various estimation methods were used to estimate these target variables. See Ouattara (2006) and Morrissey 
(2012) for details. 
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function where a measure of the fiscal behavior reacts to the emerging donors variable is a 
possible avenue for such analysis: 
 
itiititiit eZXaY ++++= ηγβ  
Our dependent variables are standard in the fiscal response literature. The first variable in the 
system is current account balance. Secondly, we disaggregate government expenditure into 
current expenditure and public investment. The two other variables in our system are the level 
of domestic borrowing, and tax revenue. We estimate our model for each policy variable. 
 
Our key independent variables are emerging donors share in total aid7, and donor 
fragmentation. The purpose is to separate the effect of increasing donor fragmentation from 
the changes related to non-DAC aid allocation. We follow Kimura et al (2012) and calculate 
the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI) of aid shares. The HHI is calculated by taking the sum 
of squared aid shares of all donors: 
,
1
2∑
=
=
N
i
isHHI  
where donor i's aid share in total aid received is defined as 
aidtotal
aid
s ii
.
≡ . The donor 
fragmentation variable is obtained by subtracting the HHI from 1.  
 
Because aid flows are tied with commercial transactions, an indicator of average trade 
intensity with emerging donors is included. To estimate the influence of the bilateral trade, we 
use the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). The other 
variables include lagged dependent variables, level of economic development, foreign direct 
                                                 
7Because of China’s high-profile in Africa, much of the discussion about new donors has centred on China’s role 
as a new actor in development cooperation, and the differences between its approach to development cooperation 
and the DAC principles. We use the ratio between China and US GDP as proxy for the perception of the 
influence of emerging countries in the global economy. We make the instrumentation of the emerging donor 
share in total ODA using the ratio of China and US GDP. 
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investment, exports, imports, domestic output growth rate, terms of trade, financial openness, 
savings ratio, government size, and institutional variables. 
 
We employed panel data regression methods to evaluate our model. We start by using a 
dynamic panel data specification, and apply the Blundell-Bond ‘system-GMM’ estimator. The 
main advantages of these GMM estimators relate to their perceived robustness to 
heteroscedasticity and non-normality of the disturbances. Moreover, the use of instrumental 
variables helps address bias arising from reverse causality (Martins, 2011). Despite the 
popularity of dynamic panel data methods in applied research, to take into account potential 
cross sectional dependence and the presence of cointegrating non-stationary variables, we also 
use Mean Group estimators (Pesaran et al 1999). 
 
(2) data 
 
The data used in this article was mainly collected from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Our data cover 82 
developing countries over the period 1980–2010. The size of the samples varies due to data 
availability with respect to our dependent variable. See Appendix for more details. 
 
 
3.3.2. Empirical results 
We start by investigating the relationship between emerging donor aid and the current account 
balance of recipients (Table 1). The current account deficit has to increase by the same 
amount as aid to effect a complete transfer of resources (Buffie et al, 2010). In the system-
GMM, the estimated coefficients of explanatory variables usually represent short-term 
impacts. The results suggest that an increase of non-DAC influence in aid allocation leads to 
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an increase of current account deficit. It seems that non-DAC aid increases the real transfer of 
resources to recipient governments, either directly via imports or indirectly via increased 
public expenditure.  The second column shows the Pesaran's estimator, and gives the average 
long-run fiscal response of recipient governments to increased emerging donor aid. These 
estimates confirm our previous findings. 
We now turn to the second empirical question about borrowing behavior (Table 2). The 
results show that our variable of interest (non-DAC influence in aid allocation) has a negative 
and statistically significant sign, suggesting that non-DAC aid allocation is generally 
associated with a change in government borrowing behavior. This finding recalls the fear of 
debt unsustainability in countries welcoming emerging donor aid expressed by Manning 
(2006), Moses (2007), and others. However, at this level we do not have evidence that this 
increase in borrowing level is sufficient to undermine debt sustainability in recipient 
countries. 
Turning to the tax revenue equations (Table 3), we find no strong evidence that non-DAC aid 
undermines government tax revenue. On the contrary it seems that the presence of emerging 
donors leads to an improvement of recipient government fiscal effort. In fact, to evaluate 
fiscal effort, we disaggregate taxation between fiscal potential and real fiscal effort as 
explained in Brun et al (2009)8. No significant effect is evident in the structural taxation 
equation, while the "revealed" fiscal effort equation shows a positive short-run effect.  (We 
are aware that data availability is a problem here). 
In Table 4, we find no evidence concerning the effect of non-DAC aid on public investment. 
When we combine our non-DAC aid variable findings with our second variable of interest 
"aid fragmentation", we see that aid fragmentation has a different impact. It leads to an 
                                                 
8
 We build an indicator of the “revealed” policy by computing the difference between the observed flows and the 
“structural” flows that result from the non-political or structural determinants of these flows. These “structural” 
flows are the fitted values derived from a regression of observed flows on economic determinants. The residuals 
of this regression, the flows that remain unexplained by the regression, represent the impact of the policy and can 
then be used to build an indicator of this policy. 
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increase in non-DAC aid. This helps to explain why predictions about the impact of emerging 
donors on fiscal behavior, based on the increased transaction costs and lower standards 
hypotheses, are not confirmed by empirical results.  
 
The thinking behind the results 
 
To interpret what seem to be counter-intuitive findings we consider the Hudson and Mosley 
(2008) framework on aid volatility and donor concentration. They note that donor 
concentration should serve to reduce aid volatility, as follows: 
Let A be the total aid provided by two donors (x and y). The combined volatility of aid is 
given by Var(A) = σxx + σyy + 2σxy. 
Now consider that the same amount is provided by a single donor, but divided into two parts 
of equal size; then by definition Var(A) = σxx + σxx + 2σxx= 4σxx. 
Only in the case where the two countries’ aid budgets are perfectly correlated will we get σxy 
= σxx; failing this, σxy< σxx. This explanation suggests that aid volatility will generally be less 
the greater the number of donors (Hudson and Mosley, 2008).  Thus, aid fragmentation could 
be used by recipient governments as an insurance policy against aid volatility, reducing the 
chance of severe aid shocks.  
According to Buffie et al (2010) this strategy will send a signal to the private sector which 
determines the success of the fiscal management of aid (more about this later), and intuitively 
we assume that more the donors are different (in their characteristics and in their allocation 
criteria) more the credibility signal to the private sector would be greater. Thus, welcoming 
emerging donors could be a fiscal strategy that helps recipients to improve their aid 
management policy. 
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To test this hypothesis we consider a policy response model as defined by the IMF and 
Hussain et al. (2009) to investigate how emerging donors' aid could influence fiscal 
management in recipient countries. 
 
 
3.4. Aid Fragmentation, Credibility Signal and Fiscal Response to Aid 
 
Donors are concerned about how their aid is used, especially how it affects the fiscal behavior 
of recipient governments. The internal pressures to spend aid money as soon as it arrives are 
very strong. Moreover, donors are also highly averse to fiscal prudence; they want to see their 
money spent doing good, not piling up as reserves in central bank vaults (Buffie et al, 2010). 
 
The IMF uses a ‘spend and absorb’ framework to classify macroeconomic responses to an aid 
surge9. Hussain et al (2009) defined ‘Absorption’ as the extent to which the current account 
deficit, excluding aid, increases in response to an increase in aid inflows. This measure 
captures the quantity of net imports financed by an increment in aid, which represents the real 
transfer of resources enabled by aid. 
‘Spending’of aid is defined as the increase in government fiscal deficit (net of aid) that 
accompanies an increment in aid. Spending captures the extent to which the government uses 
aid to finance an increase in expenditure or a reduction in taxation. Even if the aid comes tied 
to particular expenditure, governments can choose whether or not to increase the overall fiscal 
                                                 
9
 ‘Spend’ is defined as the increase in the primary fiscal deficit and ‘Absorb’ as the increase in the current 
account deficit; both measured as a percentage of the increase in aid. The IMF recommends that the central bank 
sells all the aid dollars and that the central government spends all the counterpart funds (i.e. the domestic 
currency proceeds of the aid). 
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deficit as aid increases. The aid-related increases in expenditure could be on imports or 
domestically produced goods and services10.  
 
Hussain et al (2009) discussed four potential scenarios based on these two concepts11: "Aid 
absorbed and spent", "Aid neither Absorbed nor Spent", "Aid absorbed but not Spent" and 
"Aid Spent but not Absorbed". The two "Not Spent" policies are unsustainable because donors 
want their aid spent, and ignore that could provoke a suspension of aid. The IMF recommends 
that the central bank sells all the aid dollars, and that the central government spends all the 
counterpart funds (first scenario). 
This framework emphasizes the need to coordinate fiscal policy with monetary and exchange 
rate policy in order to minimize potential adverse effects. The macroeconomic impact of aid 
depends critically on the policy response to aid. 
 
However Buffie et al (2010) explained that the private sector is aware of the connection 
between aid surges and the path of the fiscal deficit. Thus, private agents have ample grounds 
to fear that today's aid surge could threaten future fiscal stability. Furthermore, the success of 
the macroeconomic management option depends also on a strategy for managing private 
sector expectations about the end of the aid surge. This hypothesis helps to explain the 
empirical evidence about fiscal response to aid in recent studies. Berg et al (2007) and Foster 
                                                 
10Analyzing spending is important because of the natural focus on the budget as a policy variable, and also 
because of the importance of tensions between the fiscal policy response to aid and broader macroeconomic 
objectives with respect to the exchange rate and inflation (Hussain et al, 2009) 
 
11Absorb and spend aid. The government spends the extra aid inflow – either through higher public spending, 
lower domestic revenue (e.g.cutting taxes), or a mixture of both – while the central bank sells the foreign 
exchange in the currency market.  
Absorb but not spend aid. The government decides not to spend the aid inflow,  the central bank sells the foreign 
exchange. Foreign aid is thus used to reduce the government’s seigniorage requirement since it substitutes for 
domestic borrowing for financing the government deficit.  
Spend and not absorb aid. The government spends the additional aid inflow (non-aid fiscal deficit increases), the 
central bank allows its foreign exchange reserves to increase. In this case, the extra foreign exchange is not made 
available to importers, but instead it is used to build up international reserves. 
Neither absorb nor spend aid. The government does not use the additional aid inflow to increase the non-aid 
fiscal deficit, the central bank increases its foreign exchange reserves. 
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& Killick (2006) found that the current account deficit typically increases by less than half of 
the rise in aid flows, and that aid surges often coincide with large capital outflows; most aid 
appeared to finance capital flight, rather than an increase in net imports. 
 
The purpose of this section is to propose an explanation of recipients' attitudes to welcoming 
emerging donors (as a credibility signal to the private sector), and to explain how the 
emergence of non-DAC donors could be used by recipients as a strategy to improve the 
impact of their fiscal response to aid flows. These explanations will give a full understanding 
of our previous findings on fiscal variables in Section 2. 
 
3.4.1.Theoretical framework 
Our model derives from the conceptual framework in Buffie et al (2010) and Berg et al 
(2007). 
All economic decisions in the private sector are assumed to be controlled by a representative 
agent who maximizes his expected lifetime utility and has preferences over a composite 
bundle of tradable and non-tradable goods, thus : 
 
∑
∞
=
−
−
=
0
1
0 1t
tt CEU
σ
β
σ
 
where [ ] µµµ ωω 1))(1()( −−− −+= NtTtt CCC     is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
aggregator function, and ω is the weight households place on tradable consumption. The 
elasticity of substitution of consumption between tradables and non-tradables is 1/(1+µ). 
 
The private agent receives labor income, rents capital to firms, and makes investment 
decisions. In addition, the private sector receives lump-sum transfers from the government. 
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Thus, the private agent chooses asset holdings and expenditure that maximize his utility with 
the following wealth and budget constraints (WC and BC respectively): 
 
WC : Fb
e
p
mW +∗



+=  
BC : mb
e
p
rgpCW χ−∗



∗++=&  
 
whereχ=ė/e is the rate of currency depreciation, m≡M/e, M is domestic currency, r is the real 
interest rate, g is real lump-sum transfers received from government, foreign currency is F, 
and government bonds is B. Bonds are indexed to the price level P, so B=Pb, where b≡B/P. 
 
* Aid, public sector, and reserve accumulation 
When aid flows increase from X0 to X1 at t=0, the government and the private sector make 
expectations about the end of the aid surge with probabilities pg and pp. These probabilities 
determine the proportion of the increased aid spend by the government, or used as buffer 
stocks in central bank reserves, but also the success of the fiscal management policy of 
government due to the credibility level accorded by the private sector.  
 
Thus we have, the following system 
Public transfer:   ( )0101 XXgg −+= ψ ψ<= 1 
Reserves:             ( )( )011 XXZ −−=
•
ψ  
ψ determines the fiscal management scenario chosen by the government, and according to 
Buffie et al. (2010) even in the best-case scenario the success of aid surge management 
depends on private agent expectations about government capability, and fears about a future 
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period of large fiscal deficits and high inflation, while the government is struggling to curtail 
expenditure after the end of the aid surge. 
 
Following the "absorb and spend" scenario of Hussain et al. (2009) the government spends 
the extra aid inflow, and the central bank sells the foreign exchange in the currency market - 
corresponding to 0=Z& and ψ=1: 
 
(1) In the full credibility case, the public sector budget constraint is  
mXrb
e
pgZb
e
p
m χ−−+=−+ 11&&& with 0== Zb &&  
mXrb
e
pgm χ−−+= 11&
 
 
(2) low credibility case: 
 
As shown by the wealth constraint, the private sector divides its wealth between domestic 
currency M, foreign currency F, and government bonds B. Therefore, in a low credibility 
period, private agents believe that the aid surge is temporary, and have concerns about the 
government's capacity for expeditious fiscal retrenchment (Buffie et al, 2010). 
They move their wealth allocation towards F and M, generating capital flight and high 
inflation12. Thus, the public sector budget constraint becomes: 
mb
e
pXrb
e
pgm χ−−−+= && 11  
 
                                                 
12Country studies recently completed by Berg et al (2007) and Foster & Killick (2006) found that the current 
account deficit typically increases by less than half of the rise in aid flows and that aid surges often coincide with 
large capital outflows. These are disconcerting correlations. The current account deficit has to increase by the 
same amount as aid to effect a complete transfer of resources. The case study data indicate that this did not 
happen; most aid appeared to finance capital flight rather than an increase in net imports. 
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A part of the fiscal deficit is now financed by issuing debt. The intuition here is that the 
increase in current account deficit (CAD) will be higher in the full credibility scenario: 
CADFC> CADLC,  
 
whereCAD = C+g – Investment – (Transfert+Income) - (rt-1-1)bt-1/pi; ( Berg et al. 2010).  
 
If the private sector fears that after the aid surge there might be a period of large fiscal deficits 
and high inflation, their expectations could lead to capital outflows and the failure of the 
"absorb-spend" policy. 
 
Given that the effectiveness of aid flow macroeconomic management depends also on private 
sector expectations, we want to investigate if welcoming emerging donors could be used by 
recipient countries as a strategy to influence private sector anticipation (by sending a signal 
that there would not be a collapse in aid flows) and so achieve better aid management. 
 
Increased aid can serve some combination of three purposes: an increase in reserve 
accumulation, an increase in capital outflows, and an increase in the non-aid current account 
deficit (Hussain et al 2009). The rate of absorption of an increase in aid is then defined as the 
change (∆) in the current account (excluding aid) deficit as a share of the change in aid 
inflows: 
Absorption of aid = ∆(Non-aid current account deficit)/ ∆Aid. 
 
For a given fiscal policy, absorption is controlled by the central bank, through its decisions 
about how much of the foreign exchange associated with aid to sell, and through its interest 
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rates policy, which influences the demand for private imports via aggregate demand, but also 
depends on private sector behavior as explained above. 
 
‘Spending’of aid is defined as the increase in the government fiscal deficit, net of aid, that 
accompanies an increment in aid: 
 
Spending of aid = ∆(Total expenditures −Domestic revenue)/∆Aid. 
 
 
3.4.2 Empirical evidence 
We will use here the econometric structure briefly describe in Section 2, with our dependent 
variables being now "Absorption" and "Spending" as defined above. Previous studies have 
found that the response to an aid surge is bad in countries with weak records of 
macroeconomic stability and low levels of international reserves (Hussain et al, 2009). We 
control for additional factors including the level of official reserves, the existing debt burden 
and the current level of inflation. 
 
The macroeconomic response to aid is shaped by the government's spending decisions and the 
monetary authority's choices regarding reserve accumulation and bond operations, given the 
endogenous response of the private sector. As shown in Table 5, the presence of emerging 
donors in aid markets could serve recipient governments by sending a credibility signal to the 
private sector, and thus modify the fiscal response to aid. The first column reports estimates 
of the absorption rate equation. The coefficient for the non-DAC aid variable is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that countries welcoming emerging donor aid increase 
their absorption rate.  
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Hussain et al, (2009) suggested that "absorb and not spend" the aid might be an appropriate 
response if domestic debt is too large; this finding corroborates the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the "short-term debt" in the absorption rate equation. We also find 
that inflation reduces the absorption rate and the level of reserves in the central bank. 
Our spending equation does not seem to provide any valuable information, the data 
availability problem is more severe with the spending variable. 
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3.5.  Conclusion 
We started this analysis with arguments critical of the increasing influence of emerging 
donors in aid allocation to LICs, assuming that this situation would undermine 
macroeconomic management in these countries. Empirical evidences show that in practice 
fiscal authorities in LICs do not behave as a "victim" of this evolution in aid architecture, but 
appear to welcome these new donors.  
 
Our findings suggest that non-DAC aid allocation is generally associated with a change in 
government borrowing behavior. This result recalls the fear of debt unsustainability in 
countries welcoming emerging donors' aid expressed by Manning (2006), Moses (2007) and 
others. However, we find no strong evidence that non-DAC aid undermines tax revenue, and 
on the contrary it seems that the presence of emerging donors leads to an improvement of 
government fiscal effort. The most surprising result concerns the current account equation. 
The results indicate that an increase in non-DAC influence in aid allocation leads to an 
increase in current account deficit. This means that the presence of emerging donors increases 
the real transfer of resources to recipient governments, either directly via imports or indirectly 
via increases in public expenditure.  To understand these counter-intuitive findings, we move 
our analysis to an Absorption-Spending framework. 
As explained in Buffie et al (2010), donors insist on seeing their aid spent rapidly, when at the 
same time the fiscal authorities of the recipient country face a potentially serious credibility 
problem, because the private sector anticipates fiscal pressures after the end of the aid surge. 
Given that private sector expectations also determine the success of the macroeconomic 
response to aid, governments should find ways to manage these expectations. As we know 
from Hudson and Mosley (2008), aid fragmentation could serve as an insurance against aid 
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volatility, reducing the chance of an end to the aid surge. Thus, welcoming new donors sends 
a credibility signal to private agents, so avoiding capital flight and higher inflation rates. We 
find that countries receiving aid from emerging donors modify their fiscal response to aid, in 
particular through an increase in their aid absorption rate. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Results 
Note: Robust standard errors - the asterisks represent significance at the 10 per cent (*), 5 per cent (**), and 1 per 
cent (***) confidence levels. 
 
Table 1 : Current Account Equations 
 Sys-GMM PMG 
CA (t-1) 0.46 (0.00) *** 0.26 (0.00) *** 
GDP growth 0.005 (0.94) 0.02 (0.88) 
Gov size 0.001 (0.99) 0.32 (0.20) 
Imports -0.46 (0.00) *** -0.16 (0.03) ** 
Savings 0.34 (0.03) ** 0.51 (0.00) *** 
Financial openness -0.084 (0.91) 1.19 (0.18) 
Aid fragmentation -6.18 (0.07) * 4.46 (0.28) 
nonDAC influence -0.006 (0.05) * -0.15 (0.09) * 
Observations 1411 1384 
AR(2) 0.14  
Hansen 0.19  
Instruments 23  
Number of countries 63 59 
 
Table 4 : Public  Investment Equations  
 Sys-GMM PMG 
Public investment (t-1) 0.65 (0.00) *** 0.25 (0.00) *** 
GDP growth 0.01 (0.69) 0.025 (0.72) 
Gov size 0.06 (0.38) -0.11 (0.30) 
Imports 0.10 (0.03) ** 0.024 (0.49) 
Savings 0.06 (0.00) *** 0.016 (0.62) 
Aid fragmentation 0.49 (0.62) -0.29 (0.83) 
nonDAC influence 0.01 (0.26) -0.07 (0.60) 
Observations 1368 1361 
AR(2) 0.88  
Hansen 0.50  
Instruments 20  
Number of countries 60 59 
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Table 2 : Borrowing Equations (dep var= ratio lend/borrow) 
 Sys-GMM Sys-GMM PMG 
GDP growth 0.07 (0.00) *** 0.067 (0.05) * 0.26 (0.02) ** 
Gov size -0.37 (0.00) *** -0.34 (0.01) ** -0.46 (0.13) 
Imports 0.003 (0.92) -0.008 (0.70) -0.08 (0.53) 
Savings 0.15 (0.00) *** 0.16 (0.00) *** -0.08 (0.59) 
Financial openness  -0.56 (0.31)  
Aid fragmentation 0.36 (0.86) -0.13 (0.96) 1.82 (0.72) 
nonDAC influence -0.01 (0.04) ** -0.009 (0.08) * -0.21 (0.31) 
Observations 1041 908 1023 
AR(2) 0.52 0.63  
Hansen 0.14 0.046  
Instruments 20 23  
Number of countries 64 63 60 
 
Table 3: Taxation and Fiscal Effort Equations  
 Tax revenue Fiscal effort 
 Sys-
GMM 
PMG FE Sys-
GMM 
PMG 
GDP (t-1) 2.34 
(0.09) * 
2.69 
(0.53) 
0.042  
(0.92) 
  
Agri value 
added 
-0.28 
(0.01) ** 
0.24 
(0.31) 
-0.13  
(0.00) *** 
  
Imports 0.86 
(0.53) 
3.86 
(0.23) 
3.01  
(0.00) *** 
  
Savings -0.02 
(0.37) 
0.045 
(0.51) 
0.004 
(0.77) 
-0.014 
(0.56) 
0.18 
(0.33) 
M2 -0.006 
(0.92) 
0.018 
(0.77) 
0.028 
(0.05) * 
  
Gov size    -0.18 
(0.60) 
-0.10 
(0.89) 
Human capital    -0.19 
(0.31) 
0.83 
(0.48) 
GDP per capita    0.003 
(0.54) 
-0.059 
(0.64) 
Aid 
fragmentation 
-4.80 
(0.06) * 
-4.63 
(0.21) 
-1.13 
(0.26) 
0.79 
(0.83) 
-0.012 
(0.99) 
nonDAC 
influence 
0.001 
(0.99)  
-0.11 
(0.44) 
-0.003 
(0.00) *** 
0.003 
(0.07) * 
3.11 
(0.33) 
Observations 1054 1043 1054 594 522 
R2   0.41   
AR(2) 0.12   0.17  
Hansen 0.14   0.47  
Instruments 20   17  
Number of 
countries 
61 54 61 56 38 
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Table 5: Absorption and Spending Equations 
 Absorption Spending 
 Sys-GMM FE RE Sys-GMM 
GDP per capita  -0.016 
(0.30) 
0.046 
(0.28) 
-0.003 
(0.46) 
-0.003 
(0.42) 
Gov size 0.25 
(0.87) 
 -1.86 
(0.19) 
-0.45 
(0.24) 
-0.18 
(0.62) 
GDP growth -0.89 
(0.39) 
 -1.77* 
(0.05) 
-1.41* 
(0.06) 
0.97 
(0.24) 
Savings 0.36 
(0.40) 
-0.17 
(0.14) 
0.73 
(0.20) 
0.56* 
(0.10) 
-0.59 
(0.15) 
Financial openness 2.75 
(0.31) 
7.07 
(0.25) 
8.65 
(0.34) 
2.66 
(0.33) 
 
Short-term debt 0.005*** 
(0.00) 
0.004*** 0.007*** 
(0.00) 
0.006*** 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
Inflation -0.69* 
(0.10) 
 -0.17 
(0.18) 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
-0.50 
(0.15) 
FDI  0.63 
(0.72) 
   
Trade intensity with 
Emerging Donors 
 0.0003 
(0.24) 
   
Variation of 
reserves 
-0.0001* 
(0.05) 
   
 
 
Aid fragmentation 33.7 
(0.20) 
23.1 
(0.46) 
-1.42 
(0.94) 
22.6 
(0.19) 
16.8 
(0.20) 
nonDAC influence 0.02 ** 
(0.048) 
0.03* 
(0.09) 
0.067* 
(0.05) 
0.017* 
(0.08) 
0.004 
(0.76) 
Observations 1000 982 1020 1020 643 
AR(2) 0.85 0.59   0.72 
Hansen 0.70 0.57   0.34 
Instruments 30 25   27 
Number of countries 58 60 60 60 61 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics of Aid and Fiscal Variables: 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
CA -6.18 10.80 -124.56 34.84 
Lend/Borrow -3.00 7.07 -46.23 125.44 
Tax revenue 18.81 8.48 1.3 59.9 
Public investment 7.57 5.72 0.076 50.62 
NDAC influence 0.073 0.56 -24.25 10.46 
AF index 0.68 0.18 -0.63 1 
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Data details: 
Variable Definition Source 
nonDac 
Influence 
Share of nonDAC aid in total ODA OECD-CRS 
nonDAC ODA ODA received from emerging donors OECD-CRS 
CA Current account balance (% GDP) WEO 
Variation of 
reserves 
Change in international reserves WEO 
Borrowing General government net lending/borrowing 
ratio (% GDP) 
WEO 
Financial 
openness 
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index Chinn and Ito (2006) 
AF index Aid fragmentation index Authors 
Human capital  Human asset index (HAI) CERDI 
Imports Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI 
Trade intensity Bilateral trade IMF-DOTS 
FDI Foreign direct investment ((% of GDP) WDI 
Inflation  Inflation rate (CPI, percentage change) WDI 
Gov size General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP)  
WDI 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita WDI 
Public 
Investment 
Public Investment  IMF-IFS 
Tax revenue Tax revenue (% GDP) WDI-CERDI 
Savings Gross savings (% GDP) WDI 
Short-term debt Short-term debt (% GDP) WDI 
M2 Money and quasi money ( % of GDP) WDI 
Agri value 
added 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) WDI 
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List of Countries: 
Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Bhutan, 
Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon , Republic of Congo,  Republic 
Democratic of Congo, Comoros, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, 
Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, 
Indonesia, India, Iraq, Kenya, Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Rep, Liberia, Sri 
Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, Moldova, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Mali, Myanmar, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Korea  Democratic Rep, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, 
Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Somalia, São Tomé and Principe, Swaziland, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Chad, Togo, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Vietnam, Vanuatu, Samoa, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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Chapter 4. Emerging Donors and Evolution of the Aid Architecture  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper describes the behaviour of DAC donor in dealing with the increasing influence of 
non-DAC donors in development cooperation. Using both multilateral and bilateral aid data, 
the results show the importance of political and strategic interests in the competition between 
DAC and emerging donors. Furthermore, our empirical investigations assess the implications 
of these interactions between donors on the quality of DAC aid allocation from a recipient 
perspective. 
 
 
Keywords: Emerging Donors, Aid Effectiveness, Strategic interests, Competition, Aid 
allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Emerging Donors and Evolution of the Aid Architecture 
 
134 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The DAC (Development Assistance Committee) has established a wide array of principles, 
standards and procedures resulting in a complex system governing its relations with aid 
recipient countries. The Paris Declaration of 2005 represents a recent manifestation, calling 
for various steps to be taken by donors and recipients to render aid more effective.The DAC 
consensus on aid allocation was about prioritizing aid towards poverty reduction and the 
needs of the poorest countries. It downplayed the role of aid in pursuing the strategic and 
political interests of the donors. Indeed, during the past two decades DAC donors have agreed 
to protect the poverty and development focus of aid programmes from the influence of other 
policy priorities, such as trade and investment. However, the challenge for development 
cooperation goes far beyond aid principles and the DAC consensus. The underlying challenge 
arises from a combination of the emergence of new economic and political powers, and a 
radically changing global situation (Humphrey, 2011). 
 
The policies that many DAC donors have encouraged recipients to follow, embodied in the 
Washington Consensus, have been subject to growing debate, provoking a global competition 
between new ideas and new policy models (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011). Developing 
countries have begun to look beyond the DAC for policy ideas. Therefore, the emergence of 
alternative sources of financing and policy models has intensified researchers’ and 
practitioners’ attention on this evolution in development cooperation. This paper proposes a 
contribution to this debate. 
According to Paulo and Reisen (2010), more than 30 donor countries operate outside the 
DAC (a 50 year old club of ‘established donors1’).  We will use the term "non-DAC donors" 
                                                 
1The 24 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are : - Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and European Union Institutions (OECD, 
2011). 
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to describe these actors, even if it defines the group by what they are not, rather than by what 
they are2. 
 
Zimmermann and Smith (2011) pointed out that it remains difficult to weigh up the 
opportunities and risks brought by nonDAC donors until more information is available 
about their actions. Nevertheless, overall estimations for the non-DAC donors (hereafter 
NDDs) range from $11 billion to $41.7 billion per year, between 8 percent and 31percent of 
global gross ODA, implying that China, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia give more ODA than half of 
the DAC donors. Four NDDs (Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), & 
China) reach the UN target of 0.7 percent of GNI; a benchmark that 18 of the 23 DAC 
member countries do not reach (Walz & Ramachandran, 2010). At 8-10 percent of total ODA, 
the overall volume of NDD development cooperation flows remains relatively low. However, 
looking at specific developing countries reveals a very different picture. In Yemen, for 
example, the United Arab Emirates alone accounted for 33 percent of total gross ODA flows 
in 2009 (OECD, 2011). In Asia, traditional donors (e.g. Japan) are no longer overwhelmingly 
dominant in terms of aid volume. China, India, Korea, and Thailand are now key sources of 
foreign aid to poorer countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (Sato et al, 2011). A 
look at specific sectors is also instructive. China and Saudi Arabia, have dominated the 
provision of infrastructure in recent years, while at the same time DAC donors have 
prioritized aid for social sectors (Foster et al, 2009; IMF, 2011).  
The increasing influence of NDD donors in development cooperation has elicited two 
opposing reactions, resumed in the following quotations: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2Zimmermann and Smith (2011) give a good introduction to these emerging donors. 
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"…If they continue to succeed in pushing their alternative development model, they will 
succeed in underwriting a world that is more corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian.” (Naim, 
2007) 
“[The DAC] should welcome, not discourage, a greater role by donors outside DAC (…)The 
DAC should not aspire to be a donors’ cartel. Greater choice for developing countries is in 
principle good.” (Manning, 2006). 
 
Advocates of DAC practices are concerned by their impact on governance standards and 
public management systems in recipient countries. They think that the governments of 
recipient countries which have weak rule of law, particularly those with abundant natural 
resources, have gained greater freedom to circumvent governance reforms (recommended  by 
DAC), and ignore the protection of human rights and environmental standards (Manning, 
2006; Naim, 2007; Chileshe, 2010). The increased complexity of the donor community at the 
country level is particularly demanding for recipient governments with weak public financial 
management systems. These countries may accept new loans from NDDs, which lead to 
unsustainable levels of debt and undermine recent global efforts to provide debt relief to 
highly indebted countries.  Paulo & Reisen (2010) and Woods (2008) called for a more 
nuanced discussion about these policy concerns. They find little concrete evidence that the 
arrival of NDDs has undermined governance standards. Moreover, they question whether 
DAC donors have themselves been successful in promoting better governance through their 
use of conditionality.  
If the debate about emerging donors focuses on the implications for aid recipients3, it would 
be interesting to understand how traditional donors manage in this situation. We choose in 
this paper to analyze the emergence of new donors from the DAC donors' perspective. This 
                                                 
3Kragelund (2008), Sato et al (2011), Zimmermann & Smith (2011). 
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aspect of the debate is interesting because it contributes to the literature on the determinants 
of aid allocation, and explicitly assesses the importance of political and strategic interests in 
development cooperation.  
The aim of our paper is twofold. First, we revisit aid allocation motives through competition 
between DAC donors and emerging donors. Second, we evaluate how the increasing 
influence of NDDs affects the quality of DAC aid allocation. We use both multilateral and 
bilateral panel data to highlight the heterogeneous strategic reactions between DAC donors 
and emerging donors.  
 
This paper is structured in the following way: The next section reviews the theoretical and 
empirical background in aid allocation literature. Section 3 describes the empirical 
methodology and data. Section 4 presents the estimation results including some sensitivity 
analysis. Section 5 offers a discussion on the consequence of the competition between donors 
for the quality of aid. Then concluding comments are provided. 
 
 
 
4.2.Literature Review and Methodological Issues 
4.2.1. Background 
After cold war, a common interpretation is that donor agencies are now freer to pursue 
developmental or humanitarian as opposed to political, strategic commercial and related 
criteria in aid allocation. In short, these agencies now allocate more aid to countries which can 
use it better, so that aid would work in promoting growth.Several papers have addressed the 
issue of aid allocation to recipient countries. The most influential, widely-cited studies are 
those of McKinley (1978), McKinley and Little (1977) which have introduced the debate on 
the factors influencing aid allocation and have structured the discussion around the recipient 
needs and the donor interest.  
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The determinants of foreign aid allocation have received much attention in the development 
literature since the 1970s. The majority of work in this area has claimed that donor self-
interest plays a large role in determining how much aid a country receives, potentially 
undermining the efficiency of development aid.The best known of these aid allocation studies 
is Alesina and Dollar (2000), who suggest that bilateral donors care more about strategic and 
historical factors than the developmental needs of aid recipients. Their estimation relied on 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and thus was potentially biased due to the presence of time-
invariant unobservables correlated with explanatory variables;nevertheless they were 
confirmed by McGillivray (2003), Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), Younas (2008), Hoeffler 
and Outram (2011) and others.   
 
 
4.2.2. Modelling in aid allocation studies 
Most of these studies are extensions of Dudley and Montmarquette's (I976) model of 
individual donor optimization to one of simultaneous optimization by multiple donors. In 
these studies, the aid allocation of donors is motivated by recipient well-being and donor self-
interest, as follows: 
Consider a multilateral aid allocation model using a single objective function of the impact of 
aid from all j donors to m recipients. Let assume that all donors pool their aid budgets, and a 
representative donor decides how much of that is to be allocated to a recipient every year.  
Let H be the sum of the impact of the donor’s aid on its own welfare, the problem faced by 
the donor is 
( ) )1(,,,
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where, 
 
hj = subjectively measured impact of aid on the recipient country j 
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aj = aid received by the recipient j 
nj = vector of recipient j needs (income level, population, human capital, or economic 
vulnerability) 
mj = vector of  merit :  measure of the policy environment in the recipient country j (economic 
performance, human rights) 
sj =  vector of donors’ self-interest (trade openness, imports, natural resources) 
ωj = weighted measure of the importance of  recipient j in the eyes of donors. 
 
 
This model is based on the assumption that, other things being equal, the impact of aid is an 
increasing function of the aid that a recipient nation receives; the more the aid is needed, the 
more a country will benefit from an additional unit of aid. The vector of merit mj is included 
based on Burnside & Dollar’s (2000) results on the importance of a good policy environment 
for aid to be effective. Several papers have addressed this issue and identified some important 
recipients' characteristics for aid allocation, such as political and economic institutions 
(Alesina & Weder, 2002; Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2007), adherence to human rights norms 
(Neumayer, 2003), internal armed conflict (Balla & Reinhardt, 2008); and the shared 
characteristics between donors and recipient countries, such as colonial ties (Alesina & 
Dollar, 2000). Thus, economic, political, and other linkages (colonial history, cultural affinity, 
strategic values, geographic location, etc.) between donors and recipients determine the 
weighted measure of the importance of a recipient in the eyes of donors (Younas, 2008; 
Harrigan & Wang, 2011). 
The impact of aid on recipient j can be specified as follows : 
 ( ) )2(,,, τγδα jjjjjjjjj smnasmnah =
10,10,10,10 <<<<<<<< τγδα  
 
As noted above, the supply behaviour of aid from multiple donors is expressed as an impact 
maximization problem of a single donor where all donors pool their budget for aid. Thus, the 
budget constraint of the donor takes the following form: 
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Then the problem faced by the donor can be expressed as 
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The first order conditions are 
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Equating (5) and (6) gives the optimal allocation of aid for a recipient j 
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Taking the log transformation and introducing an error term, we write Equation (7) as 
follows: 
 
)8()ln()ln()ln(ln 3210* itjjjtjj smna εβββηββ ++++++=
 
 
where β0=(1/1-α)lnα, βj=(1/1-α)lnωj, β1=δ/1-α, β2=γ/1-α, β3=τ/1-α, ηt=-(1/1-α)lnλt. 
 
 
In reality, donor aid allocation is determined by factors that influence the perceived impact of 
aid. Furthermore, the allocation of aid is subject to informational time lags. Decision makers 
can only base their decisions on the information currently available and in the case of most 
variables (especially those relating to needs), this information will, at best, be for the year 
prior to that for which the aid is allocated. (Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Younas, 2008; 
Hoeffler &Outram, 2011).Therefore, authors also considered a bilateral model where a 
recipient country does not have the same weight for all donors (ωij # ωj).  
Feeny & McGillivray (2008) describe how bilateral aid allocation is complex. In fact, there 
are decision-making groups of donor aid agencies which have the task of ensuring both the 
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developmental need objective of aid, and the self-interest of donors (commercial, strategic, 
political). Furthermore, the benefit to the donor country may depend on the social, economic 
and political linkages with the recipient. Thus, the parameter α introduced in the 
maximization equation, to reflect recipient-specific considerations in the determination of aid 
flows, should be different by donor (αi # α).  The implication of this parameter αiis that the β 
coefficients attached to the recipient needs and donor interests variables determining aid 
allocation, are allowed to vary across donors4, as follows: 
)9()ln()ln()ln(ln 1,31,21,110* ittjitjitjitijijt smna εβββηββ ++++++= −−−−  
 
The fact of distinguishing these two models will allows us to take account of the 
heterogeneity of donors and of their relations with recipient countries in our analysis of the 
reaction of DAC donors to the emergence of new donors. 
 
 4.2.3.  Estimation issues 
 
The aid allocation literature examines the Need, Merit and Self-interest approach using two 
types of models.  The Type I model describes a one-stage process, where the donor 
deliberates simply between positive and zero aid amounts without first compiling a sample of 
countries which shall receive aid. 
The Type II (sample selection) model describes a two-stage decision-making process in the 
context of aid allocation. In the first stage, the donor selects from a list of potential recipients 
a sample of countries which shall receive aid. Having done this, the donor in the second stage 
decides how much aid to allocate to each of these countries from a predetermined total pool of 
funds. Each of these countries receives a positive amount of aid.  
Given that donors tend to allocate aid  only to specific targeted countries,  data on aid 
allocation include countries that do not receive aid from all donors (i.e. the aid variable is zero 
                                                 
4Feeny & McGillivray (2008) discuss this issue. 
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for a large number of cases), and so we face a potential sample selection problem. 
McGillivray (2002) discusses the estimation options and problems in detail. A number of 
recent studies have adopted a Tobit model, for example, Alesina & Dollar (2002), Thiele, 
Nunnenkamp, & Dreher (2007), Berthélemy & Tichit (2004). This model treats the decision 
on eligibility and the decision on amounts as a single simultaneous process. However, there 
are a number of potential difficulties with this approach. The Tobit model relies crucially on 
the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity in the underlying latent variable model 
(Harrigan & Wang, 2011).  
Some authors like Berthélemy (2006) or Fleck & Kilby (2010) used two-stage estimators to 
tackle this issue; estimating the selection decision first, then the allocation decision second. 
Hoeffler and Outram (2011) explain that studies that have followed this two-stage Heckman 
procedure do not found significant improvement in their results because in aid allocation the 
factors determining the selection and the allocation are broadly the same. Thus given that few 
studies have found that there are significant differences from estimation using OLS, Younas 
(2008) prefers the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) technique to assess the determinants 
of bilateral aid allocation.  
Anyway, one also needs to be aware of the potential simultaneous causation between the 
dependent variable (Aid) and some independent variables (e.g. Trade, Imports, Income or 
Multilateral aid), or reverse causality5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5The lagging of independent variables also reduces the potential problem of simultaneity and contemporaneous 
correlation in the empirical model. 
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4.3.Empirical Methodology and Data Description 
 
Before describing our empirical analysis, we provide in this section an overview of the 
implications of the emergence of new donors for aid allocation.  
In the context of slow growth and fiscal tightening, it will not be easy for industrialized 
countries to maintain public support for the current levels of development aid. Furthermore, 
the rapid economic growth in emerging countries will increase the possibility of competition 
for scarce resources (Humphrey, 2011), because It is clear from these previous studies that aid 
is not just about poverty reduction.  Researchers have investigated the role of donor 
preferences such as geo-political interests (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al, 2009); 
economic self-interest (Younas, 2008).  Given the strategic and commercial interests 
discussed in previous studies, the emergence of NDDs will induce reactions from traditional 
donors according to the perception they have of these new actors. 
 
 Steinwand (2010)6 propose a theory that summarizes donors' strategic reactions to the 
proliferation of new actors in development cooperation. He distinguished two reactions for 
donors acting as lead donor for a given recipient country.In the first scenario, leaders have 
aligned incentives, and aid is used to produce public goods. This means that donors, who give 
aid to foster things like economic development, reduce infant mortality, increase literacy, etc., 
cannot exclude other donors from enjoying success in these areas.In the second scenario, aid 
helps to secure benefits that are exclusively enjoyed by the donor.A central feature of the 
private uses of aid is that donors who try to obtain the same sort of benefit should be locked 
in competition with each other.  
                                                 
6 Work in progress, presented at the 68th Annual MPSA National Conference, Chicago, April 2010. 
Chapter 4. Emerging Donors and Evolution of the Aid Architecture 
 
144 
 
This theory suggests that the DAC donors will react to the increasing influence of non-DAC 
donors in development aid. These DAC donor reactions will vary across time, and will 
depend on the importance they give to countries, regions or specific sectors.  
 
4.3.1. Empirical strategy 
 
In order to describe the DAC donor reactions to the emergence of new donors in development 
assistance, we will use multilateral and bilateral model specification. We present here the 
bilateral aid allocation model proposed by Berthélemy & Tichit (2004) and Hoeffler & 
Outram (2011): 
ijtijijtikiijt uDXAID ++++= ηβθ
  (10) 
 
where subscripti denotes donor,j denotes the recipient, andt time.Xijt represents a vector of 
explanatory variables,θi a constant, anduijt the error term. Theβkcoefficients vary across donors 
because recipients do not have the same value in the eyes of different donors (as explained in 
the previous section).  
Di is a donor dummy variable introduced for all donors in the bilateral approach. After the 
gravity model specification, we also estimate separate equations for each of the G7 donors in 
order to compare individual strategic behaviours. This enables us to compare the coefficients 
across these donors, and examine whether they allocate aid differently.  
We also compare the individual behaviour of donors using the following extended model: 
 
ijtijtiijijtikiijt uXDDXAID +⋅++++= γηβθ
                                                                     (11) 
 
 
Thus for our empirical analysis, we use two different samples. First, we use recipient/year 
observations on multilateral DAC aid commitments. DAC Members’ multilateral aid are 
contributions to the regular budgets of the multilateral institutions.  These data are available in 
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the aggregated DAC statistics. Second, we use the bilateral aid allocation by G7 donors (the 
most important DAC donors) in order to contrast the global DAC aid allocation policy with 
individual strategic reactions to the emergence of new donors. 
 
Variable of interest 
The aim of this analysis is to assess the effect of emerging donors aid allocation on the aid 
allocation behaviour of DAC members. So, we need to add to the previous equation variables 
measuring the evolution of NDDs in development cooperation. To capture the influence of 
emerging donors on development aid, we use two variables: 
-the share of NDD ODA in total ODA received by a country  "NDD weight" = NDD 
ODA/Total ODA7 
- the evolution of emerging donors weight in total ODA8. 
Because of China’s high profile in Africa, much of the discussion about new donors has 
centered on China’s role in development cooperation, and the differences between its 
approach to development cooperation and the DAC principles. We use the ratio between 
China GDP and World GDP as proxy for the perception of the influence of emerging 
countries in the global economy and in development assistance.As an alternative strategy, we 
make the instrumentation of the NDD ODA share of total ODA with the ratio of China GDP 
to World GDP. Another reason to use instrumentation, it is that data on emerging donors aid 
allocation are incomplete because some important non-DAC donors clearly resent the 
traditional dominance of the DAC. China and India, in particular, frame their financial, 
economic and technical support to other emerging and developing countries as South-South 
cooperation. They do not want to be perceived as aid donors but rather as partners. 
                                                 
7
 In practice the ratio of Non-DAC donor aid disbursements and net aid received by a recipient. 
8
 "NDD evolution"= ∆(NDD ODA/(NDD ODA + DAC ODA)). 
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Moreover,they are reluctant to closely coordinate their aid activities with other donors if 
doing so compromises their policy autonomy. So in our paper we intentionally regroup non-
DAC as countries that "are blamed for undermining DAC efforts at better governance and 
policy reforms in the recipient countries, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of their aid" and 
"could undermine the lead-donor advantages". Thus, we emphasize on the perception that 
DAC donors have of these new donors to justify our instrumentation strategy given the data 
limitation.  
The other explanatory variables can be categorized into two groups, relative to recipients and 
donors:Need-Merit and Donor self-interest.   
 
Recipient needsand Merit 
Guillaumont (2008) proposes a normative analysis of aid allocation. He argues that two main 
categories of factors relating to the effectiveness of aid have emerged from the debate in the 
last decade. The first category is policy, institutions and governance (which has been often 
investigated in the literature since Burnside & Dollar, 2000). The second category is related to 
exogeneous shocks and structural economic vulnerability.  In this second category the idea is 
that, other things being equal, aid works better in a good policy environment and aid is likely 
to dampen the negative effects of shocks on growth, to lower the relative shortfall of 
resources, and to prevent economic collapse (Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001). 
If we can consider both structural economic vulnerability and the quality of policy as 
significant factors in aid effectiveness, then we should consider them also as relevant criteria 
for aid allocation. Guillaumont (2008) also discusses the goals of development cooperation, 
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relating international justice to the compensation of countries' structural handicaps9 to growth 
and poverty reduction.  
We capture recipient needs by three variables: income per capita, human capital (measured by 
the Human Assets Index, HAI), and structural vulnerability (measured by the Economic 
Vulnerability Index, EVI). The levels of (100-HAI) and EVI, two composite indices, are 
assumed to reflect the main structural handicaps faced by the country (United Nations 2008, 
Guillaumont 2008). 
The "merit" variables analyze whether donors pay attention to the quality of policy when they 
allocate aid. Following Berthélemy & Tichit (2004), we proxy economic performance by the 
growth of GDP per capita, and the flow of FDI received. However, donors could interpret low 
growth as an indicator of high need, and high amounts of FDI as an indicator of low need. 
Following Younas (2008), we also proxy recipient merit with democracy and human rights. 
For the human rights measure, we have used the indices for political rights and civil liberties10 
produced by Freedom House (2005).  
 
Donor self-interest 
To control for commercial interests we use openness to trade11 and total imports as ratios to 
GDP. The trade variable is included as an indicator of how donors' commercial interests 
influence aid allocation, reflecting the level of trade openness of recipient countries (exports 
                                                 
9Structural handicaps are those, which are durable, and beyond the present capability of the country (of course 
they may result from past policy): they mainly reflect the impact of historical or geographical factors, as well as 
that of the international environment. 
10Political rights refer to the freedom of people to participate in the political process by exercising their voting 
right, being able to organize political parties to compete for public office, and forming an effective opposition 
and electing representatives who devise public policies and are accountable for their actions. Civil liberties entail 
freedom of expression and religious belief, the prevalence of rule of law, right to form unions, freedom to marry, 
and freedom to travel. It also signifies the autonomy of people without interference from the state. These two 
indicators are derived from a cross-country survey every year. Each of these indices is measured on a 1 (best) to 
7 (worst) points scale. 
 
11We do not use bilateral trade flow because there might be a simultaneity bias when aid is tied, because more 
tied aid will imply more imports from the donor. 
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and imports). Aid may be given as a reward for promoting imports and following policies to 
liberalize trade (Younas, 2008). We also control for special linkages between donors and 
recipients; previous studies having found that donors give more aid to their past colonies 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003).  We use a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
recipient is a former colony of any donor in our study, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Additional controls    
We include a measure of the population of the recipient country and the average distance to 
OECD economies. In the bilateral model, we control for multilateral aid provided to the 
recipient12 as an indicator of policy coherence in aid allocation. 
We also include a lagged dependent variable to capture the possible allocative inertia in the 
aid allocation process. In practice, donor agencies are reluctant to variations in aid flows, 
especially downwards, given the administrative and political involvement with recipient 
countries. One would expect, therefore, relatively smooth aid flows over time. The coefficient 
attached to the lagged aid variable can be either positive or negative, respectively indicating a 
gradual increase or decrease in aid over time (Feeny & McGillivray, 2008). 
 
 
 
4.3.2. Data description 
There are two samples of aid data: Multilateral data and bilateral data. 
Our dataset covers 157 recipient countries, and multilateral aid from DAC and G7 donors 
bilateral aid allocations over the period 1980 to 2010. The coverage of our data is limited by 
the availability of information about aid from emerging donors. We deal here with a three-
dimensional (year / donor / recipient) panel database, of almost 33,000 observations. The data 
                                                 
12Berthélemy & Tichit (2004) used a similar strategy to test whether a donor takes note of aid allocations decided 
by other donors. 
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on aid comes from the OECD online statistics database, which provides data on DAC donor 
aid flows.  
At present, 20 countries beyond the DAC membership report their aid flows to the DAC:  
Republic of China (Taiwan), Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, 
Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Thailand,  Turkey and United Arab Emirates. The overall non-DAC aid 
dataare estimated by the OECD based on various sources, notably data published by major 
nonDAC donors: China, India, Brazil, the Russian Federation and South Africa. In 2010, 
the PLAID (Project-level Aid) and Development Gateway generated AidData. AidData is 
designed to address some of the limitations of the OECD-CRS dataset. A major advantage of 
AidData is that it includes more data from non-DAC donors. Data were collected from 
various sources, such as annual reports, media reports, public websites or the statistical 
agencies of the donors. Although the efforts made by AidData to expand the availability of 
aid data, these approaches have led to a less standardized data collection process across 
donors than is used by the OECD-CRS, and may generate some mistakes in data. As example, 
the last AidData project "China-Africa aid database" (released in April 2013) supposed to 
compile all Chinese development finance to Africa from 2001 to 2011 using a media-based 
data collection methodology, raised a huge debate about the reliability of these data. Deborah 
Brautigam (The Brookings Institution) detailed the limits of the AidData project and warned 
researchers to wait around to have someone clean the data before using them and setting 
numbers into stone. Thus, we prefer at this stage use OECD database. 
In appendix, we provide a table presenting gross concessional flows for development co-
operation from non-DAC donors reported to DAC in the 2000's to illustrate the data limitation 
faced by our analysis. 
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Following Berthélemy & Tichit (2004), we use aid commitments rather than disbursements, 
because this variable better reflects the donor decisions. Donors have total control of the 
commitments, whereas disbursements depend in part on the recipients’ willingness and 
administrative capacity to get the money. Another important issue is the common use of "per 
capita aid" as a dependent variable in aid allocation models. Feeny & McGillivray (2008) 
argue that if the main object of a model of aid allocation is to explain observed aid 
allocations, then the specification or measurement of the aid variable must ultimately rest on 
the most likely decision variable used in practice by donor agencies. Aid administrators rarely 
speak of per capita aid, the focus is on absolute aid amounts.Then we should use aid per 
capita and aid in level alternatively as endogenous variable, but here we opt for the per capita 
commitments as they allow us to test previous findings like the “small country bias”, the 
bandwagon effect or aid inertia among others. 
 
 
 
4.4.Results 
Following the existing literature, we provide estimations based on three different approaches: 
Random-effects Tobit, Dynamic POLS and Generalized method of moments (GMM)1314. 
 
4.4.1. Determinants of aid allocation 
 Before turningto the variable in which we are interested, we wanted tocheck the conformity 
ofour resultswith the patterns ofaid allocationidentifiedin previous studies. 
                                                 
13Because there can be important dynamics in aid determination, most regressions include a lagged dependent 
variable and estimate the coefficients as a dynamic panel using the general method of moments (GMM). For 
example, because of inertia in the adjustment of aid policies, aid flows in a given period may relate to those in 
previous periods, even though country policies and other circumstances have changed. In addition, aid projects 
may involve lumpy disbursements, leading to autocorrelation Claessens et al (2009). 
14Following Dreher et al (2011) we do not use the Heckman selection model because we lack a meaningful 
exclusion restriction. 
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Table 1 (columns 1-6) and Table 2 (columns 1-2) therefore present estimates run with 
thetraditionalspecificationin whichincome levelandpopulation sizecapture theneeds ofrecipient 
countries, GDP growth rate is a proxy foreconomic performance,the civil rights and political 
institution environment is a proxy formerit, and trade opennessmeasures 
thestrategiccomponentof aid allocation (as detailedin the theoretical framework). In addition, 
we also include the allocation of multilateral ODA (other thanDAC)in order to identify 
Dudley &Montmarquette's (1976)' bandwagon effect in aid allocation. This theory, recently 
tested by Feeny & McGillivray (2008) and Harrigan & Wang (2011), expresses the idea that 
when a recipient receives an increase in aid from one donor it may attract more from other 
donors as well. Allocation inertia is also a debate here. 
On average, most results (on multilateral and bilateral DAC aid data), are in line with the 
expectations. 
Lagged growth has the expected positive sign; however in the bilateral specification, the 
impact loses significance and in some cases the values shift. This result means that donors 
reward recipients which have a good policy environment, but at the same time some donors 
may interpret high growth as less need of aid. Then DAC multilateral aid allocation responds 
to merit while individual donors may have different definitions of a recipient country’s needs. 
If DAC multilateralallocationis done torewardcountries which aremakingthe most effortin 
terms ofeconomic performance, at the bilateral level other factors prevail. 
 
The results show negative coefficients on the institutional variable, implying that countries 
with bad institutions receive, other things being equal, less aid from DAC members. Its 
significance varies a little across the specifications, but on average, there is clear empirical 
evidence. 
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The coefficients for income and population indexes15 have a positive and statistically 
significant sign, suggesting that donors (multilateral and bilateral DAC allocation) respond to 
recipient needs (they assume that level of income gives a measure of need), and also 
indicating a bias against larger countries. The "smaller country bias" is related to two 
complementary explanations:- for big countries there are bottlenecks in their technical and 
administrative capacity to absorb additional amounts of aid, and donors perceive a 
diminishing marginal impact of aid as the population of a recipient increases (Dowling & 
Hiemenz, 1985). 
 
Two variables describe internal features of aid allocation: lagged aid and multilateral aid 
allocation of global ODA. The analysis of the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable 
shows evidence of aid allocation inertia. Allocative inertia reflects bureaucratic expedience 
between countries. The positive and significant coefficient for the lagged DAC aid variable 
shows that allocative inertia has allowed the amount of aid from DAC donors to increase over 
time. We also demonstrate the "bandwagon effect" with a positive parameter on multilateral 
ODA. 
 
Trade openness has a strong and significantly positive impact on aid allocation. Younas 
(2008) describes empirically the trade motive behind aid allocation as a reward to the 
recipient nations for promoting imports of goods, and removing trade restrictions. He 
concludes that bilateral aid from DAC countries is disproportionately allocated to those 
recipient nations which have a greater tendency to import goods from donor countries. These 
findings focus on aid as an important strategic tool, and it is on this non-altruistic side of aid 
allocation that we want to present new evidence through an assessment of the unseen 
                                                 
15We use standardized variables of population and income per capita in order to express needs, thus it reverses 
the interpretation of coefficients estimates. 
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competition taking place in development cooperation between DAC donors and emerging 
donors  
 
4.4.2. Results on multilateral DAC aid allocation 
Though our preliminary results largely support previous findings about aid allocation, we now 
include variables which measure the influence of emerging donors on development aid, in 
order to assess the policy of the DAC group in dealing with the increasing NDD ODA in 
recipient countries. 
 
• Average DAC multilateral reaction 
First, we include a variable capturing the "weight of NDDs in ODA" in equation (8). With 
annual data, the coefficients for "NDDs' influence" have a negative and significant sign in a 
range of -0.04 to -0.03 for the Random Effects-Tobit; between -0.033 and -0.032 for the 
Dynamic POLS; and around   -0.06 for the Blundell Bond GMM estimator (Tables 1,2,3). 
These results suggest that the more a recipient country receives aid from NDDs the less it 
receives multilateral aid from the DAC group. Thus, it seems that NDD aid and DAC 
multilateral aid are substitutes. The DAC group reduces the amount of multilateral aid 
allocated to a country in response to an increase of NDD aid. This is done in order to 
reallocate aid to others which have a needs-based objective, or to punish countries that have 
welcomed these new donors. 
Columns 4 and 9 in Table 1, present results for the second variable which captures the 
perception of the influence of emerging donors in development cooperation by DAC 
members. The findings are similar and still robust to estimation methods, but with different 
amplitude. 
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To test the robustness of the results, we include additional control variables which are 
expected to have an influence on DAC aid allocation because they capture other dimensions 
of recipient needs and linkages with donors. Therefore, we add four variables into the 
previous regressions: log of foreign direct investment per capita (economic performance), log 
of (100-Hai) and log of EVI (handicaps to growth), and a colonial past dummy (special links 
between donors and recipients). The inclusion of these controls brings us to the same 
conclusion (see Table 1: columns 5&10 and Table 3). 
We also consider the estimation results when taking 3-year averages of the data to reduce the 
effect of aid volatility. The estimation results are in Table 2 (Columns 5&6 and 9&10). The 
coefficients for the variables which capture the NDDs influence on development aid are still 
negative and statistically significant, thus confirming our previous conclusions about 
substitution between NDD aid and multilateral DAC aid16. 
 
• Test of common behaviour in the face of  NDD influence 
In Section 1 (description of theoretical framework), we saw that all countries do not have the 
same value in the eyes of donors, because of various reasons related to economic and political 
interests as well as common histories. So the coefficients for needs, merit and self-interest 
variables should vary across recipients in the model. However,the reactionof the DAC 
groupto the influence of emerging donors should be common to every country in which the 
NDDs are present. To identifythe nature of the DAC group’s behaviour as a reaction to the 
influence of NDDs, in comparison tothe other variablesinfluencingthe DAC aid allocation, we 
use the Augmented Mean Group estimator (AMG) developed by Eberhardt & Teal 
(2011).The AMG estimator is an extension of the Pesaran (2006) Common correlated effects 
Mean Group estimator (CCEMG) which allows for heterogeneous slope coefficients across 
                                                 
16We do not comment on some variations appearing in aid allocation determinants because it is not the aim of the 
paper. Berthelemy & Tichit (2004) and Claessens et al (2009) provided detailed description of the changing 
value of the factors determining aid allocation over time. 
Chapter 4. Emerging Donors and Evolution of the Aid Architecture 
 
155 
 
countries in panels, cross-section dependence (due to common shocks or spillovers effects), 
and time-variant unobservables17. Table 4 shows the results of this procedure. There is 
evidence of a common dynamic process in the multilateral reaction of DAC towards 
recipients. The coefficients for the other explanatory variables are not significant, and confirm 
that all recipients do not have the same value for donors. In fact, the non-significance of 
coefficients in this estimation procedure proves that donors treat recipients differently; on the 
other hand, DAC donors agree, at least at the multilateral level, on a common way to deal 
with the increasing influence of emerging donors. 
 
4.4.3. Results on DAC members bilateral aid allocation 
 
The aim of this sub-section is to distinguish behaviour common to the DAC group from 
individual donors' behaviour in dealing with the emergence of NDDs. In this vein, we 
estimate the model based on equation (9/10) with bilateral data. Table 5 describes the 
allocation decisions of the seven major DAC countries for the period 1980-2010, and their 
strategic choices in dealing with the emergence of NDDs in development cooperation. 
The usual findings about the aid allocation process are seen: "bandwagon effect", importance 
of commercial and economic linkages, colonial past, and allocative inertia. Furthermore, the 
results suggest that donors have responded, somehow, to good policy environments and 
recipient needs, even if they can do better. Harrigan & Wang (2011) show that bilateral 
donors put less emphasis on good policy environments and recipient needs than multilateral 
donors, and that the largest donors allocate a low proportion of their aid on a needs/merit 
basis. Our results confirm this conclusion, as well as the deterioration in allocation motives; 
we find that countries with high structural handicaps tend to receive less bilateral aid. 
                                                 
17See Eberhardt & Teal (2011). 
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The coefficients for the variables measuring NDD power in official development assistance in 
Table 5 are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that when NDDs increase their 
ODA to a country, the major DAC donors (on average) also increase their ODA to this 
recipient. This behaviour contrasts with the evolution of DAC multilateral allocation 
described above. However, it is not surprising to observe this finding because the bilateral aid 
allocation decision-making groups of donor aid agencies have as objective to preserve their 
commercial, political, and strategic self-interests. Thus, DAC donor agencies react so as to 
maintain their "lead donorship" in recipient countries, because as suggested by Steinwand 
(2010), they benefit from this position. This result is very important because we are 
empirically describing the competition between DAC donors and emerging donors in 
development cooperation. 
 
 
• Identification of common behaviour in G7 members' aid allocation 
We again use the AMG estimator procedure to identify common dynamic processes in the 
bilateral aid allocation of the major DAC donors. The results are reported in Table 6 and 
suggest that every donor follows its own strategy, due to the different interests and the 
different recipient countries concerned. There is a heterogeneous management of aid 
allocation; however, we demonstrate a common "bandwagon effect" in bilateral aid allocation 
decisions. 
 
• Individual aid allocation: Different donors and Heterogeneous behaviours 
Although the impact of NDD influence is significantly positive for most G7 donor aid 
allocation, the importance may vary among donors. Table 7 presents the results of regressions 
using equation (11), and Table 8 explores the distinct aid allocation behaviours of DAC 
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donors rather than lumping them together in one regression. We note that donors, on average, 
increase their aid allocation to maintain their leadership, although the significance of the 
coefficient varies due to estimation methods and lack of observations, when performing 
individual aid allocation regression. 
Concerning the other explanatory variables, our results are similar to Berthelèmy & Tichit 
(2004) and others. For civil liberties and political rights, we have negative parameters for 
most of the donors, meaning that, all things being equal, bad governments receive less aid. 
The coefficients are statistically significant only for Canada, Japan, United States and United 
Kingdom18. According to our estimates, France goes in the other direction, with positive 
coefficients, because France tends to give large amounts of aid to some of its former colonies, 
which are African countries with weak institutions. 
The analysis of economic performance variables gives mixed results. Few donors have 
significantly positive parameters for either FDI or lagged growth, or both. The most robust 
result across specification is a significantly positive coefficient of the United Kingdom for 
FDI. It seems that some donors like the United Kingdom may also consider investment 
attractiveness in their aid allocation. 
 
4.4.4. Sensitivity Analysis: Spurious regressions or genuine effect 
We commonly use correlated data, so we need to be sure that the estimated effect is not 
spurious. Because high correlation among regressors may lead to imprecise regressions, we 
use two tools suggested by Besley (1991) and Chatelain & Ralf (2012) to limit the risk of 
misleading findings : a collinearity diagnostic19 using variance inflation factor and condition 
index (before regression) , and the parameter inflation factor (after regression). 
                                                 
18We are commenting here on the Tobit, Dynamic BB GMM and POLS results in Tables 7 and 8. 
19The appendix provides statistics describing the data and collinearity diagnostics results. Besley et al (1980) 
suggest that if the condition index is large ie. 30 or higher then there may be collinearity problems. 
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Chatelain & Ralf (2012) propose a simple method to detect spurious regressions, using what 
they call the "parameter inflation factor" (PIF) to evaluate the level of imprecision in our 
results. The PIF is a measure of the relative omitted variable bias in a simple regression in 
proportional terms, with respect to a multiple regression (Chatelain & Ralf, 2012).  
Consider the following equations: 
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where VIF is the variance inflation factor, r1.jcorrelations coefficients with the dependent 
variable, and rijcorrelations coefficients of the regressors (i,j>1 and i#j). PIF is equal to the 
ratio of the multiple regression parameter β1.2(m) and the parameter of the simple regression 
β1.2(s)
20
,or the ratio of the multiple correlation standardized parameter β12 and the correlation 
coefficient r1.2. 
In practice, to judge the plausibility of the size of the parameter, a simple rule is that when 
PIF is above 2 it may be evidence of a potential spurious regression. 
Table 12 presents PIF results for the ordinary least squares estimated parameters. The PIF 
show that our findings about strategic interactions between donors are not due to misleading 
regressions. We also performed PIF calculations with standardized variables and the results 
remain the same. 
 
Table 12: Detecting spurious regressions 
Data used NDD weight  NDD (standardized data) PIF Spurious 
 Multi Simple Multi Simple   
Multilateral data       
-annual -0.0325 -0.0846   0.38 No 
   -0.09 -0.123 0.75 No 
-3-year average -0.047 -0.107   0.439 No 
       
Bilateral data 0.0086 0.0089   0.963 No 
 
                                                 
20The idea behind this notion is the same as Altonji et al’s (2005) ratios to assess unobservables selection bias. 
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4.5.Discussion Aid allocation more or less need-oriented?21 
One important conclusion of aid allocation literature is that donor self-interest is an important 
determinant in the allocation of development aid.  We tried to describe through this analysis 
the behaviours followed by donors to preserve their leadership in development assistance.  
According to our estimates, DAC members tend to increase their bilateral aid to countries 
welcoming emerging donors while it seems that the DAC multilateral aid policy goes in the 
other direction. This strategy aims to help traditional donors to preserve their individual 
political and economic interests in recipients.  The reaction to an increase in non-DAC aid 
may be different if DAC and non-DAC donors perceive each other as partners with 
coordinated aid activities rather than competitors. Given the political nature of development 
cooperation, there are clear limits to cooperation involving emerging donor countries such as 
China or India and traditional donors. None of the parties involved has sufficiently strong 
incentives to overcome this situation. 
Recipient countries could exploit the competition between traditional and emerging donors by 
maximizing overall aid inflows; or they may use their bargaining position to regain policy 
space after decades of conditionality from "Western donors”.However, the available evidence 
on non-DAC aid effectiveness is limited and largely based on the common argument that 
some non-DAC donors have their own recent development experience to offer on how to put 
foreign aid, in combination with local resources, and could provide important lessons to 
recipient countries. But given the absence of consensus on the conditions under which aid 
may be effective, this competition between traditional and emerging donors could undermine 
the quality of aid. 
Throughout our analysis, we have observed that the criteria used by donors do not precisely 
reflect the needs of countries, some issues like economic vulnerability and low human capital 
                                                 
21Including also merit-based decisions. 
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are rarely taken into account. Therefore, to assess the quality of aid (from a recipient 
perspective) we now focus on the orientation of aid towards needs. 
Here we briefly analyze the impactof competition between DAC donors and non-DAC donors 
onthe quality of aid allocation. Table 9 reports the estimations based on regressions of 
interacting variables measuring NDD influence with needs and merit variables. The 
instrumentation confirms our baseline estimates (Tables 10 and 11). 
For bilateral aid, we notice an improvement in aid allocation criteria as countries with severe 
handicaps in terms of capability and human capital receive ever more assistance (last three 
columns of Table 9). Thus, it seems that the competition between donors leads to a more 
need-oriented aid allocation. DAC Donors tend to specialize their aid policies and they do so 
by targeting sectors where they have comparative advantages, notably human and social 
development. 
The results related to multilateral aid tend to confirm our doubts about a ‘positive’ 
substitution or a ‘sanction’ for NDD friends. In fact, it would be logical that aid would go to 
countries that need it most, if DAC multilateral aid and NDD aid were substitutable. 
Unfortunately, the results do not point to that conclusion, and in fact show that a reduction of 
aid allocation, in reaction to recipient behaviour toward emerging countries, leads to a 
deterioration ofthe orientation of theaid allocation decisions ofDAC donors. Indeed, the 
coefficients forthe interaction termsinTable 9 (first three columns) showthat they not only 
take less account of the structural handicaps ofcountries, but alsothey are less concerned with 
the institutional quality of the country. Everything operates as if the DAC donors were 
adjusting to the criteria used by emerging donors to preserve DAC lead donorship, and we 
end up with the level of per capita income and population size as the only criteria for aid 
allocation. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
Debate about the impact of “emerging donors” is becoming increasingly heated because some 
developing countries do not simply consider emerging donors as another source of 
development finance, but rather as powerful alternatives that might lead to new ways of 
understanding development. Even if it remains difficult to weigh up the opportunities and 
risks brought by nonDAC donors, the increasing activity of emerging donors has generated 
hostile opinions because some people think that they represent a threat to healthy and 
sustainable development. Indeed, the increased complexity of the donor community at the 
recipient level may lead to unsustainable levels of debt and unproductive capital investment. 
Although concerns about governance standards and public management systems in recipient 
countries are relevant, the importance of political and strategic interests behind development 
cooperation certainly influences this debate. 
We analyzed the multilateral and bilateral reactions of DAC members in face of the 
emergence of new donors in development assistance. We find that countries where emerging 
donors have a big influence, receive less multilateral aid from DAC members, as if DAC 
multilateral aid were substituted by ODA from emerging donors. However, the bilateral aid 
allocation model shows that DAC donors increase their ODA to maintain their "lead 
donorship" in recipient countries, and so preserve their commercial, political, and strategic 
self-interests.  
The results we have obtained also conclude that competition between donors could affect the 
quality of DAC aid allocation by changing its orientation relative to the need and merit of 
recipients. In the bilateral case, there is an improvement in aid allocation criteria, as countries 
with severe handicaps in terms of capability and human capital receive ever more assistance. 
In contrast, the emergence of non-DAC actors could lead to a deterioration in the orientation 
of multilateral aid allocation decisions. 
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Our findings suggest that the relation between DAC and emerging donors, in its current form, 
can be detrimental for recipient countries. In order to protect their own interests DAC donors 
modify their aid allocation, which ultimately affects the quality of their aid allocation and aid 
effectiveness. Future research should focus more on this issue in order to better understand 
the implications for recipient countries, and then recommend policy measures to protect their 
interests. 
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Results 
 
Table 1: Multilateral aid allocation /Annual data 
 Random Effect- TOBIT POLS 
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Non-DAC evolution    -0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
   -0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
Non-DAC weight  
 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
   
 
-0.032 
(0.00) 
-0.033 
(0.00) 
  
Aid (t-1) 
 
    
 0.80 
(0.00) 
0.78 
(0.00) 
0.75 
(0.00) 
0.76 
(0.00) 
0.75 
(0.00) 
Popindex 0.036 
(0.00) 
0.037 
(0.00) 
0.021 
(0.00) 
0.038 
(0.00) 
0.023 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
Gniindex 0.004 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
-0.004 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
-0.004 
(0.09) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.0016 
(0.04) 
0.0037 
(0.00) 
0.0017 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
(100-Hai) 
 
 
 
 
0.014 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.014 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.0024 
(0.02) 
EVI  
 
 
 
0.009 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.36) 
 
 
-0.0023 
(0.24) 
Political and civil rights -0.045 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.41) 
-0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.004 
(0.74) 
-0.012 
(0.41) 
-0.013 
(0.02) 
-0.007 
(0.29) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
-0.002 
(0.74) 
0.005 
(0.50) 
Multilateral aid pc 0.24 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.075 
(0.05) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
0.096 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
Openness/GDP 0.17 
(0.04) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.069 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.062 
(0.06) 
GDP pc growth 0.003 
(0.08) 
0.0007 
(0.73) 
-0.001 
(0.78) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
-0.0001 
(0.95) 
-0.002 
(0.22) 
-0.000 
(0.98) 
0.001 
(0.81) 
-0.001 
(0.51) 
0.001 
(0.72) 
FDI/GDP  
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.94) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.94) 
 
 
 
 
0.006 
(0.43) 
 
 
0.006 
(0.46) 
Ex-colony dummy  
 
 
 
0.021 
(0.93) 
 
 
0.010 
(0.96) 
 
 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.89) 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.76) 
Intercept -0.02 
(0.93) 
-0.26 
(0.39) 
-0.63 
(0.13) 
-0.34 
(0.25) 
-0.87 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.43) 
-0.17 
(0.22) 
-0.63 
(0.13) 
-0.36 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.82) 
           
R2      0.870 0.874 0.868 0.872 0.872 
Observations 2912 1866 1462 1921 1469 2886 1851 1488 1905 1496 
Censored 109 57 45 61 45      
Rho 0.55 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.57      
Group 123 120 109 123 109 123 120 109 123 109 
Random-effects Tobit model (random-effect time_donor_recipient); Rho = standard deviation of the random effects/standard deviation of 
residual; p-value clustered by country in brackets. 
 
Dynamic POLS Estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  Year dummies included but not reported; p-value clustered by 
country (or donor_recipient) in brackets. 
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Table 2: Multilateral aid allocation/3 year average 
 Tobit POLS 
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Non-DAC evolution     -0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.067 
(0.00) 
  -0.067 
(0.00) 
-0.067 
(0.00) 
Non-DAC weight  
 
 -0.047 
(0.00) 
-0.044 
(0.00) 
  -0.047 
(0.00) 
-0.043 
(0.00) 
  
Aid (t-1) 0.58 
(0.00) 
 0.57 
(0.00) 
0.66 
(0.00) 
0.55 
(0.00) 
0.69 
(0.00) 
0.68 
(0.00) 
0.69 
(0.00) 
0.64 
(0.00) 
0.70 
(0.00) 
Popindex 0.01 
(0.00) 
0.028 
(0.00) 
0.011 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.40) 
0.012 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.58) 
0.005 
(0.32) 
-0.004 
(0.26) 
0.006 
(0.26) 
-0.003 
(0.36) 
Gniindex 0.004 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.41) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.45) 
0.002 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(0.35) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
(100-Hai) 
 
 
  
 
0.003 
(0.13) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.18) 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.26) 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.45) 
EVI  
 
  
 
0.006 
(0.06) 
 
 
0.004 
(0.13) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.17) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.17) 
Political civil rights -0.01 
(0.39) 
-0.038 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.86) 
0.003 
(0.81) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
0.007 
(0.52) 
-0.008 
(0.50) 
0.003 
(0.80) 
-0.003 
(0.78) 
0.006 
(0.61) 
Multilateral aid pc 0.19 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
Openness /GDP 0.06 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
GDP pc growth 0.005 
(0.17) 
0.016 
(0.00) 
0.013 
(0.00) 
0.019 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.013 
(0.00) 
0.016 
(0.02) 
0.010 
(0.08) 
0.017 
(0.02) 
FDI/GDP  
 
  
 
-0.046 
(0.00) 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.69) 
 
 
0.0001 
(0.99) 
Ex-colony dummy  
 
  
 
-0.03 
(0.71) 
 
 
-0.06 
(0.43) 
 
 
-0.15 
(0.16) 
 
 
-0.18 
(0.10) 
Intercept -0.0005 
(0.99) 
-0.09 
(0.78) 
-0.38 
(0.11) 
-0.71 
(0.01) 
-0.56 
(0.02) 
-0.68 
(0.01) 
-0.42 
(0.06) 
-0.29 
(0.26) 
-0.14 
(0.55) 
-0.33 
(0.19) 
           
R2       0.858 0.876 0.846 0.874 
Observations 974 1078 709 600 723 599 706 599 723 598 
Censored 31 40 20 16 23 18     
Rho 0.16 0.50 0.22 0.07 0.20 0.008     
Group 123 123 119 107 123 108 119 107 123 108 
Random-effects Tobit model (random-effect time_donor_recipient); Rho = standard deviation of the random effects/standard deviation of 
residual; p-value clustered by country in brackets. 
 
Dynamic POLS Estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  Year dummies included but not reported; p-value clustered by 
country (or donor_recipient) in brackets. 
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Table 3: Multilateral aid allocation (Dynamic Specification) 
 Annual 3-year average 
Independent 
variables 
POLS TOBIT GMM POLS TOBIT GMM TOBIT POLS GMM POLS TOBIT GMM 
Non-DAC 
evolution 
   0.003 
(0.59) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
   -0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.085 
(0.00) 
-0.054 
(0.04) 
Non-DAC weight -0.003 
(0.96) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
   -0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.044 
(0.05) 
   
Popindex 0.002 
(0.30) 
0.021 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.88) 
0.002 
(0.28) 
0.023 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.75) 
0.019 
(0.00) 
0.017 
(0.01) 
-0.023 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.021 
(0.00) 
-0.023 
(0.06) 
Gniindex 0.004 
(0.00) 
-0.004 
(0.038) 
-0.004 
(0.67) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
-0.004 
(0.07) 
-0.006 
(0.52) 
-0.005 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.007 
(0.33) 
0.008 
(0.05) 
-0.005 
(0.10) 
-0.007 
(0.33) 
(100-Hai) -0.002 
(0.01) 
0.014 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.61) 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
0.014 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.49) 
0.014 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.38) 
0.0004 
(0.94) 
-0.002 
(0.63) 
0.015 
(0.00) 
0.0004 
(0.94) 
EVI 0.000 
(0.97) 
0.009 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.90) 
0.0002 
(0.88) 
0.010 
(0.00) 
-0.006 
(0.63) 
0.005 
(0.23) 
-0.005 
(0.42) 
0.015 
(0.10) 
-0.005 
(0.40) 
0.005 
(0.248) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
Political and civil 
rights 
-0.007 
(0.92) 
-0.016 
(0.29) 
0.024 
(0.47) 
-0.003 
(0.99) 
-0.012 
(0.41) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
-0.007 
(0.71) 
0.006 
(0.81) 
-0.04 
(0.32) 
0.007 
(0.78) 
-0.007 
(0.73) 
-0.05 
(0.38) 
Multilateral aid pc 0.12 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.075 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.080 
(0.05) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.54 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.00) 
0.54 
(0.00) 
0.323 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
Openness /GDP 0.073 
(0.04) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.247 
(0.16) 
0.068 
(0.059) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.08) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.03) 
0.31 
(0.28) 
0.30 
(0.02) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.46) 
GDP pc growth 0.0003 
(0.89) 
-0.002 
(0.54) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
0.0003 
(0.90) 
-0.001 
(0.67) 
0.000 
(0.89) 
0.012 
(0.05) 
-0.001 
(0.93) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.002 
(0.85) 
0.014 
(0.03) 
0.011 
(0.15) 
FDI/GDP 0.0005 
(0.94) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
0.19 
(0.15) 
0.003 
(0.70) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
0.24 
(0.09) 
-0.017 
(0.40) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.056 
(0.12) 
-0.059 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
Ex-colony dummy 0.0001 
(0.99) 
0.019 
(0.93) 
0.007 
(0.97) 
-0.000 
(0.99) 
0.008 
(0.97) 
-0.02 
(0.94) 
0.047 
(0.84) 
0.064 
(0.74) 
-0.093 
(0.51) 
0.047 
(0.81) 
0.024 
(0.91) 
-0.079 
(0.64) 
Intercept -0.009 
(0.95) 
-0.63 
(0.13) 
-0.34 
(0.67) 
0.026 
(0.86) 
-0.86 
(0.03) 
-0.43 
(0.62) 
-1.00 
(0.04) 
-0.35 
(0.56) 
-0.008 
(0.99) 
-0.55 
(0.34) 
-1.26 
(0.01) 
0.379 
(0.72) 
R2 0.865   0.863    0.667  0.670   
Observations 1454 1462 1488 1460 1469 1496 640 560 599 559 639 598 
Censored  45   45  20    22  
Rho  0.59   0.57  0.64    0.59  
Hansen   0.36   0.14   0.16   0.18 
AR(2)   0.70   0.25   0.11   0.20 
Instruments   59   59   45   45 
Group 109 109 109  109 109 108 106 107 106 108 108 
Random-effects Tobit model (random-effect time_donor_recipient); Rho = standard deviation of the random effects/standard deviation of 
residual; p-value clustered by country in brackets. 
 
Dynamic POLS Estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  Year dummies included but not reported; p-value clustered by 
country (or donor_recipient) in brackets. 
 
Dynamic GMM Blundell and Bond (1998); only lagged variables' estimates are reported. Instruments= Ratio of China and World GDP 
(proxy of perception of Emerging countries influence on global economy), Average Distance to OECD countries, Language, other measures 
of economic policies performance and internal instruments. 
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Table 4: Donors’common behaviors (DAC Multi ODA) 
Variables Ln(aidpc) Ln(aidpc) 
         NDD influence     -0.09 (0.00) -0.05 (0.00) 
POP (index)  0.36 (0.01) 
GNI  (index)  0.058 (0.80) 
TRADE  0.195 (0.30) 
Multi AID  0.072 (0.43) 
Political and civil rights   -0.069 (0.40) 
Growth  -0.001 (0.83) 
FDI  0.028 (0.60) 
Common dynamic factor 0.85 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 
Chi2 (prob) 0.00 0.00 
Countries 126 87 
All coefficients represent averages across groups. 
Table 6: Donors’common behaviors (G7 donors bilateral aid) 
Variables Ln(aidpc) Ln(aidpc) 
         NDD influence     -0.023 (0.51) 0.026 (0.11) 
POP (index)  -0.133 (0.26) 
GNI  (index)  -0.001 (0.85) 
IMPORTS  0.254 (0.22) 
Multi AID  0.122 (0.09) 
Political and civil rights  -0.069 (0.40) 
Growth  0.011 (0.15) 
FDI  0.028 (0.60) 
Common dynamic factor 0.62 (0.09) 0.86 (0.00) 
Chi2 (prob) 0.50 0.06 
Countries 126 87 
All coefficients represent averages across groups 
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Table 5: Bilateral aid 
 static  dynamic 
Independent variables Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit  POLS TOBIT GMM POLS TOBIT GMM 
Non-DAC evolution    0.007 
(0.12) 
0.010 
(0.07) 
    0.009 
(0.07) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
0.045 
(0.00) 
Non-DAC weight  
 
0.009 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
   0.008 
(0.12) 
0.010 
(0.08) 
0.036 
(0.00) 
   
Aid (t-1) 0.57 
(0.00) 
0.58 
(0.00) 
0.58 
(0.00) 
0.58 
(0.00) 
0.58 
(0.00) 
 0.79 
(0.00) 
0.57 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
0.77 
(0.00) 
0.58 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
Popindex 0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.008 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.009 
(0.00) 
 0.002 
(0.15) 
0.007 
(0.00) 
-0.051 
(0.37) 
0.002 
(0.12) 
0.008 
(0.00) 
0.016 
(0.80) 
Gniindex (GDP pc) 0.002 
(0.00) 
0.0025 
(0.00) 
0.044 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.066 
(0.05) 
 0.004 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(0.92) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.26) 
0.001 
(0.92) 
(100-Hai) 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.19) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.23) 
 -0.002 
(0.09) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
-
0.0017 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
0.047 
(0.08) 
EVI  
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.57) 
 
 
0.0007 
(0.38) 
 -0.001 
(0.27) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
-0.006 
(0.44) 
-
0.0015 
(0.27) 
0.001 
(0.59) 
-0.006 
(0.45) 
Political and civil 
rights 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
0.0006 
(0.92) 
-0.003 
(0.68) 
0.0002 
(0.97) 
-0.004 
(0.62) 
 0.001 
(0.82) 
-0.004 
(0.64) 
-0.108 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(0.85) 
-0.004 
(0.66) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
Multilateral aid pc 0.05 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.057 
(0.00) 
0.071 
(0.00) 
 0.066 
(0.00) 
0.075 
(0.00) 
0.065 
(0.09) 
0.066 
(0.00) 
0.071 
(0.00) 
0.079 
(0.047) 
Imports /GDP 0.077 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
 0.052 
(0.07) 
0.185 
(0.00) 
0.215 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.212 
(0.12) 
GDP pc growth -
0.0001 
(0.90) 
0.0001 
(0.92) 
-
0.0005 
(0.00) 
0.0008 
(0.54) 
-
0.0003 
(0.88) 
 0.021 
(0.57) 
-0.096 
(0.08) 
1.09 
(0.02) 
0.023 
(0.62) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
0.004 
(0.19) 
FDI/GDP  
 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.00) 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.04) 
 0.0007 
(0.93) 
-0.017 
(0.04) 
0.0005 
(0.97) 
0.0018 
(0.82) 
-0.02 
(0.047) 
-0.013 
(0.43) 
Ex-colony dummy 0.096 
(0.12) 
0.133 
(0.04) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.05) 
0.21 
(0.02) 
 0.012 
(0.78) 
0.21 
(0.03) 
-1.69 
(0.11) 
0.010 
(0.81) 
0.212 
(0.03) 
-1.14 
(0.30) 
Intercept -0.97 
(0.00) 
-0.38 
(0.11) 
-0.94 
(0.00) 
-0.56 
(0.02) 
-0.87 
(0.00) 
 -0.60 
(0.08) 
-0.48 
(0.00) 
0.69 
(0.88) 
-0.48 
(0.17) 
-0.46 
(0.37) 
-2.33 
(0.63) 
R2       0.770   0.769   
Observations 16972 11046 8814 11261 8841  8854 8854 8313 8903 8903 8346 
Censored 8694 5471 4350 5605 4361   4371   4395  
Rho 0.33 0.32 0.317 0.31 0.31   0.33   0.33  
Hansen         0.15   0.104 
AR(2)         0.39   0.397 
Instruments         59   63 
Group 824 801 717 815 718  717 717 712 718 718 712 
Random-effects Tobit model (random-effect time_donor_recipient); Rho = standard deviation of the random effects/standard deviation of 
residual; p-value clustered by country in brackets. 
 
 POLS Estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  Year dummies included but not reported; p-value clustered by country (or 
donor_recipient) in brackets. 
 
Dynamic GMM Blundell and Bond (1998); only lagged variables' estimates are reported. Instruments= Ratio of China and World GDP 
(proxy of perception of Emerging countries influence on global economy), Average Distance to OECD countries, Language, other measures 
of economic policies performance and internal instruments. 
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Table 7: Estimated behaviors by donor (Equation 11) 
 
Method of estimation: POLS (with control time_donor_recipent); 
 
+++ (---) = significant positive (negative) at 1 percent level; ++ (--) = significant positive (negative) at 5 percent level; + (-) = 
significant positive (negative) at 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
 POLS POLS POLS POLS POLS POLS POLS 
Non-DAC weight 
 + + +  + + + + + +  + + 
 
Pop index + +  + + + - - -  + 
 
  
Gni index 
  +  + + + +  
 
(100-Hai) + + + + + + + + + +    
 
EVI -   - - - - -   - 
 
Political and civil rights + 
 
   + + + +  
Multilateral aid pc 
       
 
Imports/GDP 
       
 
GDP ppc (growth) 
 - - -  - -     
 
FDI/GDP - - - - - - - - + + - - - + + +  
 
Ex-colony  - + + +   - - -   - - - 
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Table 8:Estimated donors' Behaviors with estimation of individual aid allocation 
Independent variables Canada Canada France France Germany Germany Italy Italy Japan Japan UK UK USA USA 
 POLS GMM POLS GMM POLS GMM POLS GMM POLS GMM POLS GMM POLS GMM 
Non-DAC weight 0.004 
(0.65) 
0.035 
(0.17) 
0.027 
(0.00) 
0.066 
(0.01) 
-0.003 
(0.73) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
0.047 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
0.014 
(0.18) 
0.017 
(0.55) 
0.006 
(0.64) 
0.024 
(0.47) 
-0.006 
(0.52) 
0.054 
(0.07) 
AID (t-1) 0.80 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
0.87 
(0.00) 
0.65 
(0.00) 
0.81 
(0.00) 
0.44 
(0.00) 
0.51 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.73 
(0.00) 
0.48 
(0.00) 
0.82 
(0.00) 
0.46 
(0.00) 
0.86 
(0.00) 
0.596 
(0.00) 
Pop index 0.0039 
(0.36) 
0.029 
(0.09) 
0.010 
(0.00) 
0.014 
(0.35) 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
-0.004 
(0.71) 
0.006 
(0.53) 
0.06 
(0.20) 
-0.004 
(0.29) 
-0.003 
(0.77) 
0.001 
(0.76) 
0.034 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(0.70) 
0.002 
(0.87) 
Gni index 0.003+ 
(0.11) 
0.004 
(0.73) 
-0.0004 
(0.82) 
0.005 
(0.56) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.004 
(0.48) 
-0.001 
(0.79) 
-0.021 
(0.45) 
0.007 
(0.00) 
0.011 
(0.39) 
0.007 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.49) 
-0.0018 
(0.87) 
(100-Hai) -0.001 
(0.45) 
0.006 
(0.45) 
0.003 
(0.13) 
0.010 
(0.22) 
-0.002+ 
(0.10) 
0.0007 
(0.90) 
0.003 
(0.57) 
0.034 
(0.12) 
-0.013 
(0.00) 
-0.031 
(0.00) 
-0.0007 
(0.76) 
-0.017+ 
(0.10) 
0.001 
(0.69) 
0.006 
(0.51) 
EVI -0.002 
(0.33) 
-0.017 
(0.32) 
-0.005 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.58) 
-0.012 
(0.41) 
-0.009 
(0.27) 
0.001 
(0.82) 
0.022 
(0.65) 
0.011 
(0.42) 
0.0008 
(0.83) 
-0.002 
(0.93) 
0.0015 
(0.56) 
0.007 
(0.68) 
Political and civil rights -0.008 
(0.54) 
-0.052 
(0.14) 
0.026 
(0.05) 
-0.008 
(0.82) 
0.005 
(0.58) 
-0.013 
(0.69) 
0.033 
(0.34) 
-0.0056 
(0.94) 
-0.019 
(0.23) 
-0.0016 
(0.96) 
-0.050 
(0.01) 
-0.111 
(0.06) 
0.0005 
(0.96) 
-0.062 
(0.09) 
Multilateral aid pc 0.087 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.99) 
-0.011 
(0.71) 
0.01  
(0.89) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.095 
(0.05) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.031 
(0.84) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.05) 
0.061 
(0.43) 
-0.034 
(0.69) 
0.059 
(0.06) 
0.037 
(0.51) 
Imports/GDP 0.024 
(0.55) 
-0.004 
(0.88) 
-0.019 
(0.74) 
-0.09 
(0.78) 
0.078 
(0.04) 
0.012 
(0.44) 
-0.10 
(0.53) 
-0.19 
(0.75) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.18 
(0.60) 
0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.063 
(0.85) 
-0.02 
(0.94) 
-0.038 
(0.89) 
GDP pc (growth) 0.003 
(0.30) 
0.017 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.70) 
0.006 + 
(0.11) 
0.003 
(0.37) 
0.012 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.76) 
0.003 
(0.78) 
0.007 
(0.25) 
0.008 
(0.34) 
-0.005 
(0.44) 
-0.003 
(0.73) 
0.02 
(0.75) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
FDI/GDP -0.023 + 
(0.11) 
-0.004 
(0.88) 
0.005 
(0.70) 
0.024 
(0.41) 
-0.012 
(0.33) 
-0.03 
(0.18) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
0.14 
(0.07) 
-0.034+ 
(0.11) 
0.002 
(0.95) 
0.043 
(0.05) 
0.0006 
(0.99) 
0.015 
(0.34) 
0.051 + 
(0.10) 
Ex-colony (dummy ) -0.11 
(0.26) 
-0.293 
(0.40) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
0.37 + 
(0.11) 
0.023 
(0.75) 
0.29 
(0.42) 
0.14 
(0.62) 
0.57 
(0.45) 
-0.15 
(0.04) 
-0.22 
(0.23) 
-0.054 
(0.54) 
0.097 
(0.77) 
-0.107 
(0.07) 
-0.046 
(0.82) 
intercept -0.09 
(0.68) 
-0.46 
(0.45) 
-0.34 
(0.29) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.31 
(0.16) 
-0.20 
(0.76) 
-1.56 
(0.09) 
-3.07 
(0.28) 
0.026 
(0.94) 
-0.22 
(0.87) 
-0.57 
(0.19) 
-1.63 
(0.25) 
0.22 
(0.40) 
-0.017 
(0.98) 
               
R2 0.81  0.84  0.78  0.57  0.74  0.78  0.81  
Observations 1378 1378 1359 1359 1383 1383 1004 1004 1347 1347 1217 1217 1170 1170 
AR(2)  0.49  0.88  0.72  0.80  0.64  0.07  0.64 
Hansen  0.27  0.21  0.78  0.50  0.14  0.04  0.67 
Instruments  66  66  66  66  66  66  66 
Countries 105 105 107 107 107 107 94 94 108 108 105 105 105 105 
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Table 9: Impact of NDD influence on DAC allocation quality 
 Multilateral aid  Bilateral aid 
Independent variables POLS TOBIT GMM  POLS TOBIT GMM 
Non-DAC influence 
    0.039 
(0.02) 
0.014 
(0.51) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
Non-DAC influence -0.07 
(0.47) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
  
 
 
Pop index 0.022 
(0.04) 
 0.03 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
 -0.001 
(0.97) 
0.013 
(0.65) 
-0.07 
(0.16) 
Gni index 0.016 
(0.05) 
0.006 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
 0.011 
(0.02) 
0.012 
(0.01) 
-0.009 
(0.28) 
(100-Hai) 0.002 
(0.80) 
0.015 
(0.00) 
-0.016 
(0.16) 
 0.024 
(0.05) 
0.039 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
EVI -0.026 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.68) 
0.002 
(0.92) 
 -0.008 
(0.19) 
-0.0003 
(0.95) 
0.011 
(0.37) 
Political and civil rights 0.078 
(0.17) 
0.069 
(0.11) 
0.16 
(0.08) 
 -0.005 
(0.66) 
-0.010 
(0.43) 
-0.089 
(0.04) 
Multilateral aid pc 0.51 
(0.00) 
 0.33 
(0.00) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
 0.062 
(0.00) 
0.074 
(0.00) 
0.038 
(0.34) 
Openness /GDP 0.31 
(0.01) 
 0.40 
(0.00) 
0.42 
(0.07) 
 -0.12 
(0.15) 
0.044 
(0.55) 
0.285 
(0.05) 
GDP pc (growth) 0.009 
(0.37) 
0.011 
(0.06) 
0.007 
(0.37) 
 -0.003 
(0.64) 
-0.009 
(0.058) 
-0.001 
(0.77) 
FDI/GDP -0.066 
(0.03) 
-0.017 
(0.39) 
-0.063 
(0.08) 
 -0.006 
(0.64) 
-0.014 
(0.19) 
-0.020 
(0.25) 
Ex-colony dummy -0.012 
(0.94) 
-0.021 
(0.92) 
-0.20 
(0.22) 
 -0.014 
(0.73) 
0.10 
(0.27) 
-0.63 
(0.29) 
 
       
nDAC*(100-Hai) 0.0003 
(0.85) 
0.0002 
(0.77) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
 0.0011 
(0.00) 
0.0009 
(0.028) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
nDAC*EVI -0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.002 
(0.24) 
-0.003 
(0.38) 
 -0.0006 
(0.34) 
-0.0007 
(0.30) 
-0.0005 
(0.75) 
nDAC*POP -0.0002 
(0.92) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
0.004 
(0.08) 
 -0.0003 
(0.55) 
0.0003 
(0.58) 
-0.0007 
(0.45) 
nDAC*GNI 0.0023 
(0.14) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
 -0.0005 
(0.15) 
-0.0005 
(0.29) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
nDAC*Polity 0.018 
(0.10) 
 0.016 
(0.04) 
0.043 
(0.00) 
 -0.0015 
(0.53) 
0.0005 
(0.82) 
0.003 
(0.47) 
Intercept -0.62 
(0.39) 
-2.06 
(0.00) 
-2.51 
(0.09) 
 -0.37 
(0.04) 
-1.22 
(0.00) 
-1.35 
(0.31) 
        
R2 0.69    0.77   
Observations 640 640 599  8327 8327 8313 
Censored  20    4102  
Rho  0.63    0.37  
AR(2)   0.10    0.39 
Hansen   0.23    0.10 
Instruments   60    85 
Group 108 108 107  718 718 718 
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Table 10: Instrumentation [NDDs weight= {ratio GDPchina/World; NDDs evolution}] 
 Annual 3-year  Annual 3-year 
Independent variables IV-POLSa IV-POLS  IV-POLS IV-POLS 
Non-DAC influence -0.064 
(0.00) 
-0.072 
(0.00) 
 -0.48 
(0.00) 
-0.74 
(0.00) 
Lagged DAC Aid 0.74 
(0.00) 
0.61 
(0.00) 
 0.62 
(0.01) 
0.61 
(0.00) 
Pop index 0.005 
(0.02) 
 -0.001 
(0.66) 
 0.022 
(0.00) 
0.027 
(0.00) 
Gni index 0.0034 
(0.01) 
0.0014 
(0.50) 
 0.015 
(0.00) 
0.018 
(0.00) 
(100-Hai) -0.0027 
(0.02) 
-0.0011 
(0.57) 
 -0.014 
(0.00) 
-0.0037 
(0.41) 
EVI -0.002 
(0.23) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
 -0.009 
(0.25) 
0.005 
(0.52) 
Political and civil rights 0.01 
(0.25) 
0.003 
(0.79) 
 0.25 
(0.00) 
0.266 
(0.00) 
Multilateral aid pc 0.135 
(0.00) 
 0.24 
(0.00) 
 0.166 
(0.00) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
Openness /GDP 0.10 
(0.00) 
 0.22 
(0.00) 
 0.22 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
GDP pc growth 0.002 
(0.37) 
0.017 
(0.00) 
 0.006 
(0.22) 
0.015 
(0.02) 
FDI/GDP -0.003 
(0.77) 
-0.0017 
(0.56) 
 0.0056 
(0.89) 
-0.008 
(0.66) 
Ex-colony dummy -0.043 
(0.42) 
-0.165 
(0.08) 
 -0.095 
(0.36) 
-0.27 
(0.01) 
 
     
nDAC*(100-Hai)  
 
 
 -0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.60) 
nDAC*EVI    -0.0003 
(0.78) 
0.0001 
(0.92) 
nDAC*POP    0.001 
(0.15) 
0.006 
(0.00) 
nDAC*GNI    0.002 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
nDAC*Political rights & civil liberties    0.047 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
Intercept -0.48 
(0.02) 
-0.59 
(0.04) 
 -2.96 
(0.00) 
-3.93 
(0.00) 
R2 0.86 0.87  0.63 0.84 
Observations 1272 590  1267 590 
Countries 108 107  108 107 
a: Baltagi & Chang (2000) consistent estimator 
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Table 11: Instrumentation [NDDs weight= {ratio GDPchina/World; NDDs evolution}] 
 Annual 3-year av  Annual 3-year av 
Independent variables IV-Tobit IV-Tobit  IV-
Tobit 
IV-Tobit 
Non-DAC influence -0.054 
(0.00) 
-0.065 
(0.00) 
 -0.39 
(0.00) 
-0.59 
(0.00) 
Lagged DAC aid 0.78 
(0.00) 
0.68 
(0.00) 
 0.71 
(0.00) 
0.67 
(0.00) 
Pop index 0.005 
(0.03) 
 -0.003 
(0.33) 
 0.023 
(0.00) 
0.021 
(0.06) 
Gni index 0.0015 
(0.22) 
0.001 
(0.50) 
 0.01 
(0.06) 
0.017 
(0.00) 
(100-Hai) -0.0013 
(0.90) 
-0.001 
(0.33) 
 
-0.005 
(0.39) 
-0.004 
(0.42) 
EVI -0.0028 
(0.15) 
0.003 
(0.27) 
 -0.011 
(0.19) 
-0.0005 
(0.96) 
Political  and civil rights 0.018 
(0.04) 
0.008 
(0.50) 
 0.22 
(0.00) 
0.233 
(0.00) 
Multilateral aid pc 0.096 
(0.00) 
 0.22 
(0.00) 
 0.088 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
Openness /GDP 0.11 
(0.00) 
 0.188 
(0.00) 
 0.196 
(0.00) 
0.187 
(0.00) 
GDP pc growth -0.003 
(0.19) 
0.018 
(0.01) 
 0.004 
(0.30) 
0.018 
(0.00) 
FDI/GDP -0.013 
(0.16) 
-0.008 
(0.64) 
 -0.022 
(0.55) 
-0.012 
(0.42) 
Ex-colony dummy 0.001 
(0.98) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
 -0.028 
(0.78) 
-0.24 
(0.03) 
 
     
nDAC*(100-Hai)  
 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.16) 
-0.0003 
(0.71) 
nDAC*EVI    -0.001 
(0.64) 
-0.0006 
(0.75) 
nDAC*POP    0.0015 
(0.19) 
0.004 
(0.02) 
nDAC*GNI    0.002 
(0.07) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
nDAC*Polity    0.14 
(0.00) 
0.045 
(0.00) 
Intercept -0.51 
(0.00) 
-0.47 
(0.08) 
 -2.63 
(0.00) 
-3.15 
(0.00) 
      
censored 39 16  39 16 
Observations 1272 590  1268 590 
Countries 108 107  108 107 
Tobit model with endogeneous regressors/ Estimation method: Maximum likelihood estimator clustered 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
multiaidpc 1.24 1.11 0.8080 0.1920 
importsofgdp 8.04 2.84 0.1243 0.8757 
tradegdp 7.98 2.82 0.1253 0.8747 
fdiofgdp 1.37 1.17 0.7324 0.2676 
pop 1.22 1.10 0.8211 0.1789 
gnipc 2.02 1.42 0.4962 0.5038 
gdppcgr 1.11 1.05 0.9000 0.1000 
evi 1.46 1.21 0.6849 0.3151 
Hai 2.42 1.55 0.4138 0.5862 
polityrights 5.16 2.27 0.1937 0.8063 
civilrights 5.59 2.36 0.1790 0.8210 
distoecd 1.42 1.19 0.7059 0.2941 
coloecd 1.05 1.02 0.9532 0.0468 
wndac1 1.02 1.01 0.9769 0.0231 
ndacevol 1.07 1.03 0.9370 0.0630 
gdprelus 1.28 1.13 0.7817 0.2183 
Mean VIF 2.71 
Eigenvalues Cond Index 
1 3.7582 1.0000 
2 2.0182 1.3646 
3 1.4720 1.5978 
4 1.2015 1.7686 
5 1.0225 1.9172 
6 0.9952 1.9432 
7 0.9575 1.9812 
8 0.8858 2.0597 
9 0.8298 2.1281 
10 0.6664 2.3748 
11 0.6623 2.3822 
12 0.5928 2.5179 
13 0.4943 2.7574 
14 0.2786 3.6730 
15 0.1005 6.1153 
16 0.0644 7.6407 
 
Condition Number 7.6407 
Eigenvalues & Condition index computed from deviation  sscp (no intercept) 
Det(correlation matrix)    0.0022 
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Data description : 
Variable Definition Source 
dacpc Per capita aid (DAC commitments) OECD-CRS 
nonDac 
Influence 
Share of nonDAC aid in total ODA OECD-CRS 
nonDAC ODA ODA received from emerging donors OECD-CRS 
EVI Economic Vulnerability Index CERDI 
Human capital  Human asset index (HAI) CERDI 
Imports Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI 
Trade  Trade Openness IMF-WDI 
FDI Foreign direct investment ((% of GDP) WDI 
coloecd Former colonies CEPII 
gdppcgr Gross domestic product per capita growth rate WDI 
popindex Population (standardized) WDI-author' 
calculation 
gdprelus Ratio China GDP to World GDP WDI 
gnindex GNI per capita (standardized) UNSTAT -author' 
calculation 
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Correlation matrix  
 
 
 
ldacpc lmultiaidpc limports ltrade lfdi popindex gnindex gdppcgr evi Hai polityrights civilrights distoecd coloecd influ lndacevol gdprelus 
ldacpc 1.0000 
lmultiaidpc 0.7464 1.0000 
limports 0.5226 0.5211 1.0000 
ltrade 0.3937 0.3842 0.9379 1.0000 
lfdi 0.1677 0.2352 0.4662 0.5066 1.0000 
popindex 0.6325 0.6975 0.6209 0.5701 0.2767 1.0000 
gnindex 0.0824 0.1166 -0.1425 -0.3067 -0.2352 -0.3246 1.0000 
gdppcgr 0.0041 0.0570 0.1117 0.1143 0.1817 0.0051 -0.0808 1.0000 
evi 0.4923 0.5434 0.4041 0.2964 0.1159 0.7061 0.1068 0.0173 1.0000 
Hai 0.0622 0.1074 -0.2235 -0.3564 -0.3197 -0.2232 0.8100 -0.1713 0.1030 1.0000 
polityrights -0.0940 -0.0885 -0.1772 -0.2021 -0.2801 -0.2481 0.4097 -0.1221 -0.0359 0.4872 1.0000 
civilrights -0.1423 -0.1776 -0.2535 -0.2713 -0.3418 -0.3297 0.4234 -0.1192 -0.0730 0.5131 0.8918 1.0000 
distoecd 0.0984 -0.0029 0.1279 0.1393 0.1724 0.1966 -0.2681 0.0574 0.1859 -0.3872 -0.4362 -0.4509 1.0000 
coloecd 0.1131 0.1381 0.0549 0.0357 0.1291 0.0806 -0.0265 -0.0462 -0.0193 -0.0261 -0.0803 -0.1251 0.1523 1.0000 
Non-dacinflu -0.0502 0.0168 0.1132 0.1378 0.0031 0.1604 -0.2375 -0.0002 -0.0313 -0.1018 0.0829 0.0787 -0.3385 -0.0662 1.0000 
lndacevol -0.0731 0.0684 0.1188 0.1351 0.0091 0.1838 -0.2019 0.0055 -0.0009 -0.0703 0.0793 0.0667 -0.3534 -0.0591 0.9797 1.0000 
gdprelus -0.0530 0.1392 0.1076 0.1285 0.3088 -0.0778 -0.0613 0.1803 -0.1364 -0.2693 -0.1030 -0.1797 0.0571 -0.0538 -0.0998 -0.0826 1.000 
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Gross concessional flows for development co-operation from non-DAC donors reported to DAC (Current USD Millions) 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bulgaria 40,49 48,38 
Chinese Taipei 420,96 483 513 514 435,2 411,35 380,91 381,24 
Cyprus 15,1 26,02 34,88 37,44 45,5 51,17 37,61 
Czech Republic 16,16 26,49 45,43 90,55 108,28 135,15 160,87 178,88 249,21 214,7 227,56 250,46 
Estonia 0,52 0,49 1,25 1,08 4,84 9,5 14,02 16,12 22,01 18,44 18,76 24,21 
Hungary 21,23 70,14 100,37 149,49 103,47 106,94 116,92 114,34 139,73 
Israel  164,39 92,48 130,89 111,68 83,85 95,24 89,83 110,94 137,82 123,9 144,82 206,19 
Kuwait  165,03 73,43 20,38 137,79 160,94 218,46 157,93 110,07 283,18 221,12 210,56 144,496225 
Latvia 1,5 0,88 8,33 10,65 11,81 15,79 21,85 21 15,6 19,2 
Liechtenstein 17,97 23,69 26,24 26,63 31,06 
Lithuania 1,75 1,64 1,91 9,07 15,53 25,04 47,6 47,84 36,21 36,74 51,68 
Malta 13,69 13,8 19,96 
Poland 28,81 35,56 14,26 27,14 117,51 204,79 296,82 362,85 372,34 374,65 377,75 416,91 
Romania 122,86 152,54 114,26 163,85 
Russia 472,39 478,99 
Saudi Arabia 275,5 205,07 2477,75 2390,85 1734,08 1026,18 2024,9 1550,65 4978,83 3133,74 3479,64 5094,9 
Slovak Republic 5,86 8,28 6,68 15,07 28,19 56,83 55,11 67,23 91,85 75,4 73,71 86,02 
Slovenia 34,67 44,01 54,14 67,6 71,24 58,6 62,77 
Thailand 73,73 66,91 178,45 40,21 9,62 31,49 
Turkey 81,88 64,11 72,96 66,63 339,16 601,04 714,34 602,33 780,36 707,17 967,42 1273,01 
United Arab Emirates 399,24 487,19 558,06 926,3 484,77 509,83 782,68 2425,59 1265,75 833,67 412,07 737,357 
Brazil 291,9 336,8 362,2 437 450 
Russia 472,32 478,99 
China 1466,86 1807,57 1947,65 2010,61 2468,0567 
India 392,6 609,5 488,04 639,069003 730,659625 
South Africa 82,3101234 86,04 82,5081379 87,6509883 95,1 
Source : OECD website
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Chapter 5.Revisiting the Role of Development Finance on Business Cycles in Developing 
Countries: DSGE Forecasting and Panel Analysis 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the extent to which external capital flows, particularly development 
finance flows, lead to macroeconomic volatility in recipient countries. We begin by 
estimating a DSGE model of a small open economy calibrated to represent a typical 
developing country, recipient of foreign aid, remittances and foreign direct investment. The 
predictions of the model are confirmed by our panel VAR results, which show that 
development finance shocks account for more than twenty-five percent of economic 
fluctuations in aggregate output.  
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5.1. Introduction 
 
Compared to other countries, developing countries (DCs) are particularly vulnerable to sharp 
swings in commodity prices, natural disasters, and variable external financing flows. 
Furthermore, DCs’ growing trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world, which can 
confer important benefits through growth and investment, could also increase their exposure 
to costly spillovers from abroad. At the same time, their underlying vulnerabilities and weak 
policy environment can amplify the impact of external shocks, and limit their capacity to 
absorb and mitigate them. 
 
The dominant transmission channels of economic fluctuations in DCs are trade flows, Foreign 
investment, remittances, terms of trade, foreign aid, and, to a lesser extent, financial sector 
flows(IMF, 2011). While the direct financial sector impact of shocks can be muted in DCs, 
reflecting their still limited financial integration, these economies can face significant risks if 
the receive large amount of remittances as explained by Barajas et al. (2012). They show that 
accounting for remittance dependency, some recipient countries appear more vulnerable to 
risks stemming from shocks to the global economy.In fact, their results reveal that remittance 
flows significantly increase business cycle synchronization between recipient countries and 
the rest of the world. Moreover, the remittance channel effect is shown to be asymmetric, that 
is, remittances are more effective in channeling economic downturns than booms to the 
receiving countries from the sending countries. 
Crispolti and Tsibouris (2012) show that shocks in foreign aid and FDI are more frequent than 
shocks in terms of trade and external demand in the last decades. These recent empirical 
evidences suggest that the presence of development finance flows offers both opportunities 
and challenges to recipient countries. They can induce macroeconomic fluctuations in a small 
open economy by several channels. As foreign aid, remittances and FDI are major source of 
capital for many DCs, it is important to consider their implications for economic activity. 
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Concerning aid flows, the problem is almost related to the real exchange rate appreciation and 
variability of foreign aid, which increase the volatility of domestic investment and 
consumption. 
 
This paper objective is twofold. The first is to lay out a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model that is helpful to document the relation between external capital 
flows (ECF) and business cycles in developing economies and understand the adverse 
spillovers effects that can be generated by development cooperation and finance. The second 
is to quantify and describe the nature of these shocks on macroeconomic volatility. Thus, we 
seek to measure the contribution of ECF for development finance to the high volatility of 
output in DCs, in comparison to other external shocks and domestic shocks. Such analysis is 
useful if we need to improve the effectiveness of these flows. 
In recent years, focus has been on how well Real Business Cycle (RBC) models explain 
stylized facts of business cycles. Despite its remarkable success, the standard small open 
economy RBC model performs poorly when applied to developing economies. As Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2003) point out, the small open economy RBC model predicts the trade 
balance-to-output ratio to be positively correlated with output and predicts consumption to be 
smoother than output. However, most developing economies are characterized by 
countercyclical trade balance and more volatile consumption. Developing countries have a 
relative volatility of consumption to output of about 1.46, while in developed countries it is 
around 0.92. This and other differences between the business cycle in developed and 
developing countries have been documented by Mendoza (1991), Rand and Tarp (2002),  
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) or Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) among others. Some authors argue 
that developing countries are characterized by a plurality of distortions and market failures 
that make standard neoclassical models an inadequate framework to analyze those economies.  
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Assessing the conformity of model results with the observed characteristics of business cycles 
is essential for the validation of theoretical business cycle models. We therefore introduce in 
the theoretical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model some striking structural features, 
profoundly discernible, and noticeably in many DCs. First, the model embeds the framework 
explained by Berg et al. (2010) that describes the macroeconomic challenges faced by aid 
recipients.  Second, we incorporate the remittances and foreign direct investment shocks. 
Therefore, we complete the model by introducing remittances in the household budget 
constraint but also in the government domestic bonds available through savings1 (Chami et 
al., 2008). Furthermore, following Acosta et al. (2009) we take into account the impact of 
foreign direct investment in the formation of investment. The interest to add FDI as external 
capital flows also comes from the fact that with the current trends in the aid architecture and 
the growing influence of emerging donors, aid is (returns) strongly linked to trade and FDI 
flows. Walz and Ramachandran (2011) argued the majority of aid from emerging countries, 
especially China, India, and Venezuela, is combined with special trade arrangements and 
commercial investments. Statistics show that is not uncommon; many traditional donors also 
give tied aid, despite an official policy of untying. For example, 64 percent of South Korea’s 
aid is tied, 45 percent of Greece’s aid, and 23 percent of the United States’ aid is tied.  
 
Usually, after a DSGE simulation the model is estimated with observed data to ensure the 
performance of the model. However, in the case of DCs as high-frequency data that would 
define the cycle are generally unavailable, we deemed it inappropriate to follow this strategy. 
We chose to add an analysis with panel data to quantify the importance of ECF in the 
volatility of output and to describe the nature of this impact on volatility, distinguishing also 
their impact on the frequency and the amplitude of the output fluctuations. To assess the 
                                                 
1
 According to Chami et al. (2008), an increase in the level of the remittances-to-GDP ratio, everything else 
equal, improves external sustainability. Remittances also have indirect beneficial effects on debt dynamics to the 
extent that their presence reduces external borrowing costs and causes the domestic currency to appreciate. 
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performance of the model, we check if our RBC model for a small open economy is 
consistent with DCs key stylized facts. Specifically, the excess volatility of consumption with 
respect to output, the countercyclical nature of the trade balance-to-output (TBY) ratio and its 
downward sloping autocorrelation function. 
Including the basic features associated with a LIC, this research’s analytical framework would 
be more likely to minimize the conflict between theoretical predictions and empirical 
evidence, or between normative implications and policy practice. This work could help to 
refine and develop additional quantitative tools to assess risks and vulnerabilities in DCs. 
Indeed, this work seeks to represent the exposition of DCs to external capital flows and thus 
propose a model that could help to make a step further to a RBC adapted to DCs economies. 
Moreover, this paper aims to analyze the economic shocks (external and domestic) faced by 
DCs and thus brings new light on Raddatz (2009) findings about the relative contribution of 
various shocks to macroeconomic fluctuations, taking into account the development finance 
flows. Following Arellano et al. (2009), we will associate panel data analysis to DSGE 
modeling in order to enlighten our theoretical section with real economic activity. 
This paper examines the extent to which external shocks, particularly shocks in development 
finance flows, lead to macroeconomic volatility in recipient countries. We begin by 
estimating a DSGE model of a small open economy calibrated to represent a typicalDCs, 
recipient of foreign aid, remittances and foreign direct investment. To these specific external 
shocks we also consider traditional trade shocks, modeled as fluctuations in the prices of 
(exported and imported) primary commodities and external demand, we consider domestic 
macroeconomic shocks modeled as fluctuations in inflation, among others. The predictions of 
the model are confirmed by our panel VAR results, which show that development finance 
shocks account for more than twenty-five percent of economic fluctuations in aggregate 
output.  
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Our others findings concern the controversy about the procyclicity or countercyclicity of these 
flows. There is more than suggestive evidence that international aid does not contribute to 
reducing instability in DCs, and may even be a source of additional volatility itself. Global 
assistance to poor countries in response to exogenous shocks has been primarily ad hoc in 
nature, and displays large volatility (Bulir and Hamann, 2003). Furthermore, several papers 
have documented that remittances to developing countries are  countercyclical with respect to 
recipient economies’ business cycle (Frankel ( 2011) and Ebeke (2011)),  while others have 
shown that remittances tend to be more procyclical (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) , Neagu 
and Schiff (2009), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). Our panel regression estimates suggest 
that aid flows do have a clear counter cyclical pattern (at least during the last two decades), as 
would be desirable to help smooth economic shocks. We also show that remittance flows have 
become more countercyclical in recent decades as more developing economies appear to have 
integrated into the world economy, and are therefore more vulnerable to various types of 
external shocks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the structure of 
the DCsbusiness cycle model.  Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model and the 
simulation  results. Section 4 explains the methodological approach and discusses the results 
of the empirical analysis on panel data. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
5.2. The Real Business Cycle Model 
 
Consider an infinite-horizon small open economy. The economy has two goods, a home-
produced good and an imported good, and consists of the following agents: i)  households 
(income, remittances) participating in asset markets;  ii) two sectors with firms producing 
imported and exportable goods using labor, domestic and foreign private capital, and public 
capital; iii) a central bank in charge of exchange rate policy and monetary policy, including 
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reserve accumulation policy; and iv) a fiscal authority that is the direct recipient of aid and 
decides how much of this aid to spend as part of its fiscal policy. 
 
A. Households 
 
The economy is inhabited by a representative agent who maximizes the expected value of 
lifetime utility as given by: 
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where Ct and Lt represent period t consumption index and labor. The household's composite 
consumption index Ct is a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES), which combines 
the household's consumption of domestically produced goods Ch,t and imported goods CM,t: 
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and hρ elasticity of substitution between imported and domestically produced goods. 
Households decide how to allocate consumption expenditures prior to the associated 
consumer price index : ( )[ ] hhh tMhthht PPP ρρρ γγ −−− −+= 1 11,1, )(1)( .  
The price of the home-produced good serves as the numeraire. 
 
The maximization is done subject to the budget constraint: 
( ) tt
t
h
t
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h
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where REM are remittances received, s is exchange rate, bh households bonds to government, 
I interest rate , pi is inflation. Remittances follow a stochastic process: 
( ) rettret MREREMMREREM ερ +−+= −1
.
 
Remittances are unrequited, nonmarket personal transfers between households across 
countries, and as such they enter the household budget constraint as an addition to income 
separate from the domestic production process. Previously accumulated real government 
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bonds (B), income from production (Y) net of taxes, and real remittance transfers (REM) are 
all used to finance household expenditures (C)2.  
 
B. Firms 
The investment unit solves a cost minimization problem to determine demands for raw 
domestic and specific foreign investment inputs, whereas the optimal level of total final 
investment It  is determined by the production unit. Capital acquisition is subject to adjustment 
costs and, hence, implies a forward-looking behavior. The capital stock Kt changes according 
to the following equation 
( ) ttt KIK δ−+=+ 11 , where δ is the depreciation rate. 
 
- Investment Unit: 
The investment unit combines domestic raw investment Ih and the specific foreign direct 
investment good If to produce investment It3. A constant returns to scale technology allows us 
to express the investment function in aggregate terms as follows: 
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with foreign investment following a stochastic process ( ) iftftfifftf IIII ερ +−+= −1,,
.
 
Associated with this investment technology is a minimized unit cost function, i.e. the 
replacement cost of capital denoted as PI, which depends on PIF. PIF is the price of the 
imported investment in units of domestic currency. For any given rate of investment, It, the 
firm's minimization problem is as follows: 
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2
 This specification is inspired of Berg et al. (2010) and previous IMF models. 
3
 Acosta et al. (2009) proposed this specification in their analysis of remittances Dutch disease hypothesis. 
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where γi is the share of investment expenditure on the domestic component of investment, ρi 
is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign investment, and PI is the minimum 
unit cost function for It, which is expressed as  
( )[ ] iitIFiitI PP ρργγ −−−+= 1 11,, 1
.
 
 
- Production Unit: 
The representative firm is endowed with the following constant returns to scale technology: 
( ) ααφφ ttttt lqKaY qq −−= 11  
where at  is an exogenous productivity shock; lt it is the amount of labor employed, Kt is 
private capital, which is firm-specific, and qt is public capital. The coefficient α indicates the 
production share of labor, while φq denotes the share of private capital in total capital used in 
production. Private capital is subject to a depreciation rate δ. 
The unit solves the maximization problem by which total final investment is determined. The 
installation cost of capital is given by:  
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The optimality conditions for Kt+1, It and lt respectively are: 
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The Euler describes the evolution of λI, the shadow price of a unit of capital. Eq. (2) shows 
that net investment equals zero when the shadow value of a unit of capital, λI, equals its 
replacement cost, i.e. the price of new uninstalled capital, PI. 
The real exchange rate et is defined as the ratio of the price of the foreign consumption basket 
to the domestic one, et = PF,t /Pt , where PF,t is the foreign consumer price index in units of 
foreign currency. Based on the description of the consumption composites, a rise in the 
relative price of domestic non-tradables leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate (et 
decreases). The price of the foreign investment good, PIF, serves to pin down the evolution of 
foreign capital inflow. It follows an exogenous stochastic process. 
 
-Exportation sector 
Producers export domestically produced goods on foreign competitive goods markets at an 
exogenous price since the small open economy is price taker. Domestically produced goods 
are purchased by foreign households. We assume that foreign households’ aggregate 
consumption is described by a CES function that combines home produced and import goods 
as following: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11
,
11
1
,
1
−
−−








−+=
x
x
x
x
xx
x
x
tfxtxtw CXC
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρρ
ρρ γγ  
where xγ  is the share of the home economy’s exports in the rest of the world consumption 
index and 
x
ρ
 is the elasticity of substitution between the home economy’s exports and the 
foreign produced goods.  
The export demand is given by the relation 
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The rest of the world's aggregate consumption Cw,t is exogenous for the economy and its path 
is assumed to evolve along a stochastic log-linear autoregressive process. 
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C. The Government 
Governments face potentially good opportunities for public investment but have limited 
access to external capital and find raising taxes very costly. The government is the direct 
recipient of foreign aid A, which follows the process 
( ) AttAt AAAA ερ +−+= −1
,
 
where A  is the steady state level of aid, At corresponds to an exogenous increase in aid at time 
t, and Aρ  (0; 1) is a parameter that measures the degree of persistence of the increase in aid. 
The government can finance its spending  gt through a variety of sources: taxes on labor 
income and capital, using the domestic currency value of aid proceeds, drawing down on 
deposits held at the central bank, or issuing domestic debt net of amortization. This domestic 
debt (bt) is held by households that can save (bh,t) and by the central bank (bc,t ). The 
government also pays interest on the share of government debt that is held by consumers. 
Then we can write the period-by-period government budget constraint following Berg et al. 
(2010) as: 
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Government spending gt, which is endogenously determined by the constraint above, can be 
used for public consumption or investment purposes. We distinguish between the public 
investment that is a constant share of steady-state government spending and the public 
investment associated with the increase in aid. These investments serve to accumulate public 
capital qt following: 
( ) ( )gggqq tAstgt −++−= − µµδ 11  
where gδ  is the depreciation rate of public capital, sµ and Aµ measure the efficiencies of the 
two types of public investment. 
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The accumulation of government deposits is described by the following rule, which depends 
on the increase in aid: 
( ) ( ) ( )AAsddd ttAdtdt −−+−+= − γρρ 111  
where d is the steady-state level deposits, and d (0; 1). An increase in aid may or may not be 
spent initially, depending on the policy parameter [0; 1]. If aid is not spent, it will initially 
accumulate as deposits but will be gradually spent over time. Both dρ and  Aγ determine the 
speed of spending. 
We introduce the impact of remittances on government revenue in our model through the 
impact of workers’ remittances on the sustainability of government debt4  as: 
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For a given exchange rate, an increase in the ratio of remittances to GDP in period t + 1 
relative to period t improves debt dynamics, since 1+tη  increases relative to tη . Essentially, 
the government’s potential revenue base has increased5.  
 
D. The Central Bank 
The central bank is supposed to engage foreign exchange and open market operations 
corresponding to the amount of aid spend by the government, as well as the remittances and 
foreign investment inflows. Thus, we introduce the Central Bank balance sheet 
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4See Chami et al. (2009) for more details. 
5An increase in the exchange rate, et+1 > et, however, has offsetting effects; it leads to an increase in the domestic currency value of foreign 
currency debt, which worsens sustainability.  The ability of remittances to serve as a buffer against exchange rate shocks depends on many 
factors, including the source country of the remittance flows, the stability of those flows, the response of remittances to changes in the 
exchange rate, and the degree to which remittances augment the government’s revenue base. 
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where bc are the government bonds held by central bank and tR denotes the foreign currency 
value of reserves. The central bank implements the following rule for the foreign currency 
value of reserves6: 
( ) ( )( )AARRR tRtRt −−+−+= − ωρρ 111
. 
As a small open economy, residents can borrow as much as they can without affecting the 
world interest rate. However, a risk premium is assessed based on the aggregate level of 
indebtedness of the economy. The interest rate is given by: 
( )( )1exp −−+= ∗ ddii tpt ψ
. 
(The appendix provides FOC and definition of equilibrium in this model) 
 
 
 
 
5.3.Calibration and Simulation Results 
 
5.3.1. Calibration 
For the research reported in this paper, the economy response is simulated under the effects of 
technology, government spending, terms of trade, foreign aid, remittances and FDI shocks. 
Statistics were computed by conducting simulations of 10,000 periods in length, taking 
logarithms, and filtering each simulated time series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick 
and Prescott, 1997). 
For the parameters calibration is based partly on standard values found in the macro literature, 
and partly on desirable properties for the dynamics of the model. 
Some parameters remain fixed from the start of calculations to address identification issues. 
Others, which can be linked to steady state values, are calibrated to roughly match the 
equilibrium. We set the government parameters to match the low fiscal efficiency of DCs. We 
assign the conventional values of 0.98 and 0.3 to the discount factor and the capital share in 
production, respectively. 
                                                 
6Berg et al. (2010) includes the exchange regime in this rule. Here we consider only the case of flexible exchange rate regime. 
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The share of employment in the production sector is 70%. We follow Gertler et al. (2007) and 
set the value for the share of raw home investment in the investment good composite, γi, at 
0.5. Remittances expressed as a share of total output is 16% in steady state. Finally, we 
assume that the share of home-produced goods in household consumption, γh, is set to 0.4. 
In this scenario, aid-related public investment is low efficient and the government deposits 
and reserve rules imply partial spending and partial absorption of aid. 
Parameters Value Source 
share of labor in production 
function 
α= 0.70  
discount factor β= 0.98 In standard range in literature 
depreciation rate of capital δ= 0.022  
adjustment cost parameter  ψ = 2.2 Acosta et al. (2009) 
tax on labor income τ= 0.33  
degree of home bias in 
consumption  
γh=0.4 Berg et al. (2010) used 0.51 for 
Uganda 
share of domestic investment in 
total investment 
γi = 0.5 Gertler et al. (2007) 
elasticity of substitution 
between local and foreign 
investment 
ρi = 0.2 Acosta et al. (2009) 
elasticity of substitution 
between home and imported 
goods 
ρh= 0.3 Acosta et al. (2009) 
share of private capital in total 
capital used in production 
φq= 0.4  
depreciation rate of public 
capital 
δg = 0.02 Berg et al. (2010)  
Arslanalp et al. (2010) 
share of government spending 
on public investment 
µs = 0.05 Low efficiency of public 
investment 
public investment related to 
increase in aid 
µA = 0.19 Policy parameter 
 
tax on capital τk = 0.02  
degree of persistence of 
increase in aid 
ρA = 0.9 Berg et al. (2010) 
deposit drawn down rate ρd = 0.089  
degree of commitment to 
depreciation target in reserves 
ρR = 0.9  
spending speed of aid γA = 0.2 Partial spending policy 
inverse of labor supply 
elasticity 
φ = 2  
aid absorption ω = 0.8 Partial absorption policy 
degree of persistance of 
increase in remittances 
ρrem = 0.078 Help match the steady state of  
Remittances 16%  
degree of persistance of 
increase in foreign investment 
ρif = 0.08  
degree of persistance of 
increase in central bank bonds 
ρbc = 0.999  
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5.3.2. Can development finance shocks account for the variance of output? 
This section studies the optimal response to economic shocks using impulse responses. 
Starting at the stochastic steady state, the economy is subjected to an unexpected temporary 
shock, and the responses of consumption, output, trade balance, investment, the real wage and 
government spending are then plotted as a function of time. 
Our theoretical and simulated moments show that our model predictions are conform to DCs 
stylized facts. One of the key stylized facts of developing economies business cycles is that 
consumption is substantially more volatile than output. Table 1 shows the relative standard 
deviations of consumption, investment, government spending and trade balance with respect 
to output. The model accurately predicts that both consumption and government spending are 
more volatile than output. Government spending is ten times more volatile than output.  
Table 2 presents results of our variance decomposition analysis. The estimates suggest that 
the model attributes a significant share of business cycle fluctuations to foreign aid, 
remittances and FDI inflows. 
 
Table 2: Conditional variance decomposition (in percent) 
 Foreign aid FDI Remittances Internal shocks 
Output     
Q1 22.31 0.01 0.13 3.50 
Q10 25.48 0.02 0.50 22 
Trade balance     
Q1 10.51 0.01 6.83 60 
Q10 34.11 0.01 2.65 54 
 
As expected, domestic shocks can account for an important part of the output volatility. 
However, the results suggest that internal shocks are not the main factor driving fluctuations 
in real activity in developing countries.  In the short-run, development finance shocks are the 
most important exogenous source of fluctuations (26 %). The results also confirm that 
remittances have an indirect impact on economy.  
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Figure 1 shows the responses to a foreign aid shock. The trade balance naturally depreciates 
as a result. However, the deterioration of the trade balance here does not necessarily translate 
into net foreign debt accumulation.  
The short-run macroeconomic effect of the aid surge is driven by its impact on government 
spending. In response to the corresponding increased labor demand7, there is a rapid increase 
in real wages in the short run, generating expansion in consumption and investment. This 
translates in a short-lived spike in real GDP. As well explained by Berg et al. (2010), the real 
exchange rate appreciation is important here. Because the expansion of consumption 
corresponds also to an increase of imports, the real appreciation contributes to an increase in 
the trade deficit8.  
As we can see the higher government spending related to the aid surge would not imply 
private investment crowding out. This result is supported by Berg et al. (2010) which 
demonstrate that an aid-recipient could avoid the crowding out of the private sector by 
combining partial spending and absorption policies. In this case, appreciation pressures can be 
diminished, ameliorating the short-term crowding out effect on private consumption and 
investment9. In our model the relative efficiency of public investment, or the share of 
spending allocated to public investment, is low, thus in the medium-run there is a decline in 
the real GDP effect. 
Aid-recipient countries could address aid volatility on the fiscal side through expenditure 
smoothing accompanied by central bank foreign exchange sales that are limited to the amount 
of aid spent (Hussain et al. 2009). 
                                                 
7This expansion in non-traded output is partly satisfied by drawing labor from the traded sector. (Berg et al. 2010) 
8We do not include the tradable-non-tradable sector discussion in our model. Berg et al. (2010) show that by making traded goods relatively 
cheaper, the real appreciation shifts private sector demand from non-traded to traded goods. 
9The underlying cause of the private sector crowding out is the authorities' attempt to use the same aid resources twice: on the one hand, the 
central bank uses the foreign exchange value of aid inflows to build up reserves; on the other hand, the government uses the domestic 
currency counterpart to increase spending. Due to donors pressure some governments try to spend most of the aid; then accumulating aid 
flows in reserves created an excess of liquidity and, consequently, inflation pressures. Some central banks then decided to implement bond 
sterilization policies to counteract these pressures. 
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Fig. 2 reports the impulse response functions following a standard deviation shock to 
exogenous remittances. The increase in the household's disposable income results in a 
decrease in the amount of labor supplied. A shrinking labor supply is associated with 
relatively higher real wages. The household's income increases as a result of remittances and 
higher wages, which leads to an increase in consumption demand. An increase in households' 
consumption demand increases the demand for the home-produced good. This increase, along 
with the possibility of substituting relatively expensive labor with capital, positively affects 
investment demand. With shrinking labor supply and higher wages, the production  which is 
labor intensive in DCs is negatively affected.  Some studies affirmed that the productivity and 
the output would be negatively affected in the medium-run if the remittances are allocated to 
consumption and change household behavior against labor. These findings suggest that 
exogenous remittances, which are sizable and volatile, are a significant source of output 
fluctuation at shorter horizons10. 
We also present the reaction of the economy to FDI shocks (Figure 3). If the acquisition of a 
local firm by multinational corporation increases efficiency of the company compare to other 
domestic firms, it would require a more qualified human capital, generating a negative shocks 
in domestic labor demand in the short-run. Furthermore, in some DCs FDI inflows were an 
important component of privatizations and were therefore not new investments. The fact that 
corresponding cash were spent on consumption and imports could explain why there is the 
drop in investments after FDI shocks, and why even in the short run, there is a negative 
relationship between FDI and trade balance (Mencinger, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10Acosta et al. (2009) concluded that even if altruistically motivated or otherwise, an increase in remittances ultimately culminates in a rise 
in household income and, consequently, an increase in consumption that is biased toward nontradables. 
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5.4. Empirical Evidences 
 
5.4.1. Panel VAR analysis 
 
 
Section 2 (DSGE model) provides a comprehensive picture of the real exposition of DCs to 
external shocks and their impact on economic performance of developing countries, and of 
the relative importance of each type of shock. This section quantifies the impact of shocks in 
ECF for development on the output volatility of developing countries, and compares their 
relative ability to explain the large cyclical fluctuations observed in these countries vis-à-vis 
domestic shocks and other external shocks. 
 
The preeminence of external shocks over domestic shocks is subject to debate. Mendoza 
(1991) and Kose and Riezman (2001), using calibrated small open economy models, find 
terms of trade shocks to account for almost half of economic fluctuations. Hoffmaister, 
Roldos, and Wickham (1998), Ahmed (2003), and Raddatz (2007), among others, using time-
series analysis, find that external shocks explain a much smaller fraction of output volatility. 
 
Nevertheless, we know that macroeconomic volatility is not only a source of business cycle 
uncertainty but also a major cause of low economic growth. Shock episodes were 
accompanied by a visible deterioration of the macroeconomic situation. For example, 
Crispolti and Tsibouris (2012) show that in presence of FDI shock, cumulative losses 
expressed as forgone GDP growth were approximately 0.2 percentage points of GDP growth 
in a year. 
 
 
(1) Model specification 
 
 Following Love and Zicchino (2006), we directly estimate the output impact of economic 
shocks (domestic and external) using semi-structural vector autoregression analysis, as 
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applied to panel data of aggregate variables. This technique combines the traditional VAR 
approach, which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with the panel-data 
approach, which allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity. We specify a first order 
VAR model as follows: 
 
itctiitit dfzz ε+++Γ+Γ= −110  
 
where zt= (yt', xt', it')', ytis a vector of economic output; xt is the vector of external shocks, 
included development finance shocks (aid, fdi and remittances), terms of trade and external 
demand shocks; it is a vector of domestic shocks (consumer price, private credit, exchange 
rate, interest rate, inflation, agriculture, manufacture and industry value added to gdp). 
 
In our specification, we assume that current shocks have an effect on the contemporaneous 
value of output, while level of output has an effect on the level of aid, remittances and FDI 
only with a lag. We believe this assumption is plausible. For example in case of foreign aid, 
the allocation process is subject to informational time lags. Decision makers can only base 
their decisions on the information currently available, and for the most DCs, this information 
will, at best, be for the year prior to that for which the aid is allocated. 
To implement the VAR, all variables must be in stationary forms. In the presence of non-
stationary variables, a related problem is the possibility of finding spurious regressions. It is 
widely recognized that standard tests have very low power in front of the panel data (see 
Enders, 1995). This has led to the development of tests that seek to exploit the panel 
dimension of the data. Given the results of unit root tests (in Appendix) we cannot argued that 
all the variables can be characterized as stationary process, thus we will take in account 
potential non-stationarity in the model. 
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As explained by Love and Zicchino (2006) application of the VAR procedure to panel data 
impose that the underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this 
constraint is likely to be violated in practice, they deal with this restriction by allowing for 
“individual heterogeneity” in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed effects. Since the 
fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variable, they use 
forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the ‘Helmert procedure’ to eliminate fixed 
effects (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). This transformation preserves the orthogonality 
between transformed variables and lagged regressors, so we can use lagged regressors as 
instruments and estimate the coefficients by system GMM.  
 
We then recover the impulse-response functions (IRF) to each of the structural shocks using 
these reduced form coefficients and the Cholesky decompositions of the corresponding 
variance–covariance matrices of errors. We estimate the contribution of each variable to the 
variance decomposition using their empirical variance, which is equivalent to assuming that 
the occurrence of a shock is a random variable that follows a Bernoulli distribution with the 
same probability across countries. The confidence bands for the IRF will be estimated by 
parametric bootstrapping assuming normally distributed reduced form errors. 
 
We also present variance decompositions, which show the percent of the variation in one 
variable that is explained by the shock to another variable, accumulated over time. The 
variance decompositions show the magnitude of the total effect11. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11To study the responsiveness of macroeconomic volatility to external shocks, we consider two measures of real external shocks, 
development finance related shocks and country-specific shocks, including terms of trade and external demand. External demand shocks are 
measured by shocks in trading partners' growth. 
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(2) Results 
 
Our results here are close to those with DSGE simulation in section1. Foreign aid and 
Remittances shocks affect positively the output in the short-run (Figure 4). The finding about 
FDI supports the crowding out effect on private investment, which decreases the output. We 
also observe that the response of the output to terms of trade shocks is negative in the impulse 
responses, as expected. A shock to external demand increases the output, this effect will 
decrease rapidly if the production sector do not have unused capacity. 
 
Given that the aim of this section is to quantify the impact of these development finance 
shocks and determine their contributions to output volatility in developing countries during 
last two decades, we rapidly move to variance decomposition analysis. 
Table 3 shows the variance decomposition exercise for the forecast error of real per capita 
GDP with only domestic shocks, while Tables 4 and 5 progressively included external shocks 
in the specification. We follow this strategy in order to contribute to the debate about the 
preeminence of external shocks over domestic shocks and vice-versa. The tables show the 
fraction of the ten and twenty quarters year ahead forecast error that can be explained by all 
external shocks versus internal factors. 
Internal shocks play an important role in the fluctuations of GDP, accounting for about 40 
percent of the variance of output. The overall picture suggests that it is external factors the 
ones that account for most of the variance of real activity. We find that foreign aid, 
remittances and FDI shocks explain 25 to 60 percent of the output volatility. 
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Robustness: control for potential non-stationary process 
As explained above, given that unit root tests presented contradictory results we need to 
consider non-stationarity being an issue here. Spurious regression result of apparent 
significance could occur in a regression model with non-stationary variables. Luckily, we can 
test the influence of non-stationarity to see whether the relationships estimated were spurious 
or not. In fact, if the significance of parameters does not disappear after performing a first 
difference-PVAR, we can be confident about the previous results. Table 7 presents GMM 
estimates of the response of output to shocks in a PVAR model with variables in level and in 
first difference. These results suggest that our findings are robust to potential non-stationarity. 
The overall results show that internal economic shocks can account only for a small fraction 
of the variance of the forecast error. Their relative importance, vis-à-vis external factors, 
increase with the forecast horizon, but in the full specifications they account at most for 35 
percent of the total output variance. These findings suggest that development finance flows, 
supposed to help developing countries, are the most important factor driving fluctuations in 
real activity in developing countries12.  
 
 
5.4.2. Procyclical or counter-cyclical? 
 
The last step of our analysis is to determine the nature of effect of each flow on business 
cycle. 
 
(1) Empirical specification 
 
The specification of the impact of foreign aid, FDI and remittance inflows on the DCs' 
business cycles is as follows: 
tititititititi fuXFRA ,',,3,2,1, εβααασ ++++++=  
                                                 
12Crispolti and Tsibouris (2012) show that shocks in foreign aid and FDI are more frequent than shocks in terms of trade and external 
demand in the last decades, thus our results are somehow highly expected. 
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where ti ,σ  is a measure of country’s i business cycle (alternatively the magnitude and 
frequency of shocks)  at year t . Ai,t, Fi,t and Ri,t are respectively the value of foreign aid, 
foreign direct investment and remittance inflows received by a country i at the year t 
expressed as a share of country’s i GDP. X denotes the matrix of control variables, which 
includes household consumption, inflation, interest rate, credit to private sector as proxy of 
domestic financial depth, trade and financial openness13, external demand and agriculture 
value added to gdp. ui and ft represent the country and year fixed effects, respectively, and ɛit 
is the idiosyncratic error term. 
 
Following Calderon et al. (2007), business cycles are measured by taking the log deviation of 
the real GDP in each country with respect to its trend. The trend is computed using the 
Hodrik-Prescott filter. The smoothness parameter of the Hodrik-Prescott filter is set equal to 
6.25, following Ravn and Uhlig’s (2002) recommendation for annual data. 
 
The financial openness variable for each country is drawn from the Chinn and Ito (2008) 
financial openness dataset. Higher values of the index refer to smaller capital account 
restrictions. The other variables are provided by World Development Indicators database over 
the period 1990-2010. 
 
To correct for potential reverse causality, we follow Bruckner (2013) and apply a two-stage 
approach to uncover the relationship between foreign aid, remittances, FDI and business cycle 
in DCs.  
                                                 
13
Following Barajas et al. (2012), we control for trade and financial openness to ensure that the coefficient associated with remittance 
inflows captures the direct effect, which does not work through the positive impact of remittances on these variables. 
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This twostep 2SLS estimation strategy enables to compute an estimate of the effects that 
development finance flows have on business cycle that are adjusted for the reverse causal 
effect that the business cycle variable has on these flows, while controlling their responses to 
economic conditions in  the recipients' economies14.  
 
In the model, the endogeneity of development finance inflows is addressed by instrumenting 
variables with the residuals of this first stage regression:  
 
titititi XZZ ,
'
,,21,1 ωβθ ++= . 
 
We chose to base our analysis here on OLS and 2SLS regressions despite the potential 
problems with the data because is a transparent way to look at the data without obfuscating 
the inherent mechanisms.  
 
In this context of potential non-stationarity of some of the variables, as robustness checks, we 
choose to use the PMG (Pooled Mean Group) approach developed by Pesaran et al. (1999).In 
its generalised form, the PMG estimation can be represented by  
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The variable y is the ratio of primary interest (output volatility, skewness or kurtosis of GDP); 
X is a vector of non-stationary (I(1)) variables; Z is a vector of stationary (I(0)) variables;φi  is 
the, country-specific, error-correction coefficient;µ is the, country-specific, intercept;θ is the 
vector of coefficients that define the long-run relationship,β, δ andγare the country-specific 
short-run coefficient vectors, and ɛ are, stationary, country-specific vectors of standard errors. 
The term in brackets represents the (normalised) long-run, cointegrating relationship. 
                                                 
14
 See Brückner (2013) for the proof of the robustness of this two-step approach and the efficiency of the technique. 
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Besides providing an estimate of the long-run relationship between the non-stationary 
variables (within an error correction framework), the PMG estimator has several other 
advantages. By assuming common long-run coefficients across panels (countries) but 
allowing for differences in short-run and error-correction coefficients (as well as intercepts) 
across panels, this approach is less restrictive than fixed effects estimators that allow 
intercepts to vary but assumes common short-run and long-run coefficients as well as a 
common speed of error correction across panels. 
 
 
The results are presented in Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
 
 
(2)Results interpretation 
 
 
Foreign Aid :  Stabilizing impact 
 
The baseline specification includes a measure of the output cycle in recipient countries. 
At the macroeconomic level, a major effect that can be expected from aid is due to its possible 
stabilizing impact. As expected, the foreign aid variable is negatively correlated with the 
volatility of the output in all the specification (Table 7). 
We find that aid flows are on average counter-cyclical vis-à-vis the recipient cycle in the last 
two decades. 
 
To document the stabilization property of aid, we test some channels suggested in the 
literature. First, income stabilization is an important component of aid impact. As explained in 
Guillaumont and Tapsoba (2012) we found that by making the resources available for national 
expenditure, aid stabilizes the output in recipients' countries. The results in Table 10 (column 
1) suggested that when aid flows are directed toward public investment, its stabilizing impact 
on output fluctuations increases. Aid might also be used to finance higher levels of foreign 
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reserves and greater financial depth, which can then be used to cushion shocks to external 
income. The results in Table 10 (columns 2&3) indicate that the stabilizing impact of aid 
diminishes with the level of foreign reserves, and increasing when it serves financial 
development.The stabilizing impact of aid can also be captured through the quantity of net 
imports15 financed by an increment in aid, which represents the real transfer of resources 
enabled by aid. Thus, aid should finance current account deficit in DCs (Column 4). 
 
Furthermore, in column 5 the negative sign of the coefficient of the interaction term of aid and 
terms of trade shocks, as proxy of exposition to external shocks, suggested that foreign aid 
helps dampen external shocks effects. This finding confirms recent empirical findings in 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2009) which suggested that aid may be more effective in 
vulnerable countries, and Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) which find that bilateral aid is 
countercyclical when aid recipients are hit by large adverse shocks. 
 
 
Remittances: Counter-cyclical (stabilizing) but increase exposition to shocks 
 
Now focusing on the impact of remittances on business cycle, estimation results present a 
negative correlation between remittances inflows and output volatility, confirming previous 
findings of Frankel (2011) and Ebeke (2011) which show that these flows have become more 
countercyclical in recent decades. This stabilizing effect works through two main channels: 
access to credit because it serves as substitute to credit market or as a collateral, and 
household consumption (Table 11). 
 
If this empirical evidence justifies the importance given to remittances flows by policy 
makers, they should be aware that this potential positive effect could become smaller than the 
                                                 
15Both the direct and indirect increase in imports financed by aid, i.e. direct purchases of imports by the government, as well as second-round 
increases in net imports resulting from aid-driven increases in public or private expenditures 
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instability cost brought by remittances. Indeed as they increase business cycle synchronization 
with the rest of the world, they also increase the magnitude of shocks on output. In Table 9, 
we present estimation of the variables on the magnitude (skewness) and frequency (kurtosis) 
of shocks on output. The coefficient associated to the remittances variable is positively 
correlated to the exposure to shocks and negatively correlated to the incidence of these shocks 
on output. 
Thus, DCs are more expose to external shocks than we were thinking, even countries with 
capital account restrictions and relatively few trade linkages. Barajas et al. (2012) suggested 
that these findings imply a revision of the concepts of openness and integration into the global 
economy. 
 
 
 
Foreign direct investment: Increase output fluctuations… 
 
The sign of the coefficients in the baseline specification (Table 7) and in the skewness 
regression (Table 9) shows that FDI increase the magnitude of shocks on output but the 
coefficient of the kurtosis regression suggests that it seems to reduce the frequencies of 
shocks. If FDI flows can provide a stimulus to domestic investment and innovation, it is 
possible that sudden changes in the volume of FDI inflows have a destabilizing impact on the 
economy. A second interpretation of the results is that the FDI flows gives a proxy for 
economic or political uncertainty; thus FDI volatility may give an indication of underlying 
instability (political and economic) in a country, and thus explain the procyclicity of FDI. 
However, we know that some FDI inflows are linked to foreign aid received as explained 
before and thus there could be a part of FDI inflows that is countercyclical like aid flows. 
When we control for the share of FDI inflows related to growth rate in trading partners 
countries, the remaining FDI (tied to aid flows) seems countercyclical. 
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Results in table 12 show that when FDI flows are translate into increase in investment their 
destabilizing effect diminishes but if FDI receipts finance imports and consumption, the 
economy ends with a higher current account deficit and more volatile output. 
 
Our regressions provide other interesting results internal factors driving fluctuations of output. 
Consumption is mainly driven, in the short run, by changes in expectations about permanent 
productivity. After a demand shock, as consumers temporarily overstate the economy's 
productive capacity, demand increases while productivity is unchanged. This generates 
inflation. This stabilizing property of inflation is reflected by the negative correlation with 
output volatility in Table 7. On the other hand after controlling for the external demand, the 
correlation became positive, suggesting that prices volatility increases macroeconomic 
volatility (last column Table 7). 
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the Agriculture Value added to GDP 
variable, shows that the size of agriculture sector in GDP increases the output volatility. 
Given that DCs are price takers, agriculture sector can make a country more vulnerable 
through the fluctuations in the prices of its main exports. 
 
The financial depth has a positive effect on output volatility. This finding is consistent with 
the existing literature (Easterly et al. 2000; …). Our regression on kurtosis suggests that the 
financial depth also increase the frequency of shocks on output. Arcand et al. (2012) find that 
there is a positive relationship between the size of the financial system and economic growth, 
but too much finance could be associated with less growth.  
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5.5. Conclusion 
 
The fundamental issue addressed in this paper is how development finance affects 
business cycles in developing countries (DCs). In particular, we explore the role of foreign 
aid, workers' remittances and foreign direct investment flows in the macroeconomic 
fluctuations faced by these economies. Indeed, beyond the opportunities offered by these 
flows they also induce macroeconomic challenges to recipient governments which could 
exacerbate the vulnerability of developing countries to external shocks.  
In this paper, we experimented a simple real business cycle (RBC) model of small 
open economy with some characteristics of DCs. We accounted for their exposition to 
external capital flows like foreign aid, remittances and FDI, and represented how they 
influence the government, households and firms behaviors in recipient economies. Our 
preliminary outcomes suggest that our RBC model is consistent with some stylized facts of 
DCs business cycles: Consumption and Government spending are more volatile than output 
and a countercyclical trade balance. 
The analysis of our theoretical model yields several results that are relevant to 
understanding the business cycles fluctuations in DCs. The response of the economy to 
foreign aid shocks depends on the government capacity to translate aid receipts into effective 
public investment. Moreover, to avoid the short-term crowding out effect on private 
investment, the government and central bank must follow partial spending and absorption 
policies as recommended by Berg et al. (2010).      
Our results also confirm that remittances have only an indirect impact on output. If 
remittances, as expected have a positive impact on households' income and consumption, they 
could induce in the long run a decrease in labor supply and negatively affect the production. 
In the other hand, our findings show that the introduction of FDI in domestic firms is related 
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to an increase of the demand of highly qualified human capital, generally imported, and thus 
could correspond in the short-run to a negative shock in the demand of domestic labor.  
The main contribution of this paper concerns the relative contribution of development 
finance flows shocks to macroeconomic fluctuations in DCs. We found that domestic shocks 
are not the main factor driving business cycles fluctuations in DCs. Our DSGE simulations 
show that foreign aid, FDI and remittances can account for twenty-six percent of output 
fluctuations. This finding suggests that contrary to the conclusions in Raddatz (2007), external 
shocks are responsible of an important fraction of the instability of output in low-income 
countries. In order to empirically document the findings of our theoretical model, we 
measured the role of these external flows using panel data on LICs and other developing 
economies during the period 1990-2008. We find that, even for countries like LICs with 
limited financial sector, when taking into account development finance flows (Foreign aid, 
FDI and remittances), they appear more expose to external shocks than expected. Panel VAR 
estimations show that internal factors can only explain thirty-five percent of the output 
instability in developing countries.     
Finally, the results of the panel analysis help to describe the nature of each flow. First, 
as expected, FDI flows which are essentially capital movements, are procyclical to economic 
environment. Second, we find that during the last twenty years, aid flows were mostly 
counter-cyclical and this stabilizing property of aid works through revenue available for 
governments and increase in public investment. We also find that another significant 
component of aid impact in less developed countries is the financing of increase in the level 
of foreign reserves.  Third, our empirical findings confirm recent studies about remittances 
showing that they are countercyclical. However, our results also show that dependence to 
remittances flows also increase the magnitude and the frequency of shocks on output as they 
increase business cycles synchronization with the rest of the world. 
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 Our overall results can help to complete the analysis of macroeconomic vulnerabilities 
in developing countries (DCs) that arise from changes in the external environment. For 
example, the IMF implemented the Vulnerability Exercise for Developing Countries (VE-
LIC) to provide to policy makers a systematic framework to “connect the dots” between 
vulnerabilities, potential tail risks in the global outlook, and their repercussions for countries. 
This program seeks helping DCs to manage volatility and mitigate external shocks; some 
findings of this paper could serve as contribution to this purpose. 
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DSGE estimations 
Table1: Volatility and Correlation with output 
 Standard deviation  Correlation with output  
     
Output 1  1  
Trade balance 7.1  -0.27  
Consumption 3.2  0.65  
Investment 0.36  0.18  
Gov Spending 10.43  0.34  
 
Table2: Conditional Variance Decomposition 
 Foreign aid FDI Remittances Internal shocks 
Output     
Q1 22.31 0.01 0.13 3.50 
Q10 25.48 0.02 0.50 22 
Trade balance     
Q1 10.51 0.01 6.83 60 
Q10 34.11 0.01 2.65 54 
 
PVAR Estimations 
Table 3: Internal shocks 
 Inflation 
(CPI) 
Agri. value  
Added gr 
Manufact. value 
Added gr 
Financial 
sector 
Interest rate 
Output      
10 9.8 1.6 9.2 3.3 18 
20 15.4 2.3 10 6 16 
 
Table 4: Internal shocks vs development finance shocks 
 Inflation 
(CPI) 
Agri. 
value  
added 
Manufact. 
value 
added 
Industry 
Value  
Foreign 
aid 
Remittances FDI 
Output        
10 4 10 1.2 11 36 1.3 1 
20 24 4.6 3 5.6 34 4 0.4 
 
 Inflation 
 
Financial 
sector 
Interest rate REER Foreign aid FDI Remittances 
Output        
10 0.95 2.7 1 0.3 17 36 6.2 
20 1.2 8 0.52 0.7 25 31 9.7 
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Table 5: Internal vs external shocks 
 Terms of 
trade 
 
Agri. 
value  
added 
Manufact. 
value 
added 
Industry 
Value  
Foreign 
aid 
Remittances FDI 
Output        
10 3 3.3 14 9 41 2 1.5 
20 2.4 5.1 12 19 34 1.9 1.6 
 
 inflation Financial 
sector 
Demand 
from 
Partners 
Terms of 
trade 
Aid Remittances FDI 
Output        
10 1.9 2.09 18 1.6 11 2.3 0.1 
20 2.2 3 14 1.2 16 4 0.3 
30 2.3 3.3 13 1.1 18.5 4.5 0.6 
 
 
Table 6: Main results of a 4-variables VAR (Test of spurious regression: PVAR with potential non-stationarity) 
Response of 
Output 
 PVAR  PVAR in first 
difference 
     
Output  (t-1)  1.27 (18.89)***  1.07 (24.75) *** 
Foreign aid (t-1)  2.41 (3.82) ***  0.001 (4.81) *** 
FDI (t-1)  -0.01 (-4.33) 
*** 
 -0.005 (-5.24) 
*** 
Remittances (t-
1) 
 0.016 (2.49) **  0.002 (1.05) 
 
Four variables VAR model is estimated by GMM. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are 
in parentheses. *** and ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively. Reported 
numbers show the responses of output to shocks on lagged variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel IV estimations 
 
Table 7 : Development finance impact on output volatility 
 OLS (RE cluster- robust) 2SLS ( IV-FE) 
 Business Cycle (HP) 
Aid -0.0066*** (0.00) -0.05 *** (0.00) 
Remittances -0.00003** (0.049) -0.002*** (0.00) 
FDI 0.00004 *** (0.00) 0.0005*** (0.00) 
Observations 2106 (127) 1380 (110) 
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 Dependent variable: Output volatility 
Aid -0.11 *** (0.00) -0.11*** (0.00) -0.11 
***(0.00) 
-0.044 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
Remittances -0.0016 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.0014***(0.00) -0.0009** 
(0.03) 
-0.0045 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.0015 *** 
(0.00) 
FDI 0.0004 *** (0.00)  0.00038 *** 
(0.00) 
0.0006 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.00) 
0.0006 *** 
(0.00) 
      
Interest rate    -0.00003 * 
(0.08) 
-0.00003* 
(0.05) 
CPI -0.0012 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** (0.00) -0.0023*** 
(0.00) 
0.0012* (0.07) -0.002 *** 
(0.00) 
Credit to private 0.00001 (0.41) -0.00004 (0.99) -0.00001 
(0.18) 
0.00012 *** -0.000003 
(0.80) 
Financial 
openness 
-0.00003 (0.83) -0.000029 (0.83) -0.000016 
(0.9) 
-0.000055 
(0.68) 
-0.000018 
(0.89) 
Investment (local)   -0.00016 ** 
(0.04) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00007 
(0.41) 
Public Investment -0.0001 * (0.07)     
Agri.value added 0.0002*** (0.00) 0.00015 *** 
(0.00) 
0.00017 *** 
(0.00) 
0.00017*** 
(0.00) 
0.00014*** 
(0.00) 
Household cons.  0.00002 * (0.05) 0.00001* 
(0.05) 
0.000022** 
(0.03) 
0.00002** 
(0.04) 
      
External demand    0.003*** 
(0.00) 
 
      
Observations 1041 (84) 1011 (80) 1011 (80) 1011 (80) 1011 (80) 
R-sq 0.18 0.15 0.154 0.19 0.16 
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Table 8: PMG estimation (control for non-stationarity and cointegration) 
 
 PMG IV-PMG PMG IV-PMG 
Short-run 
Aid -0.027*** 
(0.00) 
-0.25*** 
(0.00) 
-0.017*** 
(0.00) 
-0.53*** 
(0.00) 
Remittances -0.0002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00014 
(0.13) 
-0.018*** 
(0.00) 
FDI 0.0003 (0.16) 0.0007*** 
 (0.00) 
-0.00006* 
(0.07) 
0.0044 *** 
(0.00) 
Error correction/ 
adjustment 
speed 
0.77*** 
(0.00) 
0.57 *** 
(0.00) 
0.77 
(0.00) 
0.45*** 
(0.00) 
Interest rate   -0.00002 
(0.82) 
-
0.0004*** 
(0.00) 
CPI   -0.0012 
(0.21) 
0.004*** 
 (0.00) 
Credit to private   -0.00003*** 
(0.00) 
0.0003*** 
(0.00) 
Financial 
openness 
  0.0005** 
(0.04) 
-0.00033 
(0.81) 
Agri.value added   0.00001 
(0.86) 
-0.001*** 
(0.00) 
Household cons   0.0009 (0.49) 0.0003*** 
(0.00) 
cons -0.0008***  -0.003(0.15) -0.003* 
(0.07) 
-0.01*** 
Long-run Normalized (corrected) 
Ec_AID -0.011*** 
(0.00) 
-0.028 (0.26) -0.012* 
(0.07) 
-0.13*** 
(0.00) 
Ec_Remit -0.0006* 
(0.07) 
-0.001 (0.11) -0.0001 
(0.80) 
-
0.0022*** 
(0.00) 
Ec_FDI -0.00001 
(0.8) 
0.0004** 
(0.03) 
-0.00002 
(0.53) 
0.0009*** 
(0.00) 
 
The PMGestimates are presented as a two-equation model: the normalized cointegrating vector and the short-run 
dynamic coefficients, with robust-standard errors. 
Panel-specific intercepts are allowed. 
Output on normalized estimates of the other variables are not display but available upon request. 
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Table 9: Development finance shocks on magnitude and frequency of shocks on output 
 Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis 
Aid -3.08*** 
(0.00) 
1.80*** 
(0.00) 
0.55 (0.75) -0.08 
(0.90) 
Remittances 0.056 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.023) 
0.29 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
FDI -0.01 (0.15) 0.004 (0.14) 0.20 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.09 *** 
(0.00) 
     
Interest rate   -0.00005 
(0.97) 
0.00004 
(0.93) 
CPI   0.02 (0.75) -0.017 
(0.54) 
Credit to private   -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.004*** 
(0.00) 
Financial 
openness 
  -0.11*** 
(0.00) 
0.045*** 
(0.00) 
Agri.value added   -0.007 (0.22) 0.003 
(0.13) 
Household cons.   0.0009 (0.49) -0.0003 
(0.57) 
     
External demand   -0.11 * 
(0.05) 
0.042** 
(0.04) 
     
Observations 1380 (110) 1380 (110) 1011 (80) 1011 (80) 
R-sq 0.062 0.10 0.155 0.21 
Regressions here follow the same 2SLS specification used in Table 7, with dependent variables being the skewness and 
Kurtosis of GDP. 
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Table 10: Foreign aid transmission channels 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Aid -0.12*** -0.047*** -0.11 *** -0.11*** -0.07*** 
Aidxpublic 
invest 
-0.0008** 
(0.04) 
    
AidxResevres  0.017 (0.26)    
AidxCredit   -0.0002** 
(0.01) 
  
AidxCA    0.00084***  
AidxTOT 
shocks 
    -0.00005 
(0.22) 
Remittances -0.004*** -0.0019*** -0.0016*** -0.0014 *** -0.002 *** 
FDI 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0006 *** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 
      
Interest rate -0.00007***  -0.0003** 
(0.04) 
-0.00003** 
(0.03) 
 
CPI -0.0013***  -0.002*** -0.002***  
Credit to private 0.00005** 
(0.01) 
 -9.17e-07 
(0.94) 
  
Financial 
openness 
0.0001 
(0.56) 
 -0.00004 
(0.77) 
-0.00003 
(0.84) 
 
Agri.value 
added 
0.0001 
(0.85) 
 0.00012** 
(0.02) 
0.00016***  
Household cons 0.00002* 
(0.08) 
 0.00002* 
(0.05) 
0.00002* 
(0.088) 
 
Public 
investment 
0.00004 
(0.5) 
    
Current account    -0.00008***  
Foreign reserves  -0.00045* 
(0.07) 
   
External demand      
Terms of trade 
shocks 
    0.0000003* 
(0.08) 
Observations 790 1363 1037 1011 1069 
R-sq 0.189 0.06 0.14 0.173 0.091 
Regressions here follow the same 2SLS specification used in Table 7. 
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Table 11: Remittances transmission channels 
 1 2 
Remittances -0.0025*** -0.0007 * 
(0.06) 
RemitxCredit 0.0007***  
RemitxHousehold  -
0.000015*** 
Aid -0.11*** -0.11*** 
FDI 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 
   
Interest rate -0.00003** 
(0.03) 
-0.000034** 
(0.02) 
CPI -0.002*** -0.0019*** 
Credit to private -0.0001*** -1.9e-06 
(0.8) 
Financial 
openness 
-0.000016 
(0.90) 
-0.00001 
(0.94) 
Agri.value added 0.00005 
(0.34) 
0.0001** 
(0.04) 
Household Exp. 0.00002** 
(0.04) 
0.00005* 
(0.07) 
   
Observations 1011 1011 
R-sq 0.185 0.17 
Regressions here follow the same 2SLS specification used in Table 7 
 
Table 12: FDI transmission channels 
 1 2 3 
Aid -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.117*** 
Remittances -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0016*** 
FDI 0.00067*** 0.00066*** 0.0003** (0.04) 
FDIxInvestment -3.06e-06* (0.05)   
FDIxICurrent account  0.00008***  
FDIxndustry   0.00001 *** 
    
Investment -0.0004 (0.66) -0.0001 (0.31) -0.0001 (0.28) 
Interest rate -0.00003* (0.06) -0.00003** (0.02) -0.00004*** 
CPI -0.002*** -0.0021*** -0.002*** 
Credit to private -0.00003 (0.78) -0.00006 (0.63) -0.000045 (0.73) 
Financial openness -0.00002 (0.88) -0.00007 (0.63) -0.00008 (0.53) 
Agri.value added 0.00015*** 0.00015*** 0.0001** (0.04) 
Industry value added   -0.00005* (0.07) 
Household cons. 0.00002* (0.054) 0.00002* (0.05) 0.000024** (0.02) 
Current account balance  -0.0001***  
    
Observations 1011 1011 1011 
R-sq 0.161 0.184 0.178 
Regressions here follow the same 2SLS specification used in Table 7 
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Graphics and Figures: 
 
Figure 1: IRFs to foreign aid shocks 
 
Figure 2: IRFs to Remittances shocks 
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Figure 3: IRFs to foreign direct investment shocks 
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Figure 4: IRFs from Panel VAR analysis 
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Appendix A.  Tests and Data description 
 
Unit Root and Cointegration tests: 
 
Panel Unit Root Tests 
chi_sqin cells and  p-value in parenthesis 
 
 
Pesaran (2007) CIPS Test 
lags Output volatility Aid Remittances FDI 
 Specification without trend 
0 -23.82 (0.00) -12.66 (0.00) -20.34 (0.00) -12.42 (0.00) 
1 -21.31 (0.00) -4.17 (0.00) -13.31 (0.00) -2.58 (0.005) 
 Specification with trend 
0 -16.65 (0.00) -12.57 (0.00) -14.54 (0.00) -7.28 (0.00) 
1 -12.22 (0.00)  -1.01 (0.15) -10.78 (0.00) 2.20 (0.98) 
Zt-bar   p-value 
 
Null hypothesis for MW and CIPS tests: series is I(1).MW test assumes cross-section 
independence.CIPS test assumes cross-section dependence is in form of a single unobserved 
common factor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher Test 
lags Output volatility Aid Remittances FDI 
 Specification without trend 
0 1713.41 (0.00) 639.69 (0.00) 756.29 (0.00) 904.18 (0.00) 
1 1615.70 (0.00) 315.73 (0.10) 524.36 (0.00) 491.85 (0.00) 
 Specification with trend 
0 1168.32 (0.00) 651.90 (0.00) 825.65 (0.00) 859.01 (0.00) 
1 1068.74 (0.00) 326.81 (0.05) 455.29 (0.00) 482.14 (0.00) 
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Appendix B. Optimality Conditions and Exogenous shocks equations 
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- Government constraint 
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-Central Bank Reserves rule 
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Exogenous processes introduced to the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
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Chapter 6. The Impact of Being an LDC Member 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
The paper studies the impact of being categorised as a Least Developed Country (LDC) by 
using matching methods for parametric and non-parametric estimations. Our results suggest 
that LDC status has a positive and statistically significant impact on the growth rate of Gross 
domestic product per capita. Our findings also suggest that the least developed countries 
respond better to external shocks and are less vulnerable prior to the support measures linked 
to the LDC status. 
 
JEL code : C14, C31, C33, F35, O11 
Keywords: Least Developed Countries, Macroeconomic Vulnerability, Economic Growth, 
Treatment effect, Matching, Non-parametric preprocessing, Sensitivity analysis 
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6.1. Introduction 
The "Least developed countries" (LDCs) are defined as being among the poorest 
countries in the world; and as suffering from severe structural handicaps to their development 
viz: lack of human capital and a high vulnerability to natural and external shocks. Table 1 
briefly compares some characteristics of LDCs with those of other Low Income Countries 
(LICs). They are weak and vulnerable.  
                                                                               [HereTable1] 
The official recognition in 1971 of this special category of developing country represented an 
exception in the history of the UN system (Guillaumont, 2009). The structural characteristics 
of LDCs dampen their economic development and make them more likely to remain caught in 
the poverty trap. Because of that, they have benefited from special treatment from the 
international community since 1971; such as special support measures from the donor 
community, including bilateral donors and multilateral organizations, as well as special 
treatment accorded by multilateral and regional trade agreements. Currently, the major LDC 
support measures vary depending on development partners. These support measures primarily 
relate to trade preferences and to the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA), but 
they also include various other special treatments provided by multilateral institutions; in 
particular by the UN and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (UNDP, 2008). The main 
measures related to international trade are preferential market access, special treatment 
regarding WTO obligations, and trade-related capacity building. As regards the ODA, as well 
as the old target of ODA of developed countries reaching 0.7 per cent of their GNI, an 
additional target of 0.15 per cent for the ratio of their ODA specifically allocated to LDCs was 
adopted at the first UN Conference on LDCs in 1981. Some other measures consist of direct 
support aimed at facilitating their participation in the UN system, and thereby to empower 
them within the system. 
Chapter 6. The Impact of Being an LDC Member 
 
 
  235 
 
This paper proposes an analysisof the evolution of countries identified as LDCs with the 
objective of finding a better understanding of the impact of the special support measures 
related to this country category. Instead of taking an evaluation measure by measure, this 
paper chooses to find the average impact of the LDC status on economic growth and 
macroeconomic vulnerability. To permit this approach we need a control group that can be 
compared to LDCs - a group of comparable countries, but countries which do not benefit from 
LDC status. 
A recent note by Arcand et al (2012) showed that the status of LDCs had no significant effect 
on economic growth of such countries1. The method used in that work is the Regression 
Discontinuity Design which determines the "local average effect" by simulating a pseudo-
randomization around the threshold of identification2. However, results from these estimates 
are difficult to generalise in case of LDC identification, especially if countries around the 
threshold are not representative of the entire sample3.  Here we want to go further the only 
growth effect and see if LDCs are less vulnerable after their inclusion.So this analysis covers 
economic growth, volatility of output and volatility of exports in LDCs. 
                                                 
1 Due to the structural break in the LDC criteria, they split the sample into two periods: 1971 to 1990 and 1991 to 
2008. 
2
 Intuitively speaking, RDD is akin to a local randomization and allows looking for the difference between 
members and non-members who are at the border of the criteria thresholds (just below and just above). But 
history of LDCs shows that identification the criteria were sometimes violated, to take that into account we have 
three choices: (i)Before the Study: Talk to those who can might override assignment (administrators) 
– Identify their concerns. 
– If those concerns can be clearly articulated and uniformly implemented, then they can be made into exclusion 
criteria for getting into the study 
(ii)Designing the Study: Combine RDD with a randomized or nonrandomized experiment, using two cutoffs 
with random (or nonrandom) assignment occurring in the interval that will be fuzzy (method used in Arcand et 
al. 2012) 
(iii) Intent-to-Treat: In a randomized experiment, it is standard to analyze the data according to how people were 
assigned, not according to which treatment they actually received. This preserves the internal validity of the 
design. (We apply this method in the Heckman selection model) 
3
 Extend the results to countries far away from these thresholds should be done with caution. 
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Our empirical strategy is based on the specificity of the LDCs' history and variations of 
identification criteria over time.  These issues about the identification of LDCs allow us to 
have ex-post a kind of randomisation in the selection process that is useful for our analysis4. 
We use two applications of matching methods to perform our empirical analysis of 
themacroeconomicimpact of being an LDC. First, we apply the Abadie and Imbens (2007) 
nearest neighbor-matching estimator on a small group of comparable countries identified by 
Guillaumont (2009), called "discordant" countries. This is a group of similar (in term of some 
observable characteristics related to structural features) low-income countries with different 
evolution: some became LDCs and other did not. Second, following Ho et al. (2007) we use 
matching to pre-process a dataset of 120 developing countries to generate a control group to 
assess the impact of LDC status on countries' economic growth and macroeconomic volatility. 
Then, we apply the parametric estimation methods on the matched data, with the aim of 
producing robust causal effect estimates with low bias and variance. 
Applying the nearest neighbor matching method to the discordant dataset, we reach the 
conclusion that LDC membership has positive and significant economic growth effects and 
reduces the vulnerability to shocks. We perform two robustness analyses: simulation-based 
sensitivity analysis (Ichino et al 2007) and the Altonji et al. (2005) procedure to assess bias 
from unobservables. Both analyses confirm that there is no reason to reject our findings. As 
an alternative, pre-processing matching proposes an analysis with more observations and less 
assumptions. Parametric models (Random effect, Fixed effect and Heckman selection models) 
applied to the pre-processed dataset produce less model-dependent causal inferences, and 
confirm a positive effect of LDC status. 
                                                 
4Ex-post randomization will be done using the retrospective's HAI and EVI that allow to have the values of these 
criteria for the periods preceding their creation.  Thus, our assessment will be done uniformly throughout the 
period 1971-2008 with the criteria adopted since 2006. 
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The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a model to explain the 
implications of LDCs support measures. Section 3 describes the empirical issues related to the 
identification of the impact of LDC membership. Section 4 explains the adopted empirical 
strategies to measure the causal effect of the special measures package for LDCs. Section 5 
presents data and results. Section 5 offers conclusions. 
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6.2. Modelling LDCs Measures Effects 
 
To understand support measures to LDCs we choose to theorize that in a small open 
economy. 
 
 
A) The Model 
 
1. Households 
 
The economy is inhabited by a representative agent who maximizes the expected value of 
lifetime utility as given by: 
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where Ct and Lt represent period t consumption index and labor. The household's composite 
consumption index Ct is a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES), which combines 
the household's consumption of domestically produced goods Ch,t and imported goods CM,t: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11
,
11
,
1
1
−
−−








−+=
h
h
h
h
hh
h
h
tMhthht CCC
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρρ
ρρ γγ , where hγ is consumption of home goods bias 
and hρ elasticity of substitution between imported and domestically produced goods. 
The consumer price index is: ( )[ ] hhh tMhthht PPP ρρρ γγ −−− −+= 1 11,1, )(1)( .  
The maximization is done subject to the budget constraint: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) FREMsbiLwbCp tt
t
h
t
ttt
h
ttchcmm +++−=+++++
−
− pi
ττηττη 1121 1111  
where ( ) h
P
PM
h
ρ
γη
−






−= 11 and ( )
h
P
Ph
h
ρ
γη
−






=2 , REM are remittances received, s is 
exchange rate, bh households bonds to government, I interest rate , pi is inflation and F is a 
lump sum transfer from government to households. 
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2. Firms 
 
-Production unit 
 
The production unit produces goods according to the following function: 
[ ] ( )ααφφ ttttt LqKaY −−−= 111 where at is an exogenous productivity shock in production, φis 
share of private capital in production function, α is share of labor and qt is public capital. 
The investment satisfies the standard law of motion for capital: 
( ) ttt IKK +−=+ δ11 , where δ is the depreciation rate of the capital stock and It is 
investment. 
 
-Exportation sector 
 
Producers export domestically produced goods on foreign competitive goods markets at an 
exogenous price since the small open economy is price taker. Domestically produced goods 
are purchased by foreign households. We assume that foreign households’ aggregate 
consumption is described by a CES function that combines home produced and import goods 
as following: 
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where xγ is the share of the home economy’s exports in the rest of the world consumption 
index and 
x
ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the home economy’s exports and the 
foreign produced goods.  
The export demand is given by the relation 
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The rest of the world's aggregate consumption Cw,t is exogenous for the economy and its path 
is assumed to evolve along a stochastic log-linear autoregressive process given. 
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-Profits of firms 
 
The profits of the importable goods sector are determined by: 
( ) ( )( ) mcnmmmM kY τττpi ++−+= 111 . 
The profits of the exportable goods sector are determined by: 
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,
, where τxis an export tax levied by the rest of the 
world, km (kx) is the amount of capital demand by the importable sector (exportable). 
 
 
3. The Government 
 
We assume that government satisfies the following constraints: ( ) ( )gggqq tAstgt −++−= − µµδ 11  
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δg  depreciation rate of public capital, µ s  efficiency of public investment in steady state, µA efficiency of aid related public investment, 
with ( ) AttAt AAAA ερ +−+= −1 . 
 
 
 
B) Effects of LDCs measures 
 
Support measures to LDCs are related to trade preferences and foreign aid surge. If an aid 
surge and its macroeconomic implications for government budget and the economy appear 
clearly in our model (see Berg et al. 2010), the impact of trade agreements and other trade 
related measures require more explanations. These measures would imply for example: 
- decreasing of the export tax: an LDC would have an increased market access; 
- reducing of imports tariffs; 
- with low transactions costs trade agreements would attract long-term risk-sharing investment 
flows. 
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Although traditional focus on commercial policy at the border, these measures imply 
structural reforms and policy change. For example, the implementations of the schedules for 
gradual tariffs reduction on different goods and services would impose additional roles to the 
country administration. Moreover, quality standards, as well as measures specific to the 
services sector, laws related to property rights, reforms of stated-owned industries etc… will 
enhance competitiveness and long-run growth. Because of their nature trade agreements are 
expected to produce gradual changes in the variables that intend to capture them. The 
structure of the economy also determines the speed of the transition. 
The whole set of measures related to LDC status represent a supply of possible benefits. Their 
inventory is required as a starting point but it does not inform on how they are used. For each 
of them, the real benefit for a LDC depend on (i) whether the measure has been actually used 
by the country, (ii) whether this use has been a real advantage and (iii) how the measure has 
been implemented. 
The measures linked to the category should not only enhance growth but also reduce the 
macroeconomic vulnerability of the LDCs. 
 
 
6.3. Empirical Difficulties: How to Identify the Impact of the Status 
6.3.1. Definition of LDC 
To understand the methodological difficulties faced by this analysis, one has to appreciate 
the process of categorising countries as least developed. 
 The United Nations (UN) Committee for Development Policy (CDP) defines the category 
of the LDCs as comprising those LICs suffering from structural handicaps to economic 
development, and suffering from a high level of economic vulnerability. At present 
identification of LDCs is related to pre-determined threshold values of three main criteria: 
GNI per capita (GNIpc), Human Assets Index (HAI) and Economic Vulnerability Index 
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(EVI). There is an additional condition – that of a population less than 75 million, the idea 
being that larger populations have an advantage in terms of the potential supply of human 
capital, as well as offering potentially larger domestic markets. The triennial review of the list 
of LDCs begins with an analysis of the economic and social conditions in all Low Income 
Countries by an expert group consisting of CDP members. Today, to be added to the category, 
a country must satisfy the inclusion threshold levels in respect of all three criteria. A country 
will be eligible for graduation from LDC status when it no longer meets the graduation 
thresholds for two of the criteria, or when its GNI per capita exceeds at least twice the 
graduation threshold and with a high likelihood that the level will remain sustainable. 
(Handbook on the LDC category, 2008) 
Before 1991 and the UN reform5 , most of the new LDCs were included because of a 
degradation in their situation, measured essentially in per capita GDP growth. After 1991, 
countries were included because of degradation in their situation measured by two other 
criteria: economic diversification and physical quality of life. Since 2000, these criteria have 
been replaced by economic vulnerability and lack of human resources6. The asymmetry 
between inclusion and graduation criteria is also important to understand how LDCs are 
identified:  
- Thresholds for graduation are established at a higher level than those for inclusion; 
- In order to be eligible for graduation, a country must cease to meet not just one, but 
two out of the three inclusion criteria; 
                                                 
5The Committee has furthermore always stressed the importance of maintaining stability in the criteria, and in 
the application of the established procedures, so as to ensure the credibility of the process, and consequently, of 
the list itself. In this regard, the Committee, in establishing which indicators to use, selected those which proved 
to be sufficiently stable over time to minimize the likelihood of easy reversibility of status from LDC to non-
LDC and vice versa. 
6More details on components and criteria evolution in the appendix. 
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- Eligibility for inclusion is ascertained once, whereas eligibility for graduation has to 
be observed over two consecutive triennial reviews. 
Guillaumont (2009) provides an analysis of implications and consequences of this asymmetry 
on the identification of LDCs, and explores possibilities for reforming LDC inclusion and 
graduation criteria.  
 
 
 Table 2 - Criteria for developing countries to be eligible for inclusion on the LDC list, 1971-2009 
1971–90 1991–97 
 
Meet three criteria a: 
 
 • Per capita GDP  is below a threshold adjusted 
according to world growth. 
 • Literacy rate is 20% or lower. 
 • Share of manufacturing value added in the GDP is 
10% or lower. 
  
or (since 1981) 
  
Meet two criteria: 
 • Per capita GDP is below a lower threshold. 
 • Share of manufacturing value added in the GDP is 
10% or lower. 
 
 
 
 
 
Meet four criteria : 
 
 • Population is 75 million or less. 
 • Per capita GDP is below a threshold. 
 • Augmented physical quality of life index value is below a 
threshold. 
 • Economic diversification index value is below a threshold. 
 
 
 
  If the augmented physical quality of life index or economic 
diversification index criterion is not met, other qualitative 
elements may be considered. 
 
 
 
  
2000 2003–09 
Meet four criteria: 
 • Population is 75million or less. 
 • Per capita GDP is below a threshold. 
 • Augmented physical quality of life index value is 
below a threshold. 
 • Economic vulnerability index value is above a 
threshold. 
  
 If the country is near the threshold for any criterion 
other than population size, a vulnerability profile is to be 
taken into consideration. 
Meet four criteria : 
 
• Population is 75 million or less. 
• Per capita GNI is below a threshold. 
• Human assets index value is below a threshold. 
• Economic vulnerability index value is above a threshold. 
  
  
  
  
 
Source: Guillaumont (2009): Caught in a trap: identifying the least developed countries 
 
 
6.3.2. Finding a control group to LDCs 
Because LDC membership corresponds to a well-defined category as explained above, 
perform an impact analysis for the category is difficult. There seems to be no available 
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"control" group, i.e. countries with similar characteristics to LDCs, but not identified as 
LDCs, to which we can compare LDCs. 
However, evolution and asymmetry between inclusion and graduation criteria have a 
consequence. There are LDCs that would not be eligible for inclusion if they were newly 
considered under the current rules and criteria; in the same way, there are non-LDCs countries 
that would not be eligible for graduation under the same rules and criteria if they were already 
on the LDCs list. These countries are called "discordant" countries in Guillaumont (2009) and 
constitute two groups of "similar" (in terms of their observable characteristics) countries 
meeting neither inclusion nor graduation criteria. The only difference is that one group is 
constituted of LDCs, which benefit from special support treatment, and the other group 
consists of countries which do not. Wisely used, this latter   group could generate control 
observations, even though a problem of selection bias may remain7. 
Table 3 : Discordant countries (relative evolution) 
1990-2008 Discordant LDCs Discordant non-LDCs difference 
GDPpc               2.38 1.51 ** 
HAI 49.68 57.56 *** 
GNIpc 750 851 *** 
EVI 47.29 41.21 *** 
 
 
 
6.4. Empirical Strategy 
 
 Our strategy to construct the control group is twofold. First, we use the group of "discordant" 
countries to find a counterfactual and apply a matching estimator to identify the 
macroeconomic effect of LDC status. Then we use Altonji's ratio to assess the level of 
                                                 
7
“Discordant” countries are countries meeting neither inclusion, nor graduation criteria, and as such are in 
similar situations, but some being LDCs and benefiting from the status, and others not being LDCs and not 
benefiting. There is potentially a problem of selection bias using a simple comparison of growth performance 
between discordant LDCs and discordant non-LDCs.  Table 3 shows that discordant non-LDCs have better 
structural characteristics, but perform weaker than discordant LDCs in term of economic growth.  
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confidence of these estimates. Second, we use matching as a form of data pre-processing to 
reduce model dependence to variables distribution before applying parametric causal 
inference (FE, RE, IV (Heckman two-step method)). This new dataset is our second 
counterfactual. 
Another important point in the empirical analysis concerned the application of identification 
criteria. Because the history of LDCs shows that the identification criteria were sometimes 
violated, for example Maldives, Samoa and Cape Verde resisted against being withdrawn 
from the list, while Papua New Guinea and Zimbabwe have refused to be included. To take 
that into account we have three choices:  
(i)Before the Study: Talk to those who can might override assignment (administrators). 
Identify their concerns. If those concerns can be clearly articulated and uniformly 
implemented, then they can be made into exclusion criteria for getting into the study 
(ii)Designing the Study: Combine RDD with a randomized or nonrandomized experiment, 
using two cutoffs with random (or nonrandom) assignment occurring in the interval that will 
be fuzzy (method used in Arcand et al. 2012) 
(iii) Intent-to-Treat: In a randomized experiment, it is standard to analyze the data according 
to how people were assigned, not according to which treatment they actually received. This 
preserves the internal validity of the design. We apply this method in the Heckman selection 
model. 
 
6.4.1. Selection on observables 
(1) Matching estimator 
As explained above, the evolution of criteria and their application replicate a kind of ex-post 
randomized experiment, which generates the "discordant" group. We perform nearest 
neighbor matching on this sub-sample. 
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Matching methods consist in finding a group of non-LDC countries that present similar 
characteristics to countries identified as LDCs (while reducing as much as possible 
theselection biasin the estimateoftreatment effect). Matching estimators rely on the 
assumption of "selection on observables"; in other words, non-random selection into 
membership based on countries unobservable characteristics is assumed away. Of course, 
there is a possibility that some unobservable characteristics related to special relations 
between industrialized countriesand some LICs may have influenced identification criteria 
and then the impact of membership. The challenge in this context is to evaluate the risk and 
importance of the (potential) selection bias related to these unobservable characteristics. This 
method allows identification of an average macroeconomic effect of LDC membership, but 
the empirical validity of this result depends on the validity of the assumptions made about the 
treatment, i.e. inclusion and graduation, on the unobservable characteristics, and on the 
resulting selection bias. 
The average treatment effect for the entire sample (ATE) and the average treatment effect for 
treated groups (ATT) are obtained by comparing some macroeconomic variables between 
discordant LDCs and discordant non-LDCs. We use the Abadie and Imbens (2007)8 bias 
adjusted matching estimator.  
Mathematically, we consider a random sample of n countries indexed by i=1,...,n. Utilising 
the potential outcomes framework, Yi(LDC) denotes the potential outcome of country i under 
treatment LDC9. The causal effect of the treatment group (LDC=1) relative to the control 
group (LDC=0) is defined as the difference between the corresponding potential outcomes.  
                                                 
8
 For details of the corrected bias estimator - see appendix. 
9
 LDC=1 when the country is a least developed country; LDC=0 otherwise. 
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Formally, 
( ) ( ) ( )101 iii YY −=τ  
 
In the evaluation literature, several population parameters are of potential interest. The most 
commonly used include the ATE, the ATT, and the ATU (on untreated). These are defined as: 
 
 
 
In general, the parameters 
τATE, τATT, andτATU may vary with a vector of covariates, M. As a result, each parameter may 
be defined as conditional on a particular value of M as follows: 
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The simple matching estimator may be biased in finite samples when the matching is not 
exact10. We use a finite number of matching variables11. Also, Abadie and Imbens (2002) 
show that, with m matching variables, the estimator may create a bias corresponding to the 
matching discrepancies12. In order to correct this bias, we use the Abadie and Imbens (2007) 
bias adjusted matching estimator.  
 
 
                                                 
10
 The matching cannot be exact since we cannot find two countries that are similar in everything except LDC 
membership. 
11We use the GDP per capita, literacy and manufacturing for 1975-1990 and the EVI, HAI and GNI per capita 
for 1991-2008. 
12Discrepancies correspond to the differences in covariates between matched units and their matches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )40|010|
31|011|
201
=−===
=−===
−==
LDCYYELDCE
LDCYYELDCE
YYEE
iiiATU
iiiATT
iiiATE
ττ
ττ
ττ
Chapter 6. The Impact of Being an LDC Member 
 
 
  248 
 
- Does the unconfoundedness assumption fail? 
Estimating τ is not trivial; some assumptions are required in order to proceed. One such 
assumption is unconfoundedness of selection on observables. Under this assumption, 
treatment assignment is said to be independent of potential outcomes and conditional on the 
set of covariates, X. As a result, selection into treatment is random conditional on X, and the 
average effect of the treatment can be obtained by comparing outcomes of individuals in 
different treatment states with identical values of the covariates. This would imply that 
countries could not influence their inclusion in the LDC group and predict future gain of their 
membership. 
 
(2) Using selection on observed variables to assess bias from unobservables 
 
Although the sets of observables provide a substantial amount of country level information, 
they may not fully control for all relevant characteristics which explain the identification of 
LDCs, thus the possibility of some omitted variable bias remains. So, we measure the relative 
importance of selection on the unobservables bias by investigating how the coefficient of 
ATE changes with the inclusion of the additional explanatory variables. If including controls 
substantially attenuates the estimated coefficient, then it is possible that inclusion of more 
controls would reduce the estimated effect even further. If, on the other hand, the inclusion of 
controls has no effect on the estimated magnitude of the coefficient, then we can be more 
confident in suggesting a causal interpretation for the estimated relationship. Following 
Altonji et al., (2005), we formalise this intuition and derive the ratio of the “influence” of 
unobservable variables relative to the observable that would be needed to explain (away) the 
entire macroeconomic impact. 
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These additional explanatory variables are of two types:- first, short-term growth determinants 
(inflation, exchange rate, exports, size of government, and so forth), commercial relationships, 
natural resource rents, and -second, countries’ individual control variables related to specific 
relationships with OECD countries, such as a colonial past or language13.  A large ratio would 
imply that the ATE result could not be plausibly explained by the unobservables; full details 
of this method are provided in the appendix. 
 
6.4.2. Matching as non-parametric pre-processing: causal inference with fewer 
assumptions 
 
As mentioned earlier, the immediate aim of matching is to improve balance, or the extent to 
which the treatment and control covariate distributions resemble each other. For Ho et al. 
(2007) unless matching is exact, it is not a method of estimation and must be paired with 
another analytical method to obtain causal estimates. 
Following Ho et al. (2007), we use matching to pre-process data before parametric 
estimations.  In the pre-processed data set, the treatment variable is closer to being 
independent of the background covariates, which renders any subsequent parametric 
specification difference less important for the ATE. Indeed, by breaking or reducing the link 
between the treatment variable and control variables, pre-processing makes estimates based 
on parametric analyses far less dependent on modeling choices and specifications. Thus, the 
causal effect estimates do not vary much with the modeling assumptions. 
An advantage of this two-step procedure is that it is doubly robust, in the sense that under 
weak conditions if either the matching or the parametric model is correct, but not necessarily 
                                                 
13For some critics, there are unobserved characteristics not related to official identification criteria which 
potentially influence LDC membership. 
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both, causal estimates will still be consistent. That is, if the parametric model is miss-
specified, but the matching is correct, or if the matching is inadequate but the parametric 
model is correctly specified, then estimates will still be consistent. The common procedure of 
matching followed by an unadjusted difference in means does not possess this double 
robustness property14. 
To adjust the data without inducing bias in causal estimates we can select, duplicate, or 
selectively drop observations from an existing sample without bias, as long as we do so using 
a rule that is a function only of treatment Ti and covariate Mi. Our pre-processed data set will 
therefore include a selected subset of the observed sample for which Ti and Mi are unrelated, 
meaning that the treatment and control groups have the same background characteristics, or in 
other words, that this relationship holds 
0~1~ === TMpTMp
 
 
Our pre-processed dataset thus is the same as the original dataset with any unmatched control 
units discarded, and thus with Ti and Mi now independent. The effect of the matching 
procedure is to delete the observations that would have required substantial extrapolation, and 
which would have produced imbalance. With these deletions, the dataset is now highly 
balanced, and as such, different parametric models give essentially identical causal effects. 
The result of this process, when done appropriately, is considerably less model dependent, 
with a reduced potential for bias, less variance, and as a result has a lower mean squared error. 
To ensure that selection during pre-processing depends only on Mi (to avoid inducing bias), 
the outcome variable Yi should not be examined during the pre-processing stage. As long as 
Yi is not consulted, and is not part of the rule by which observations are dropped, pre-
processing cannot result in stacking the deck one way or another. 
                                                 
14All details of this matching procedure are attributed to Ho et al (2007) unless otherwise noted. 
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Matching can be viewed as a way to make the LDC and non-LDC covariates distributions 
look similar by re-weighting the sample observations. Thus, matching mimics a random 
assignment through the ex post construction of a control group.  We use Genetic matching15 to 
improve the degree to which the treatment and control covariate distributions resemble each 
other without losing too many observations or making additional assumptions in the process. 
Then we apply various parametric models (fixed effect, random effect, Heckman selection 
model16 on endogenous treatment) to the pre-processed data and compare the average 
treatment effect estimates. 
 
 
6.5. Data and Empirical Evidence 
6.5.1. Data description 
The starting point of this analysis is the "discordant" countries group of Guillaumont (2009) 
over the period 1991 to 2008. We also use a sample of 120 developing countries over the 
period 1975 to 2008 to perform the matching pre-processing algorithm. Our dependent 
variables are the GDP per capita average growth rate, the volatility of GDP and the volatility 
of exports after the triennial review of the LDC list. The set of covariates we use for matching 
are the observable characteristics used as identification criteria. 
                                                 
15
 Both propensity score matching and matching based on Mahalanobis distance are limiting cases of this 
method. The algorithm makes clear certain issues that all matching methods must confront. 
16
 Wooldridge (2000) recommends this two-step method to estimate ATE with a heterogeneous treatment effect. 
We estimate in the first stage a probit of identification as LDC on eligibility and the other covariates of the 
growth model. Then we use fitted probabilities as instruments of LDC dummy and the other covariates in the 
second stage. The eligibility is random because it is based only on retrospective EVI, HAI and GNIPC. 
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Table 4 gives the summary statistics of some covariates and compares LDCs to Developing 
countries (DC). We observe that LDCs are more vulnerable to external shocks and poorer 
than DC. But since the mid-90s they have average growth rates higher than in other 
developing countries17. 
Information about countries’ status is collected from FERDI and UNDESA databases18. The 
World Development Indicators (World Bank) provide the GDP per capita, exports to GDP 
ratio and short-term growth determinant variables used as control. Finally, data on the 
Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) and the Human Assets Index (HAI) are provided by 
FERDI. EVI reflects the risk of being harmed by exogenous events or shocks; it is determined 
by the size of shocks, exposure and resilience to the shocks. HAI, which is also used for 
identifying LDCs, is an indicator of handicaps, revealing the lack of development capacity or 
capability. The other variables include level of economic development, aid fragmentation 
index, terms of trade, financial openness, government size, and institutional variables. 
 
6.5.2. Selection on observables results   (Non-Parametric strategy) 
Using the Abadie and Imbens (2007) matching estimator (hereafter A-I) for the k- nearest 
neighbors, we calculate the ATEs19and ATTs for a sample of 43 countries for six triennial 
periods from 1990 to 2008. Table 6 provides the results.  
 
                                                 
17P. Guillaumont (2013): Out of the Trap , forthcoming    
18FERDI (Fondation pour les études et recherches sur le développement international) and UN department of 
economics and social affairs (UNDESA). 
19Coefficients give the impact of LDCs membership on growth rate’ average; EVI, HAI, and income are used as 
matching variables. 
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Table 6: LDC membership treatment effects: Growth, volatility and response to shocks 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
  
(2) 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
  
(4) 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
Period  
 
growth  
 
 Export 
volatility 
 
 
Gdp 
volatility 
 
 
 Skewness 
gdp 
 
 
Skewness 
export 
 
 
1990-
2008 
 
S.E 
 0.60** 
(0.01)    
 
 0.24 
  -0.07* 
(0.06)  
 
 0.037   
 -0.063* 
(0.08) 
 
  0.03 
  -0.21* 
(0.09) 
 
  0.13 
 
 -0.28** 
(0.049) 
 
  0.14    
 
p-valuesare in parentheses * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Data: 41 discordant countries over six triennial periods from 1990-2008 (234 observations) 
Matching variables: evi, hai, gnipc; treatment variable= dummy LDC 
Dependent variables are log-transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation 
Estimates of average treatment effect are obtained using the Abadie&Imbens –(k)-nearest neighbor bias corrected  estimator  with the 
Mahalanobis metric;   
The same regressions are performed using  Leuven and B. Sianesi. (2003) estimator for stata with the program “psmatch2”, and r.ATE is k-
nearest neighbor estimator with bootstrap standard errors 
 
 
Interpretation: 
Using the Abadie and Imbens (2007) matching estimator (hereafter A-I) for the k- nearest 
neighbors20, we calculate the effect of LDC status on macroeconomic volatility. We use the 
subsample of "discordant" countries21 over the period 1990 to 2008.  
Table 6 reports the treatment effects estimated using the bias-adjusted nearest neighbor 
matching estimator. They provide estimates of the effect of LDC status over the period 
following LDCs list reviews.  
 
 
Our first result suggests a positive and statistically significant correlation betweenthe LDC 
status and economic growth during the short-term period following review. This is an average 
effect of 0.6 per cent in growth over a triennial period. Table 6 also reports the treatment 
                                                 
20
 For each LDC, a number k of comparable non LDCs (regarding the three criteria) are selected with the Abadie 
and Imbens (2007) matching method. 
21
 Coefficients give the impact of LDC membership on growth rate average. 
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effect on the volatility of exports and the volatility of output. It seems that countries 
benefiting of LDC status record a decrease in aggregate instability. 
No less important, the LDC status has a positive effect on the country's response to shocks. 
Indeed columns 4 and 5 show negative effect of the status on the amplitude of the 
macroeconomic instability faced by the LDCs.  
 
Robustness checks:  
Heterogeneity of treatment effect: Crump et al. (2008) 
 
We have performed the treatment effect heterogeneity test of Crump et al. (2008), the results 
are presented in the appendix (Table 8). Crump et al (2008) develop two non-parametric tests. 
The first for the null hypothesis that the treatment has a zero average effect for all sub-
populations defined by covariates. The second test is for the null hypothesis that the average 
effect conditional on the covariates is identical for all sub-populations.  
Our results reject the zero average treatment effect of LDC membership, and support the fact 
that the ATE of LDC status is heterogeneous. One can make a parallel between this result and 
those obtained by Arcand et al (2012), because it means that there are some countries, in some 
periods, for which the LDC status had no significant impact on growth. Perhaps those 
countries have been selected by the regression discontinuity design procedure.  
 
Sensitivity analysis : (Ichino et al. 2007; Altonji et al. 2005) 
 
As noted in section 3, the key identifying assumption of the matching estimator is the 
“selection on observables” condition. This condition may fail if there are omitted variables or 
unobservable country characteristics that affect both the membership of LDC category and the 
economic growth. 
To address our concern about unobserved characteristics and selection bias the Altonji 
procedure, briefly presented in section 3.1 (b) and detailed in the appendix, provided more 
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information about the validity of matching results. This procedureallows the assessment of 
what levelofselectionmade on theunobservables is necessaryto invalidatetheresult,based only 
onselectionmadeonthe observables.  
The Altonji ratios are reported in table 7; they range from 8.83 to 64. These values mean that 
to explain the estimated effects of the special support measures on LDCs' economic growth 
and macroeconomic vulnerability, the selection on unobservables should be on average 27 
times greater than the selection on observables.  This finding is highly improblable when we 
look at the history of LDC membership. 
As an alternative, to determine how strongly an unmeasured variable must influence the 
selection process in order to undermine the implications of the matching analysis, we 
implemented the Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2007) sensitivity analysis (Table 8). The 
simulation-based sensitivity analysis of Ichino et al (2007) tests the estimated treatment effect, 
and confirms the result of matching estimates (see Table 8).  
Both procedures confirm our previous finding about the positive correlation between 
economic growth and LDC membership, and the reduction of the macroeconomic 
vulnerability. 
Even if, we know that selection on unobservables could be ignored without affecting our 
entire estimate effect, the fact is that we could not affirm that we have controlled for 
everything that could affect the treatment and outcome. For our purpose, we have to confirm 
these results using a framework with fewer assumptions and risk of selection bias.  Thus, we 
apply our second strategy using matching as pre-processing. 
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 6.5.3. Results on pre-processed data: FE, RE, IV               (Parametric strategy) 
 
Using the R package "MatchIt"22, a matched dataset was created where each treated 
observation is matched with two or three control observations. We finally arrived at a dataset 
of 82 countries with 49 LDCs over the period 1975 to 2008. To generate our matched data we 
chose the Genetic matching algorithm of Diamond and Sekhon (2006), because it produces 
matches with the best balance.  
To assess the balance we used two graphic tools. First we used the empirical quantile-quantile 
(QQ) plots to compare full empirical distributions for LDCs and the control group for each 
covariate (before and after pre-processing). Then we compared the propensity scores of the 
treated and control groups before and after pre-processing. Figure 2 shows a set of QQ plots 
for the dataset with triple-control matches. Two plots are given for each covariate, one prior to 
matching and one after. For these plots, the 45-degree line indicates identical distributions, 
and the closer the points on the plot are to that line, the better the matching. Figure 2 
illustrates that the process of Genetic matching reduces significantly the differences in 
covariate distributions for LDCs and the control group.  
 
 
 The covariates are: 
- Inclusion criteria (Observables) : EVI, HAI, Population andGNI per capita; 
 
-  Unobservables to the inclusion: trade openness, availability of natural resource rents 
(oil and mineral) in the country, a dummy for former colonies, a dummy for common 
official language shared with the OECD countries. These variables are used to check 
                                                 
22
 MatchIt implements a wide range of sophisticated matching methods, making it possible to greatly reduce the 
dependence of causal inferences on hard-to-justify, but commonly made statistical modeling assumptions. 
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for the existence of a special relationship between countries, which may have 
influenced the identification.  
 
 
Figure 2: Improvement of data after genetic matching 
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This improvement in the balance of covariate distributions is confirmed in Figure 3, with the 
comparison of the probability of being identified as an LDC country for both groups. We see 
clearly how the pre-processing procedure significantly reduces the difference in the 
probability of treatment between the treated group (countries finally classified as LDCs) and 
control group (countries with similar background- ex post- before the treatment but not 
selected). 
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Figure3: Pre-processing and propensity scores 
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 Like the first strategy, the aim is to estimate the impact of the identification as LDC on the 
growth rate and macroeconomic vulnerability in the next triennial period. Then we perform 
some parametric estimation on the matched data to estimate the causal effect of LDC 
membership.  
Our overall results confirm that LDCs seem to experience less economic vulnerability thanks 
to the support measures they have benefited prior to their status.  
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Tables 9: Parametric model results on matched data 
 
Table 9.0: Hausmann test 
 
Method 
 
 
 
RE 
 
 
 
FE 
 
 
Growth rate  
 
GDPpc  
 
GDPpc  
 
LDCs  
 
 
Rent 
 0.55**  
(0.01) 
 
1.91** 
(0.01)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.39 
(0.23) 
 
3.18*** 
(0.00)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Openness 
 
 
 
0.30* 
(0.09) 
 
 
 
 
  0.66** 
(0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVI 
 
-0.06 
(0.88) 
 
 0.82*** 
(0.00) 
 
-0.094 
(0.58) 
 
 
0.10 
    0.69 
(0.27) 
 
0.78** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.14 
(0.62) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HAI 
 
 
Income 
 
 
Hausmann  
test 
 
const 
 
 
Countries 
 
 -3.5** 
(0.04)    
 
  82 
   -2.33 
 (0.23)    
 
 82 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; p-value in parenthesis 
 
 
We also perform Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) regression on Table 10 (in appendix) to 
test the sensitivity of the results to outliers in the sample. 
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Table 9.1: LDCs and macroeconomic volatility (3-year =1980-2011) 
 
Method 
 
 
RE 
 
 
 
Heckman 
 
 
 
Heckman 
 
 
 
Heckmana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth 
of gdppc 
 
 
Growth of 
gdppc 
 
 
Volatility 
exports 
 
 
Volatility 
GDP 
 
 
 
 
LDCs  
 
 
Rent 
0.48*  
(0.05) 
 
1.39* 
(0.08)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03 
(0.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.46) 
 
0.24 
(0.60) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.07*** 
(0.00)  
 
  -0.75*** 
(0.00)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade openness 
 
 
 
0.20 
(0.34) 
 
 
 
 
-0.18 
(0.56) 
 
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.88) 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.06*** 
(0.06)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ComHistory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.40) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government size   0.47 
(0.20) 
   -0.05** 
(0.02) 
  
Financial 
openness 
    0.04 
(0.15) 
 0.014 
(0.22) 
  
Inflation     0.039** 
(0.03) 
 0.016** 
(0.01) 
  
Public invest   0.06* 
(0.05) 
      
Volatility of 
exports 
      0.004*** 
(0.00) 
  
EVI 
 
 0.12 
(0.34) 
 
 0.63** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.018 
(0.91) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.67 
(0.29) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.18 
(0.16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 0.15 
(0.12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HAI 
 
 
Income 
 
 
 
Mills ratiob 
 
const 
 
 
Countries(obs) 
 
 -3.6* 
(0.05)    
 
  82 (452) 
   -0.98 
 (0.47)    
 
 82 (250) 
 6.11***  
(0.00) 
 
  82(250) 
 4.19 
 (0.00) 
 
  82(250) 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; p-value in parenthesis.a: We estimate in the first stage a probit of identification as LDC on eligibility and 
the other covariates of the growth model. Then we use fitted probabilities as instruments of the LDC dummy and the other covariates in the 
second stage. The eligibility is random because based only on retrospectives EVI, HAI and GNIPC. 
b: After the pre-processing matching, the non-significance  of the Mills ratio here implies that the potential remaining selection due to 
difference between eligibility and treatment are not important. 
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Table 9.2: LDCs and macroeconomic volatility (annual 1990-2008) 
 
Method 
 
 
 
 
Heckman 
 
 
 
Heckman 
 
 
 
Heckmana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth of 
gdppc 
 
 
Volatility 
exports 
 
 
Volatility 
GDP 
 
 
 
 
LDCs  
 
 
Rent 
 
 
 
 
 
0.64*** 
(0.00) 
 
1.27* 
(0.07) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.09* 
(0.08) 
 
0.02 
(0.87) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.043*** 
(0.00)  
 
 -0.10*** 
(0.00)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade openness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.35* 
(0.08) 
 
 
 
 
-0.024 
(0.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.08*** 
(0.00)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ComHistory 
 
 
 
 
 -0.21 
(0.57) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.02 
(0.20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government size   
 
   -0.06** 
(0.02) 
  
Financial 
openness 
 -0.14 
(0.17) 
 0.057** 
(0.00) 
 0.028*** 
(0.00) 
  
Inflation  -0.08* 
(0.08) 
  0.01 
(0.22) 
 0.006** 
(0.01) 
  
Public invest   
 
      
Volatility of 
exports 
     1.08*** 
(0.00) 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 0.32 
(0.23) 
  
 
 
 
 
0.003 
(0.94) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 0.07 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mills ratiob 
 
const 
 
 
Countries(obs) 
 
    -4.03 
 (0.00)    
 
 62 (1030) 
 6.47***  
(0.00) 
 
62(1030) 
 -0.81 
 (0.00) 
 
  
62(1030) 
 
 
a: We estimate in the first stage a probit of identification as LDC on eligibility and the other covariates of the growth model. Then we use 
fitted probabilities as instruments of the LDC dummy and the other covariates in the second stage. The eligibility is random because based 
only on retrospectives EVI, HAI and GNIPC. 
b: After the pre-processing matching, the non-significance  of the Mills ratio here implies that the potential remaining selection due to 
difference between eligibility and treatment are not important. 
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Table 9.3: LDCs and Response to shocks (3 year-period) 
 
Method 
 
 
 
RE 
 
 
 
Heckman 
 
 
 
RE 
 
 
 
 
 
Heckmana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Skewness  
gdp 
 
 
Skewness 
of gdp 
 
 
Skewness 
exports 
 
 
 
 
Skewness 
exports 
 
 
 
 
LDCs  
 
 
Rent 
-9.27** 
(0.03) 
 
-32.1 
(0.19)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
-14.4** 
  (0.01) 
 
-76.2* 
(0.05)    
 
        -3.96* 
       (0.08)    
 
-22.8*  
       (0.08)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5.31* 
(0.06)  
 
  -55.4*** 
(0.00)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade 
openness 
 
 
9.27** 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
 
  8.10* 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
 
2.20 
 (0.19)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.76 
(0.19)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
openness 
 
3.87* 
(0.05) 
 3.95* 
(0.09) 
 
 1.72* 
(0.09) 
  2.26* 
(0.07) 
  
Inflation 
 
2.87** 
(0.03) 
 
 
 4.05*** 
(0.00) 
 
  0.78 
(0.26) 
  1.69** 
(0.03) 
  
EVI 
 
-9.91 
(0.23) 
 
2.39 
(0.51) 
 
-4.54 
(0.26) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.18 
(0.88) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  7.25* 
(0.08) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HAI 
 
 
Income 
 
 
 
Mills ratiob 
 
const 
 
 
Countries 
 5.63 
(0.88)    
 
  82 
   -53.12* 
 (0.05)    
 
 82 
  -16.6* 
(0.07)  
 
 82  
    -7.31*** 
 (0.00) 
 
  82 
 
 
 
Interpret estimation after inverse hyperbolic sine transformation 
*Dependent variable transformed 
In such models where the dependent variable has been log-transformed and the predictors have not, the format for interpretation is that 
dependent variable changes by 100*(coefficient) percent for a one unit increase in the independent variable while all other variable in the 
model are held constant. 
 
 
*Independent variable transformed 
In this model we are going to have the dependent variable in its original metric and the independent variable log-transformed. A one percent 
increase in the independent variable increases (or decreases) the dependent variable by (coefficient/100) units.  
 
 
*Both dependent and independent variables transformed 
In instances where both the dependent variable and independent variable(s) are log-transformed variables, the relationship is commonly 
referred to as elastic in econometrics. In a regression setting, we'd interpret the elasticity as the percent change in y (the dependent variable), 
while x (the independent variable) increases by one percent. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
To add to the debate about the usefulness of the status “Least Developed Country”, which has 
been recognised by the UN since 1971, this paper investigates whether special support 
measures designed for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) affect the macroeconomic 
vulnerability of such countries. Such an evaluation is useful to reaffirm the importance of 
these support measures for LDCs, because there is an erosion in effective market access for 
LDCs paired with the risk of collapse in ODA received given the debt crisis faced by major 
donors. This paper tries to provide empirical estimates of the implications of LDC 
membership for growth and macroeconomic vulnerability.  
Such an assessment always faces problems of selection bias in the construction of the 
control group, omitted variables in model construction and sensitivity of the findings to 
unobservables potentially influencing selection process and the impact of programs or policies 
engaged. In our empirical strategy, we associated two methods to build the control group for 
the assessment of the impact of LDC status. Matching estimators provide estimates of average 
effect of LDC membership on economic growth, exports instability and output volatility of 
members, minimizing selection bias in identification process of LDCs, as suggested by 
Altonji's ratio on the influence of unobservables. Because our matching estimates do not 
explicitly address selection on unobservables, we use parametric methods after matching pre-
processing to eliminate the link between LDC treatment and (observed and unobserved) 
control variables.  
We find that membership in LDC category has a significant growth enhancing effect 
for countries. The average effect is gain of 0.5 per cent on economic growth in the short-term 
period following inclusion. Nevertheless, as point out in this analysis, this growth effect is 
heterogeneous across countries and time. Furthermore, our preliminary results demonstrate 
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that the least developed countries respond better to external shocks and are less vulnerable 
prior to the support measures linked to the LDC status, even if a long road remain before to 
get these countries out of the poverty trap.  
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Structural handicaps to growth 
1971-2009 LDCs Others LICs difference 
Human capital    
Under Five Mortality Rate 161 68 *** 
Undernourished prevalence 31 14 ** 
Literacy rate 49 77 ** 
Secondary Enrollment 
Gross rate 
20 59 ** 
Vulnerability    
Exposure to shock 51,8 36,9 *** 
Affected by natural 
disasters 
1803,8 530,8 ** 
Displaced because conflicts 110,16 25,24  
 
Source: Caught in a Trap: Identifying the Least Developed Countries (Guillaumont, 2009) 
 
Table 4 : Summary statistics 1975-2008 
1975-2008 LDCs Other DCs difference 
Growth rate   (gdppc)                 1.63 1.68  
HAI 38.39 69.17 *** 
GNIpc 507 2220 *** 
EVI 47.49 38.46 *** 
Resource Rent 0.035 0.087 *** 
Openness    66.64 77.48 *** 
Countries 50 69  
Eligible countries 40 13  
 
 
  Variable                         Obs        Mean         Std. Dev.         Min             Max 
 
Growth rate                    3343       3.83              6.27            -51.03     106.28 
 HAI                                3546      58.12            24.43            3.46       99.82 
 GNIpc                            3546    1604.75      2006.10         72.45    17883.57 
 EVI                                 3546    41.71             12.34           12.96       75.5 
 Resource Rent              2997     0.069             0.155               0           2.13 
Openness                        3308    73.82            40.21               0.31     280.36 
Former colonies             3546     0.914           0.281                  0          1 
  
 
Table 5: Partial correlation of core variables 
  Variable                          Gdppc        HAI       GNIpc     EVI         Resources        Openness 
Gdppc                                 1.0000 
 HAI                                    0.1338   1.0000 
 GNIpc                                0.1240    0.6033    1.0000 
 EVI                                    0.0890    0.3940    0.2294    1.0000 
 Resources                         0.0975    0.0269    0.2485  -0.0324        1.0000 
Openness                           0.2166    0.5091    0.4414   0.3586        0.1026         1.0000 
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Figure 1 : Comparative evolution (LDCs vs DCs) 
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Table 2 : Statistics on discordant countries 
1990-2008 Discordant LDCs Discordant non-LDCs difference 
Gdppc               2.38 1.51 ** 
HAI 49.68 57.56 *** 
GNIpc 750 851 *** 
EVI 47.29 41.21 *** 
 
 
Table 2 (continued) : 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
 
Test on propensity score difference 
Ho: pscore(dldc==0) = pscore(dldc==1) 
z = -1.026 
Prob> |z| =   0.3049 
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Table 7: Assess the bias from unobservables (Altonji's ratio) 
 
Restricted model Extended Model Ratios 
No control Full set of controls 64 
MRW (1992) Full set of controls 44.2 
No control With additional controls 8.83 
MRW (1992) With additional controls 8.27 
Full set of controls With additional controls 10.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Robustness checks 
 
Simulation-based sensitivity analysis results 
 
 
 
Sensatt            first stage                        second stage         
               (radius matching) (bootstrap with simulated confounder)                                                                                                         
ATT                   0.524*  (1.73)               0.677 * (1.89) 
Sel. eff.                                                             1.5 
Bias                    0.804                      
 
Test of treatment effect heterogeneity (Grump et al. 2008) 
 
                   Zero_Cond_ATE    Const_Cond_ATE 
Chi-Sq_Test         17.6583         17.6580 
dof_Chi-sq          4.0000          3.0000 
p-val_Chi-sq          0.0014          0.0005 
Norm_Test          4.8289          5.9841 
p-val_Norm          0.0000          0.0000 
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Table 10: LAD regressions 
This table reports the results of a set of least absolute deviation (LAD) regressions in which the GDP growth rate 
is regressed over LDC dummy and a set of independent variables. Variables are log transformed using the 
inverse hyperbolic sine. Bold indicated statistically significant coefficients. The purpose being to test the 
sensitivity of our previous estimates of growth effect to potential outliers. 
 
 
 GDP 
growth 
LDC  0.42*** 
(0.00) 
Gov size -0.65*** 
(0.00) 
EVI -0.47*** 
(0.00) 
HAI -0.58*** 
(0.56) 
Income 
 
0.04 
(0.72) 
Trade Openness 0.311** 
(0.02) 
Inflation -0.01** 
(0.02) 
Natural resources 
rent 
0.98 
(0.15) 
  
observations  
countries 82 
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Appendix:  
 
List of countries and LDC status evolution 
 
      Year  
 
country 
Year of triennial review 
 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Afghanistan   X    X 
 Angola      X X 
Bangladesh X  X X X X X 
Bhutan       X 
Botswana X       
Cameroon   X X X X  
Cape Verde X X X X X X  
Congo,Rep of    X X X  
Côte d'Ivoire   X X X X X 
Dem. Peo'sRep.Korea    X X X X 
Djibouti  X   X X X 
Equatorial Guinea    X  X X 
Eritrea    X    
Ethiopia      X X 
Ghana X  X X X X X 
Guinea       X 
Guyana X X X X    
Haiti X X      
Kenya  X X X X X X 
Kiribati X X X X X X X 
Laos X X     X 
Lesotho X X X X  X X 
Liberia   X X    
Madagascar  X  X X X X 
Maldives X X X X X X X 
Mauritania      X  
Mongolia   X X X X X 
Mozambique X X X  X   
Myanmar X X X X X X X 
Nepal     X X X 
Nicaragua   X X X X  
Papua New Guinea     X X X 
Samoa X X X X X X X 
Sao Tome and Principe   X  X X X 
Senegal   X    X 
Solomon Islands   X    X 
Tanzania, United Rep. of     X X X 
East Timor       X 
Tuvalu X X X X X X  
Vanuatu X X X X X X  
Vietnam X X X X X   
Yemen X       
Zimbabwe    X X X X 
Total 17 16 23 24 24 24 28 
LDC 14 12 14 12 12 17 21 
Non-LDCs 3 4 9 12 12 7 7 
1. color blue shows period of membership 
2. X refer to discordant (LDCs and non-LDCs) 
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Abadie and Imbens (2002, 2007) estimator 
 
For each observation i, the unit-level treatment effect is τi = Yi(1) − Yi(0); however, only one 
of the potential outcomes Yi(0) or Yi(1) is observed, and the other is unobserved or missing. 
The matching estimators we consider impute the missing potential outcome by using average 
outcomes for individuals with “similar” values for the covariates. Let the observed outcome 
be denoted by Yi: 
( ) ( )( ) 1
0
1
0
=
=


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==
i
i
i
i
iii Wif
Wif
Y
Y
WYY
 
Considering the set of observed covariates for an individual i, Xi, let ||x||V = (x′V x)1/2be the 
vector norm with positive definite matrix V . We define ||z – x||V  as the distance between the 
vectors x and z, where z represents the covariate values for a potential match for observation 
i. Let dM(i) be the distance from the covariates for unit i, Xi, to theMth nearest match with the 
opposite treatment. Allowing for the possibility of ties, at this distance fewer than M units are 
closer to unit i than dM(i) and at least M units are as close as dM(i). Formally, dM(i) > 0 is the 
real number satisfying 
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where 1{·} is the indicator function, which is equal to one if the expression in brackets is true 
and zero otherwise. 
LetJM(i) denote the set of indices for the matches for unit i that are at least as close as theMth 
match: 
( ) ( ){ }idXXWWNliJ MVililM ≤−−=== ,1,...,1  
If there are no ties, the number of elements inJM(i) is M but may be larger. Let the number of 
elements ofJM(i) be denoted by #JM(i). The first estimator that we consider, the simple 
matching estimator, uses the following approach to estimate the pair of potential outcomes: 
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Namely, given that only one potential outcome is observed for each observation i, the 
observed outcome Yi = Yi(0) or Yi(1) represents one potential outcome. The unobserved 
outcome is estimated by averaging the observed outcomes for the observations of the opposite 
treatment group that are chosen as matches for i. 
Using these estimates of the potential outcomes, the simple matching estimator (ATE) is 
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K′M (i) represent a comparable measure in which the square of the number of matches is used 
as the weight. 
The simple matching estimator will be biased in finite samples when the matching is not 
exact. Abadie and Imbens (2002) show that, with k continuous covariates, the estimator will 
have a term corresponding to the matching discrepancies (the difference in covariates between 
matched units and their matches) that will be of the orderOp(N−1/k). In practice, we may 
therefore attempt to remove some of this bias term that remains after matching. 
        Let µw(x) = E[Y (w)|X = x], and let ûw(Xi) be a consistent estimator of µw(xi). A 
regression imputation estimator uses û0(Xi) andû1(Xi) to impute missing values of Yi(0) and 
Yi(1), respectively. 
Finally, we consider a bias-corrected matching estimator where the difference within the 
matches is regression-adjusted for the difference in covariate values: 
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Supposing the regression function µw(x) is given by the nonparametric series estimator of 
Newey (1995),let mMBˆ be the estimated bias term: 
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Abadie and Imbens (2007) propose a bias correction that renders matching estimators N1/2 –
consistent and asymptotically normal: 
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Altonji et a. (2005): Assessing the Importance of selection on unobservables bias 
 
Consider first a Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) growth model with LDC dummy (that we 
call "restricted model" denote by R), were X are growth determinants 
εγα ++= 'XTY ; 
The OLS estimation of the effect of special measures on countries growth performance, have 
a standard omitted variables bias (Wooldridge, 2002): 
)var(
)',cov(
ˆlim 0, T
xTP Rols
γγαα +=
. 
Now, suppose additional individual controls, unobservable for researcher during the 
identification process, but that could potentially influence outcomes and assignment of LDC 
status within the group of discordant countries such that: XxX ~+=     (x are observed). The 
new ols (???) estimate of α will have the following bias: 
)var(
)~,cov(
ˆlim 0, T
XTP extendols γαα += , "extend" denotes the new model. 
The intuition of authors of Altonji et al (2005), is that the ratio between the estimates in 
restricted and extended models,  
)',cov(
)~,cov(
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,
γαα
α
XT
XT
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extendols
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measures how much stronger the selection on unobservables needs to be, relative to 
observables, to explain the entire effect. The ratio shows how strong the covariance between 
the unobserved countries characteristics and identification of LDCs must be, relative to 
covariance between the observed characteristics and the assignment of status treatment, to 
explain the entire growth impact. A large ratio suggests that it is implausible that potential 
unobserved variables bias explains away the entire effect. 
 
We consider two sets of restricted covariates: one with no controls and another with a set of 
growth determinants including initial income, physical capital, and human capital. We also 
consider two sets of extended covariates: one with additional short-term growth determinants 
(inflation, exchange rate, exportation, size of government…) and a second adding to the first, 
some individual control variables related to specific relationships with OECD countries, such 
as colonial past of countries, language23 or commercial interest (availability of natural 
resource rent and openness are used as proxy).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23For some critics, some unobserved characteristics not related to official identification criteria potentially influence LDC membership. 
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Description of core variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Code Original data 
source 
Notes 
Per-capita GDP  gdppc World bank 
Indicators 
(2010) 
 
Human Asset 
Index 
HAI FERDI  
www.ferdi.fr 
Korachais C. (2011). Human Assets 
Index retrospective time series 
Economic 
Vulnerability 
Index 
EVI FERDI  
www.ferdi.fr 
 
Cariolle, J. (2011) "L'indice de 
vulnérabilité économique, élaboration et 
analyse des séries rétrospective de 1975 
à 2008" 
GNI per capita Gnipc UNSTAT  
(2010) 
 
Exports to GDP Export WDI (2010)  
Openness Trade WDI (2010)  
Natural resource 
rent 
Rent Luc Désiré 
Omgba (2007) 
"Oil rents and the tenure of the leaders in 
Africa" Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 
42    
LDC dummy LDC CDP triennial 
report 
 
Ex-post Eligibility Eligibility Author Use of retrospective data (EVI, HAI) and 
GNIpc to estimate the ex-post eligibility 
of countries for LDC identification based 
on 2006's criteria 
Common language 
with OECD 
countries 
comlang Cepii data  
Variable "Common history " 
Former colonies coloecd Cepii data 
Population Pop WDI (2010)  
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Additional variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Variation of 
reserves 
Change in international reserves WEO 
Financial openness Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index Chinn and Ito (2006) 
AF index Aid fragmentation index Authors 
Imports Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI 
Inflation  Inflation rate (CPI, percentage change) WDI 
Gov size General government final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP)  
WDI 
Public Investment Public Investment  IMF-IFS 
Short-term debt Short-term debt (% GDP) WDI 
M2 Money and quasi money ( % of GDP) WDI 
Agri value added Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) WDI 
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General Conclusion 
 
The issue of financing development through foreign capital flows has attracted significant 
attention in policy and academic circles since the 1970s. This gave rise to a highly 
controversial literature about these flows, especially on foreign aid flows or more recently on 
private flows such as FDI and remittances. These flows should be able to finance and support 
the actions of the main economic agents in developing countries, respectively government, 
firms and households. Indeed, foreign aid is mainly oriented to support the government 
budget and finance public investments, while workers' remittances and FDI flow to the private 
sector. Remittances are dedicated to stabilize households' income and consumption, and FDI 
consist in the creation of new capital for local firms.  Given the large volume of these flows, 
many empirical studies became interested to their macroeconomic implications for the 
recipient countries. In addition, if the stakes are at different levels for each flow, the existing 
literature was heavily influenced by the controversies regarding the preconditions and factors 
influencing their effectiveness to promote growth. Moreover, in recent decades, changes in 
global economic and political powers and the emergence of new actors in development 
cooperation have greatly changed the environment of development finance. 
This thesis is concerned with both the evolution in development finance environment and the 
macroeconomic implications of development finance flows for DCs, and their effectiveness to 
promote growth. First, using meta-analysis this thesis investigated the causes of controversial 
findings in the existing literature about the capacity of these flows to promote growth. It 
appears that political and ideological appurtenance as well as authors' methodological and 
econometric choices, determine the quality of reported estimates…The second part of the 
thesis relies on the revolution going on in the aid architecture with the increasing influence of 
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emerging donors and the consequences for aid allocation and recipient countries. The third 
part discusses macroeconomic implications of development finance. 
In the first part, Chapters 1 and 2 showed the importance of the authors' characteristics and 
institutional affiliations in the research process, highlighting the fact that the researcher can be 
influenced in his argument by the environment in which it belongs. These personal factors 
would also define methodological choices made in the empirical analyses. 
Chapter 1 conducted a meta-analysis of the literature of aid effectiveness to test the 
hypothesis that aid is conditionally effective. The results allowed us to establish that if there is 
a publication bias due to authors and editors, empirical evidences still confirm that the policy 
environment determines the effectiveness of aid. In addition, econometric regressions have 
shown the methodological choices responsible of heterogeneous findings. First, the measure 
of aid flows, Official Development assistance (ODA) or Effective development assistance 
(EDA), influences the quality of the analysis. The studies using EDA provide more precise 
picture of disbursed foreign aid. Second, to capture the impact of aid on growth, studies 
should follow the growth model literature and use longer periods of analysis. Third, the 
econometric specifications used for the treatment of endogeneity, as well as the control for 
transmission channels, also matters for the reported results. 
As far as that goes the chapter 2 explains why results vary across Remittance/Growth studies, 
and summarizes the true empirical effect of remittances on growth. The meta-analysis of 
results collected from existing empirical studies reveals that remittances have positive indirect 
effects on growth. Suggesting that the research should focus on channels and mechanisms by 
which remittances affect growth. In the other hand, it appears that like in aid literature, non-
empirical factors related tothe research environment also represent an important issue for the 
quality of empirical evidences reported by authors. 
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The second part of the thesis begins with the analysis of the influence of emerging donors aid 
allocation on government fiscal choices in recipient countries. The starting point argument is 
that emerging donors are encouraging poor policies, lowering standards and increasing the 
debt burden of recipient countries because they do not apply conditionality, in terms 
governance and macroeconomic policies reforms, on their aid. The chapter 3, thus empirically 
documents this argument. Panel data evidences show that even if non-DAC aid allocation is 
generally associated with a change in government borrowing behavior, the increasing 
influence of emerging donors in development assistance does not lead to bad fiscal 
performance in countries welcoming their aid. The results indicate that welcoming emerging 
donors' aid increases the room for manoeuvre of recipient countries. First, evidences do no 
support that non-DAC aid undermines government fiscal effort. Moreover, the presence of 
emerging donors seems to increase the real transfer of resources to recipient governments, 
either directly via imports or indirectly via increases in public expenditure.   
The analysis of the consequences of the increasing influence of emerging donors is extended 
toward the aid allocation of DAC members (traditional donors) in chapter 4.Given the 
importance of political and strategic interests behind development cooperation, this chapter 
analyzed the multilateral and bilateral reactions of DAC members in face of the emergence of 
new donors in development assistance. Several results emerged. Countries where emerging 
donors have a big influence, receive less multilateral aid from DAC members, as if DAC 
multilateral aid were substituted by ODA from emerging donors. However, the bilateral aid 
allocation model shows that DAC donors increase their ODA to maintain their "lead 
donorship" in recipient countries, and so preserve their commercial, political, and strategic 
self-interests. Furthermore, the results suggested that this competition among donors lead to a 
deterioration in the orientation of aid allocation decisions toward recipient's needs. 
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The last part of this thesis revisits the empirical evidence about the influence of development 
finance on developing countries business cycles.  The Chapter 5 examines the incidence of 
foreign aid, workers' remittances and foreign direct investment flows on business cycles in 
developing countries. Our analysis helps to see whether development finance flows increase 
the exposition of developing countries to external shocks. This chapter contributes to the 
existing literature in several dimensions. First, this chapter presented a simple real business 
cycle (RBC) model for developing countries, accounting for the major macroeconomic shocks 
faced by those countries. The predictions of the theoretical framework show that foreign aid, 
FDI and remittances can account for twenty-six percent of output fluctuations in our 
representative developing country. Thus, development finance flows are responsible of an 
important fraction of the instability of output in recipient's country. The interest of this 
chapter relies also in the association of DSGE modeling to panel data analysis. The 
econometric results also reveal that domestic shocks are not the main factor driving business 
cycles fluctuations in DCs. Panel VAR estimations show that internal factors can only explain 
thirty-five percent of the output instability in developing countries.  It also emerges 
from this chapter that while FDI flows are procyclical, foreign aid and remittances appear 
counter-cyclical to recipients' economic fluctuations.   To sum up, this chapter provides 
empirical evidences that the presence of development finance flows offers both opportunities 
and challenges to recipient countries, as they increase their exposition to external shocks. 
 
The last chapter of this thesis provides an impact evaluation of one of the most important 
programs designed for the most vulnerable countries. Chapter 6 investigates whether special 
support measures designed for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have improved their 
macroeconomic vulnerability. This chapter provides an interesting empirical strategy that 
could help to circumvent the problems faced by impact evaluation at the macro level, 
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particularly in terms of the construction of the counterfactual group and the analysis of 
unobservables influencing the treatment process. Our impact analysis revealed that 
membership in LDC category has a significant growth enhancing effect for countries. The 
LDC status is related an average to an economic growth rate gain of 0.5 per cent in the short-
term period following inclusion. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that the least 
developed countries respond better to external shocks and are less vulnerable prior to the 
support measures linked to the LDC status.  
 
Policy implications: 
The evidence shows that quality of the policy environment determines the impact of foreign 
aid on economic growth. This finding supports the claim that the donors' bilateral aid 
allocation should be more biased towards merit and good of economic environment in 
recipient governments. Multilateral agencies are important given that their aid allocation is 
less constrained by donors' self-interests. 
 
The second relevant policy message emerges from both our meta-analysis on remittances and 
our RBC model, and state that remittances do not have a direct positive effect on output. 
Given the fact that only indirect effects are significant, governments should think about 
policies that could enhance the transmission channels on long run growth rate, instead of 
promoting measures that could only increase remittances receipts. Some recent studies argue 
for example about the choice of the appropriate taxation system in the remittance-dependent 
countries. 
 
International development cooperation is in a period of major transition. The system is 
becoming more fragmented with diverse actors, funding sources and delivery modes. 
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Emerging donors, by quietly offering positive alternatives to aid-receiving countries, they are 
introducing competitive pressures into the existing system. They are weakening the 
bargaining position of western donors in respect of aid-receiving countries. Despite the 
political sensitivities about ODA, the DAC and other providers might have a more fruitful 
conversation about the set of official finance flows for development because their competition 
is badly affecting the quality of aid. Reflecting these concerns, in 2007 the United Nations’ 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) launched the Development Cooperation Forum 
(DCF) to promote a more effective international development cooperation. The DCF aims to 
bring together a wide range of stakeholders, including DAC and non-DAC donors, aid-
recipient countries, multilateral institutions, parliamentarians, local governments, and a range 
of civil society and private sector actors. The interest of DCF is to incorporating the views of 
Southern partners in the development cooperation and thus provides an environment that 
allows traditional donors and developing countries to discuss aid allocation issues. 
 
The findings of this thesis militate in favor of such initiative like DCF that will provide 
sufficient incentives for non-DAC donors to engage with other donors and the aid 
architecture. In the other hand, developing countries should be aware of this revolution in aid 
architecture as well as the consequences for them. Thus, they should not just adopt a passive 
willingness to accept whatever aid is offered but should be able to design strategic absorption 
and spending policies that could help them to take full advantage of their new sources of 
funding. Emerging donors' aid allocation is estimated between $11 billion to $41.7 billion per 
year, representing 8 percent and 31 percent of global gross ODA. This thesis has shown that 
the role of emerging donors is not limited to their contribution to the rise of aid received but 
also increases the fiscal room of manoeuvre of recipient governments. Moreover, the presence 
of emerging donors is an insurance against sudden stop in foreign aid that send a positive 
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signal to private sector that fears the potential fiscal pressures following the end of aid surge. 
Thus fiscal authorities in developing countries could manage private sector expectations and 
improve their policies response to aid by avoiding capital flight and higher inflation rates 
through a diversification of aid donors. 
Macroeconomic management in developing countries is a recurrent concern in this thesis. 
Better understanding of macroeconomic vulnerabilities in developing countries should help 
policy makers to manage volatility and mitigate external shocks. Given that the ongoing 
revolution in aid architecture and the development finance flows have significant implications 
for output fluctuations, one could expect also a change in the analysis of developing countries 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Indeed, developing countries appear more integrated and 
synchronized to the rest of the world and thus more vulnerable to external shocks. The thesis 
has shown that the risks associated to development cooperation seem to be more important 
than expected and provides incentives for governments to act policy reforms and 
improvement of governance quality.  
 
Despite the macroeconomic challenges related to external financial flows and doubts about 
usefulness international measures for development, this thesis has also shown how far some 
of these support measures benefit to the less developed countries. This thesis has highlighted 
positive outcomes for LDCs during the last two decades that should comfort industrialized 
countries and international organizations to continue promoting and stimulating development 
in poor countries. 
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